Learning about war and peace in the Great Lakes Region of Africa

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Thesis submitted for degree of Doctor of Philosophy

ABSTRACT

Two thirds of the world's conflicts are in Africa. In particular, the Great Lakes Region (Rwanda, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Uganda and Tanzania), continues to see conflicts which are complex, extreme and seemingly intractable. By exploring the narrative experiences of those most affected by the conflicts in the region, specifically Burundi, DRC and Rwanda (refugees living in camps in North Western Tanzania) the thesis examines to what extent educative processes (holistic formal and informal learning processes) affect the identity construction/shifts that lead people to engage in violent conflict. These educative processes are located within a framework of 'structural levels' of society. These reflect the likely gaps in information acquisition and identity construction between individuals and organisations 'at the top' of society and communities at grassroots levels.

The qualitative methodology adopted gave the necessary flexibility and potential for opportunistic data collection essential in an environment where the unexpected is a daily occurrence. Through focus group discussions, depth interviews and questionnaires, the research identified different information circuits by which people learnt about conflict. In opposition to the common perception that formal schooling effects change, the findings indicated that the primary mechanisms were oral/aural, such as gossip, traditional story telling and radio. Individual and collective identities were constructed through this process and the research identified how identities could be shifted through different formal and informal educative processes - often through indoctrination or coercion.

The thesis indicates how the synergy between educative processes, identity and trust could form the basis for alternative strategies for peace building within a refugee context. Efforts at peace building continue to falter in the region and this illustrates the need to construct a more inclusive peace-making process, taking into account the insights and values of those most affected. This constitutes the main recommendation of the thesis.

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ABBREVIATIONS

ADFL	Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire
AGLI	Africa Great Lakes Initiative
APPGR	All Party Parliamentary Group on Rwanda
BERA	British Educational Research Association
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CD	Compact Disk
CfBT	Centre for British Teachers
CNDD-FDD	Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie-Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
DANIDA	Danish International Development Agency
DRC	Democratic Republic of Congo
EDC	Education Development Centre
EPCPT	European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation
FAB	Forces Armées Burundaises
FDD	Force for the Defence of Democracy
FGD	Focus Group Discussion
FLC	Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front pour la Libération du Congo
FNI	Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes
FNL	Forces for National Liberation
FRODEBU	Front Démocratique de Burundi
HRW	Human Rights Watch
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
ICTR	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia
IDP	Internally Displaced Person

IRC	International Rescue Committee
INEE	Inter-Agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IPA	International Peace Academy
IRIN	Integrated Regional Information Networks
JHA	Journal of Humanitarian Affairs
MHA	Ministry of Home Affairs
MLC	Mouvement de Libération Congolaise
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
OCHA	United Nations - Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs
RCD	Congolese Rally for Democracy (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie)
RCD-ML	Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie -Mouvement de Libération
RFI	Radio France International
RPF	Rwandan Patriotic Front
SIRC	Social Issues Research Centre
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNESCO-IIEP	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation – International Institute for Educational Planning
UNHCR	United Nations High Commission for Refugees
UPRONO	Union Pour le Progrès National
VOA	Voice of America
VSAT	Very Small Aperture Terminal

GLOSSARY

Abashingantahe	The Burundian equivalent of the gacaca Rwandan traditional justice system
BaHutu	A supposedly Bantu ethnic group living in Burundi and Rwanda constituting the majority of the population
BaTutsi	A supposedly Hasimite ethnic group living in Burundi and Rwanda constituting a minority
BaTwa	'Pygmy' ethnic group living in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC constituting approximately one percent of the population of those countries
Banyamulenge	The name given to an ethnic group living in the Mulenge region of DRC
Banyarwandan	People originating from Rwanda
Bourgemestres	Mayors of communes in Rwanda
Communes	A defined area of administrative rule
Development Gateway	The World Bank led knowledge repository for developing nations
Ethnie	The Burundian term for ethnicity or ethnic group
Gacaca	The traditional courts of Rwanda that dispense justice based on community evidence and local solutions
Génocidaires	The name given to those who participated in the genocide in Rwanda in 1994
Great Lakes Region	Countries that border Lake Victoria but for this research, the Great Lakes constitutes Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Uganda and Tanzania

Gendarmarie	The army loyal to the government of Micombero in Burundi
Hima	The tribe from which the Tutsis are alleged to have originated
Hima Empire	A hypothetical empire that Hutu refugees suggest is going to be established by Tutsis through force
Interahamwe	The Hutu rebel army that was considered responsible for the genocide in Rwanda
Ikotanyi	Term used by Hutu respondents for the Rwandan Patriotic Front army
Kabisa	Completely
Mambo Elimu	Education is everything
Milles collines	A thousand hills – the name used for the notorious radio station and hotel in Rwanda
Mwami	Tutsi king of the 14^{th}-18^{th} Centuries
Mzungu	White person
Refoulement	Forcible return of refugees to their country of origin
Regroupement	Forced grouping of Burundi villagers into camps (widely condemned by the international community) by the President of Burundi, Pierre Buyoya
Twende Na Wakati	Let's Go with the Times
Umuganda	Communal labour, a traditional form of obligation of villagers to the community and used in the genocide when the killings were termed *umiganda.*
Urunana	Hand in Hand
Zone Leader	A category of leader in the refugee camps (divided into 'Zones' usually following the letters of the alphabet, for example Camp A has Zones A-E)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This thesis could not have been started or completed without the tremendous support, encouragement and friendship of my supervisors Chris Williams and Eva Gamarnikow. Much of the credit for this thesis should go to them.

I would like to thank particularly the research assistants in the refugee Camps A and B who worked hard in translation and in conducting the focus group discussions with such energy and skill. Particular thanks to Paul, Yvonne, Beatrice, Justine, Ndulu, Germain, Sela and Bomba.

Much appreciation goes to Jean Paul Baribata and Pastor Wilondja who helped so much in translations of the data. To Jean Paul who remains a dear friend, special thanks, as his advice and encouragement have been invaluable.

I would like to thank all the UNICEF, Tanzania staff who assisted me during my data collection especially Rob, Lydia, Penina, Anna and everyone in the two offices in Western Tanzania. The support offered to me without reservation both from staff in UNICEF Dar es Salaam, and the field offices was unprecedented.

My partner Mike Kiernan has been a constant support throughout the writing and completion of this thesis. His patience and advice have sustained me during the whole process.

This research of course would not have been possible without the commitment and participation of the respondents in the research. They were attentive, patient and willing to give time and energy in the belief that something positive would emerge.

Finally I would like to dedicate this work to my dear friend Stephen Mallatratt who sadly died in 2004. His belief in me has been an ongoing source of encouragement.

CHAPTER ONE: LIFE AND CONFLICT IN THE GREAT LAKES – A RATIONALE FOR RESEARCH

1.1 Introduction

> There have been over 9.5 million refugees and hundreds of thousands of people slaughtered [in Sub-Saharan Africa]. If this scale of destruction and fighting was in Europe, then people would be calling it World War III with the entire world rushing to report, provide aid, mediate and otherwise trying to diffuse the situation (Global Issues, 2002).

This report from Global Issues highlights the trauma that millions have suffered and are still suffering in Sub-Saharan Africa, where terrorism, guerrilla warfare, constant uncertainty and displacement are facts of everyday life. Yet the world has still largely ignored these conflicts in Africa. If prevention of conflict and effective long-term reconstruction in regions of conflict is to be achieved it is vital to consider the key mechanisms within communities that might bring about positive change.

The motivation behind this research is presented in this chapter, which introduces some of the contextual factors that influenced my decision to undertake the research. One of the key factors motivating the research arose out of my role as an education officer working with refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in the Great Lakes Region in Africa. My concern regarding the complex inter-relationship of the conflicts in these countries was compounded by the low level of international interest in a situation where over four million people had already died in DRC alone. Peace deals at national and international levels had been brokered but apart from Rwanda where an uneasy stability is maintained, these deals have largely failed to bring lasting peace.

This chapter outlines the main assumptions in the research that:

a) there are various formal and informal educative processes that influence conflict (and therefore peace building);

b) informal educative processes are particularly significant in information transmission that influence conflict;
c) these processes affect identity construction and shifts which in turn can affect the outcome of conflict; and
d) there are different 'structural levels' of society (Smith, 1977) within which the relationship between educative processes, information transmission, identity construction and their influence on conflict are framed.

Educative processes are defined here as both informal and formal learning mechanisms that individuals undergo as part of life's experiences i.e. formal implies institutional and highly structured learning and informal refers to non institutional and unstructured learning. These processes are as Nunan suggests, concerned with learning that promotes change, not just with the receipt of information:

> ...the transmission of information is considered a necessary but not sufficient condition for educative processes to occur. To be termed educative, the process must address changes which occur in individual learners and teachers (Nunan, 1993: 202).

Non-formal learning has been considered and embedded within the context of formal and informal in order to avoid ambiguity between the different terms.

The thesis also examines the effect of these educative processes at different levels of society. It investigates the differences and gaps between individuals 'at the top' of society and communities at grassroots level. To what extent these do these differences and gaps between 'structural levels' influence the outcome of conflict - and therefore as the flip side to conflict – the potential for peace building?

1.2 The Context

At global and geo-political levels, peace negotiations take place, are broken or revised often without reflecting initiatives and experiences that have proven to be successful in the promotion of peace at the micro-level. Communities are the most affected, and women and children are typically the first to flee, constituting as they do, nearly seventy five percent of refugees. Yet the community is largely ignored in the decision making processes of either conflict preparation or peace negotiations. Participatory approaches are often used in other areas of development activity, but less so in conflict situations where everything takes place at a heightened pace. The Great Lakes summit held in Dar es Salaam in November 2004 is a case in point. Millions of dollars were spent[1] to bring together 11 heads of state from Africa and hundreds of donor representatives from all over the world to resolve the eight year conflict in the Great Lakes region. The following week, Rwanda invaded the Democratic Republic of Congo for the third time, having committed itself to regional peace initiatives the previous week. This makes one question the efficacy of high level peace negotiations in isolation from the reality on the ground and is one of the reasons why the grassroots level of society was selected for the research focus.

1.2.1 *The conflicts*

Despite the fact that two thirds of all global conflicts have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa there is little international recognition of the nature of the conflicts in Africa. They are regarded primarily as 'ethnic' or 'tribal' by many Western nations, which imply that states should be left alone to deal with their internal crises. In contrast, the comprehensive involvement of Western nations in Kosovo, Yugoslavia, highlighted the disparity of interest shown by the West towards so called 'ethnic' wars which were on their doorstep. With the

[1] Personal interview with a representative from one of the donors funding the summit

conflicts in Africa being a continent away they could dismiss the need for intervention with impunity (EPCP, 1999).

This is particularly the case in DRC where more than four million people have died either directly or indirectly because of the civil wars raging in the country since 1996. Yet the international community has largely ignored the conflicts not only in DRC but also in the rest of the Great Lakes Region. Rwanda has invaded DRC at least twice with limited response from the international community. Reports provided by email from refugee colleagues also suggest that people are leaving Rwanda on a daily basis, scared for their lives. More than three hundred thousand people have been killed in the civil war in Burundi, and despite the ceasefire signed in May 2005 with the last remaining rebel group the Forces for National Liberation (FNL), sporadic fighting in the capital Bujumbura, continues (time of writing December 2005).

Not only has the North largely ignored the conflicts between and within African states, but it has also failed to address the mechanisms by which conflicts can be mitigated or resolved on the ground. It is hoped that through this research, alternative mechanisms for conflict mitigation and resolution may be identified.

The consequences of the conflicts in the Great Lakes on the lives of those who have experienced it first hand and their subsequent loss of independence and dignity is explored below in a brief overview of life in the refugee camps featured in this research.

1.2.2 *The consequences of conflict – refugees in North Western Tanzania*

As the Tanzanian Government places mounting pressure on the refugees from Burundi and DRC to return home, life in the refugee camps of Western Tanzania has become increasingly harsh. Markets in most of the Burundian and some of the Congolese camps have been closed, supposedly as a security measure but refugees suggest that it is to put further pressure on them to leave.

The narratives described in Chapter Six indicate the depth of negative feeling of refugees in the camps which they liken to a 'prison' or being 'trapped in a cage'. This perception of imprisonment has been compounded by the increased restriction of movement enforced by the Tanzanian authorities. The four kilometre 'zones' around the camps, instituted by the government, have been strictly enforced and refugees outside these zones (without written permission) are arrested. The increased harassment and insurgencies by rebel groups from across the borders have created an environment in the camps which is far from a situation of peace or even safe haven. Many said they would return to Burundi 'to die in my own country rather than like dogs here.' The culture of dependency that pervades the camps is aggravated by the loss of traditional roles and limited access to employment. This has resulted in large numbers of youth, particularly males, remaining idle, often leading to drunkenness and abuses of various kinds.

Tanzania has traditionally accommodated large numbers of refugees in the past, and currently hosts one of the largest refugee populations in the world, but the strains on the economy and environment has led to increasing tensions, reflected in the attitudes of the refugees quoted above. The three hundred and fifty thousand plus refugees (time of writing December 2005) live in thirteen camps in the North Western part of Tanzania (see Annex I for maps of the camps and impacted areas). The Congolese are in three camps and the Burundians in nine, with approximately two thousand people of mixed nationality and mixed marriage (Hutu and Tutsi) living in Camp E. A few Rwandans and Congolese live in Camp D, which is a transit centre for asylum seekers. The five hundred thousand Rwandan refugees who crossed the border in 1994 after the genocide were forcibly returned in 1996, and the Tanzanian Government has consistently *refouled* (forcibly returned) any remaining Rwandans who have sought asylum.

All refugees are almost entirely dependent on external assistance as the increasingly belligerent stance of the Tanzanian government precludes self-reliance and integration (EC, 2004). This has stripped them of much of their independence and dignity, and as indicated above has led to increasingly

negative perceptions held by the majority of refugees towards life in the camps.

The camps included in the research were Camp A, Camp B, Camp C and Camp D. Although Camp A has another camp adjoining it from where the sample groups were also selected, for the purposes of this research refugees from both camps were interviewed jointly as representative samples of Burundian refugees who had arrived in Tanzania at different times since 1993. Camp C was used for the training of research assistants to interview Rwandan respondents and during this time a small number of Rwandan respondents were found, but the majority of Rwandan respondents came from the transit camp, Camp D.

Camp A houses approximately fifty-seven thousand refugees and was initially a 'semi-permanent settlement' for Burundian refugees who arrived in 1993. At that time, there were less than eight thousand refugees and a greater degree of liberality towards the refugee population was in evidence as refugees were provided with plots of land to grow vegetables and supplement their food ration.

The adjacent camp (Camp M), bordering Camp A was opened initially as an extension for additional refugees who arrived in 1996. Its status changed to a fully independent camp in 1997 and currently houses over thirty-five thousand refugees. The Congolese Camp B was opened in 1998 and houses approximately forty-six thousand refugees, the remainder of the Congolese are housed eighty kilometres away in two other camps.

Camp C in N. district, close to both the Rwandan and Burundi border, was also originally a semi-permanent settlement, housing only seven thousand Burundian refugees until the influx in 1996-7 resulted in the expansion of the camp to over one hundred thousand. Camp D also in N. where the Rwandan respondents were interviewed, housed only fifty-six refugees at the time of writing (March 2005), although as it is a transit centre the number fluctuates according to the number of asylum seekers.

I first started working in the refugee camps in 1994 in the Burundian camp of Camp A. As the education co-ordinator for Concern Worldwide (from 1994-1996) I assisted the refugees to establish their first primary school in the camp, which was built with a grass roof and bamboo walls, but sufficient to start basic teaching using the curriculum from Burundi. Although many permanent structures have been built since this time, these grass structures were still in use when I returned in 2004, although some had deteriorated to an extent where they looked unusable. Teachers stated however that they were still holding classes even under these appalling conditions (see photo below taken in March 2005 of a classroom in Camp A).

Photograph 1.1: School in Camp A

Refugee housing is of a similar construction as the school seen on the left, although the more 'wealthy' build mud brick rather than grass huts. All are packed tightly together and organised into 'blocks' and 'streets'. This crowding of homes is an anathema to refugees from rural areas where usually only family groups live in such close proximity, and huts would typically be surrounded by large plots of land. While the difficulties of camp life – the poor diet, the reliance and dependence on external aid, overcrowding – cannot be ignored there are positive aspects, such as free health care and primary education, which are compensations that should be recognised. In some cases the relatively high standard of service provision sometimes outstrips that of the neighbouring Tanzanian villages, causing tension between Tanzanian villagers and refugees.

Working in this environment for five years (1994-1999), with teachers and children from a variety of backgrounds, provided me with considerable insights into the lives of those in exile, and into the dynamics of education provision for people affected by conflict. This experience was one of the primary motivations behind my research.

1.2.3 *The motivation for the research*

In my role as education co-ordinator for both Concern Worldwide (1994-1996), and UNICEF (from 1996-2000), I worked among thousands of refugees who consistently reported that they had lost dignity and self-esteem by the denial of basic freedoms and reliance on external aid. They reported that they were the victims of both the initiation of wars and of the failed peace deals, excluded as they were from any consultative processes. My experiences working with those in exile raised many questions about the mediation of education in relation to the nature of conflict and the potential for peace building.

This was particularly so during my four years as an education officer working with UNICEF, as the Emergency Education Co-ordinator when the question was frequently raised as to why national and international peace initiatives took so long to reach a conclusion, if indeed they succeeded. How to effect peaceful transformation was a significant issue in organisations where there was increasing pressure within the education sector to initiate peace education programmes. It was suggested that such programmes would help mitigate conflict and promote peace amongst young people and their communities. In my capacity as education co-ordinator I was responsible for overseeing the development of a refugee peace education programme including preparing training and support materials for schools and communities. However after some years of development of the school based programme – which had a limited degree of success – I started to question whether the mechanism of using school as a change agent was really appropriate and effective. I wanted to examine the role other educative processes had to play in influencing

conflict. When my contract with UNICEF was completed I took the opportunity to conduct further research in this field not only as a doctoral student but also by undertaking a number of consultancies related to the topic.

While recognising my stance as 'outsider' i.e. a 'white Western woman', researching in a black African culture; the fact that I had already spent many years working with the people I was to interview, and my familiarity with the culture, mitigated what Owens refers to as the 'indignity' of representing others (Owens, 1990). The reactions to my research were extremely positive and people were anxious to give their opinions not just on issues of conflict. They saw the interviews as an opportunity to air grievances in general. They complained that they were rarely 'listened to'. Therefore rather than accepting that there was indignity in representing others, I found that the research presented a rare opportunity for the voiceless to be heard.

The research pays particular reference to Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo as these countries are critically interlinked in terms of the nature and causes of their conflicts (see Chapter Two for the cultural context of the research). They were also countries where I had a personal connection in terms of the work I had undertaken with the refugees. The groups selected for the research are Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan refugees residing in refugee camps in North West Tanzania (see Annex I). Unfortunately few Rwandan refugees were willing to participate in the research as they were in hiding and fearful of being forcibly returned to Rwanda. Therefore the data collected from this group were limited.

Apart from the obvious security concerns, one of the primary reasons for using the refugee camps as the sample population was the fact that not only do refugees have a particular experience of the conflicts within their countries, (both before and after exile), they also have the potential to make a great impact on any future peaceful reconstruction of their country. While their experiences and narratives of the conflicts are in many ways retrospective, they have witnessed much of the conflict before they fled and retain links to their own countries while still in exile. These links and the information they

receive about the situation in their countries affect their decisions to repatriate and therefore the potential for post-conflict peace building in their country.

By analysing the narratives of refugees, it is possible to begin to appreciate in a 'second-hand' way, the nature of the conflicts in which they were embroiled. This includes examining how messages of hatred and violence are promoted most effectively. Are they sent through the traditional healer, the radio or a combination of different conduits? Can you replace negative messages with positive ones through the same conduits? How much influence does a schoolteacher have, relative to other key members of the society? The research addresses these and other issues, to try and reveal instrumental methods of communication and circuits of information that affect identity construction and shifts within the context of refugee societies in Tanzania. By doing so it is suggested that some effective conduits for peace-building strategies in this context might be identified.

Information in this context refers to information that the respondents received (both prior and subsequent to their flight from their home country) and relates to number of questions that were asked of respondents concerning their knowledge and information acquisition before, during and after the conflict. These included:

a) What respondents knew about the history of the conflict – where and how it started and who did that information come from;
b) What had respondents learnt more recently about the preparation or planning for the conflict and how did they access this information a) at home and b) in the camp;
c) When obtaining information from different sources, whose information did respondents trust and why?; and
d) How respondents accessed information from powerful people and whether mediators between the powerful and the 'ordinary' people were used. (see Annex V for the full text of the topic guide used in the data collection which contains all these questions and more).

1.2.4 *The research*

The research examines the role of formal and informal educative processes and information acquisition that occur at different 'structural levels' of society. Formal educative processes refer to the institutional bases for learning which only a number of people are engaged in, while informal educative processes refer to the life experiences that all people undergo. These classifications are taken from those presented by the European Commission, and are outlined fully in Chapter 3.1 (pp. 82-83). These reflect similar definitions and perceptions of informal education from a number of authors (Avenstrup and Swarts, 1999; Bryceson, 1999; Bush and Salterelli, 2000; McGrath and King,1995; Ziderman, 1997).

Non-formal educative processes are not addressed separately in this research. These processes, (which are loosely based around institutions and usually teacher/tutor centred, but often adopting more flexible and innovative learning styles) are embedded in and analysed as part of the above categorisation of formal and informal educative processes in order to avoid ambiguity within the research setting, where there is considerable overlap between non-formal and informal processes.

The research investigates which educative processes are perceived as most significant and why. The perceptions and narratives of the grassroots communities - who are typically the main victims of conflict - are central to the investigation of the gap between those with influence and those without i.e. the gap between the different 'structural levels' of society. It is necessary to examine this gap between the national and community levels of society to determine whether the acquisition of information concerning conflict, differs at different levels and thereby influences conflict. The grassroots level was selected as the focus of the research primarily because it is under-researched in terms of investigation into the influences of conflict and the potential for peace building.

There is often conjecture within the literature that access to information leading to informed knowledge and critical thinking is more limited the lower down the structural ladder one goes, and therefore the potential for manipulation is more likely. For example, within much of the literature underpinning education for conflict resolution, there is a suggestion that education can mitigate manipulation from malign sources (Arnhold et al, 1998; Boyden and Ryder 1996; Nicolai, 2003; Sinclair, 2002). However, there are many examples of education systems which belie this. For example in Nazi Germany, the education system served to inculcate the messages of the Nazi regime through systematic methods of indoctrination. From textbooks to pedagogy

> ...the Hitler regime articulated anti-semitism across the curriculum as a central element to the understanding of an educated person (Wegner, 2002: 2-3).

The legitimisation of the 'other' as enemy through education was a powerful means of indoctrination of age-old prejudices. In this way the access to certain types of information via education was controlled by the Nazi regime, the 'gatekeeper' of information was the government. In contrast, in oral societies, such as those where the respondents originated, the 'gatekeepers' tended to be the oral transmitters i.e. the parents, elders, respected members of the community, who were endowed with 'wisdom' and therefore listened to.

For example, in Rwanda it was not only the inculcation of anti-Tutsi propaganda through schooling, but also the *lack* of education of many of the rural population, that was considered a factor that made it easier for the propaganda machine of the Hutu extremists to succeed in fuelling the genocide in 1994 (Obura, 2003). There is a supposition that literate or educated communities are more competent to judge the merits of one type of information over another merely because they have received an education. However, information transmission based on oral transmission from non-literate communities is typically considered less valid than information from literate sources; even though it may often be more powerful.

In order to determine whether these assertions regarding the role of education as a benign force are correct, it is necessary to investigate the role of educative processes within their sphere of influence over conflict. Only then, can the potential for effective change be identified, and the role of educative processes in conflict transformation and peace building, be recognised. This would then indicate how different educative processes could be used as bridge building mechanisms between different 'structural levels' of society.

In order to identify the most effective conduits for peace, a number of assumptions were made and research questions identified, which are outlined below (cf: 10.2.-10.3 pp.262-266 to see how these were addressed by the research).

1.3 Research assumptions

- There are various educative processes (formal and informal) that affect information acquisition at different 'structural levels', and these influence identity construction and shifts. They in turn affect the outcome of conflict.
- Informal educative processes have a particularly critical role to play in identity construction and shifts which affect the outcome of conflict.
- The synergy between educative processes, information transmission and identity within different 'structural levels' is crucial to determine the most effective conduits to promote peace.

1.4 Research Questions

From the assumptions mentioned above, the following research questions focus on a central enquiry:

What factors in different educative processes affect information transmission and identity at different 'structural levels' and how do these influence the outcome of conflict?

Educative Processes

- *What types of formal and informal educative processes exist?*
- *Which of these are perceived by respondents as the most significant in the transmission of information in their countries?*
- *What factors within the most significant educative processes make them so?*
- *How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts?*
- *Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence conflict?*

Identity

- *Is identity as significant a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts as the literature suggests?*
- *How does identity construction and shifts in identity affect the outcome of conflict?*

NB: In order not to pre-empt the responses on this issue of identity, no direct questions were asked of respondents in the interview schedules and topic guides developed for focus group discussions. This was for two reasons, a) to ensure that respondents were not led into prioritising identity as the key issue in conflict development and b) to determine whether identity was in reality such a significant factor in conflict development as has been presented in much of the literature.

'Structural levels'

- *Do the 'structural levels' identified in the Model B (see below) reflect the reality on the ground?*
- *Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to exist?*
- *How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups)*
- *Is there a gap between the levels and if so what form does it take?*

Conflict

- *What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people's perceptions of the conflict?*
- *How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in their country might be resolved?*
- *How might educative processes, used to learn about conflict, be transformed into peace building mechanisms?*

NB: Conflict here is seen in the light of other processes that affect its outcome. It is not the primary feature of the research to identify causalities of conflict in general, but to highlight issues relating to conflict as perceived retrospectively through the narratives of the respondents.

1.5 Diagrammatic Models

My original research proposal highlighted the gaps between the top and bottom levels of conflict ridden societies in terms of how peace negotiations might be brokered at the 'top' (e.g. UN peace-keeping) and broken at the 'bottom'. It is at this level where the concerned people actually participate in, and suffer the consequence of, the conflict. The proposal suggested that peace agreements were typically made at only the highest level, and as a result they were rarely respected at the grass-roots level.

Through reflection and discussion my original proposal was adapted using a model that Lederach presents as a way of viewing peace building approaches. It is presented below and the adaptation forms the basis for the diagrammatic models presented in 1.5.1-2.

Lederach's model shown below emphasises leaders at different levels as the most significant actors in the process of peace negotiation. In an attempt to broaden the focus, I adapted the model and introduced a wider range of actors – alongside leaders - at the different hierarchical levels found in East Africa and refugee camps. The adapted models shown in section 1.5.1-2 illustrate the

potential for the gaps in educative processes between and among the different levels to influence the likelihood of conflict.

Figure I.1: Lederach's model of peace negotiation



(Lederach, 1997 in Miall et al, 1999: 18)

The models presented in 1.5.1-2 have arisen out of my experience as a practitioner and personal recognition of the different socio-economic hierarchies that operate within East Africa. Similar hierarchies have been recognised for example in literature on the Rwandan genocide which acknowledges both the vertical and horizontal relationships between different societal groups (Mamdani, 2001; Colletta and Cullen, 2000). Mamdani for example suggests that although during the reign of King Rwabugiri in Rwanda, power was increasingly centralised, the country '...was administered through a threefold hierarchy, running from province to district to hill' (Mamdani, 2001: 68). This form of hierarchy still exists and corresponds largely to the vertical levels of one, two and three identified in Models B and C below. According to Colletta and Cullen, these 'vertical' relationships were reinforced by the conflict, when the 'horizontal' relationships (relationships

within a particular level) such as '...exchange, mutual assistance, collective action, trust, and protection of the vulnerable...' were all but destroyed and '...vertical relations were reinforced...' (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 45).

Consequently the models that are outlined in 1.5.1-2 function in a number of ways:

a) As a description of the hierarchies recognised in East Africa (and refugee camps)
b) As a guide to the investigation of perceived power relations in relation to conflict, and the potential of the differentials in these relations, both between and among different structural levels, to influence conflict and/or peace (as indicated in Chapter Eight).
c) As a site of explanation of the context within which, information, educative processes and identity can be framed.

The models represent a visual interpretation of how certain types of educative processes might lead to information acquisition and identity construction and shifts that might influence conflict (Model A) and how these are located within what are defined as 'structural levels' of refugee camps and recognised in East Africa (Models B and C). The suggestion is that there is a substantial gap between the type of information acquired and utilised at the higher level and that utilised at the grass roots level. This in turn influences the identity construction and shifts that may influence conflict and therefore peace. This is not to suggest that if the gaps were removed there would be no conflict but that mitigation of conflict might be easier to manage.

1.5.1 *Illustrative model of how educative processes might affect information acquisition leading to identity construction and shifts that influence conflict*

Model A below outlines loosely what is meant by the term educative processes (as indicated in the outer circle). They are defined as coming under the two broad concepts of formal (institutional and highly structured), and informal

(non institutional and unstructured) educative or learning processes. The term educative was selected in order to avoid the formal institutional connotations that load the term 'education'.



Model A: How educative processes might affect information acquisition leading to identity construction and shifts that influences conflict

The second circle of the model aims to show how such educative processes contribute to information acquisition, in terms of creation, transmission and utilisation. As mentioned in Section 1.2.3 (p. 23) the thesis is concerned particularly with information relating to the conflicts as experienced by the respondents, how they received information and transmitted it to others. This indicates how the information acquired by community members might be influenced by different educative processes. These could be dependent on a variety of factors such as age, status and gender that affect their identity and relationship to the source of information.

The third circle illustrates how educative processes and the type of information they generate affect identity construction and shifts, both individually and collectively. The identities that are constructed, whether positive or negative, influence the outcome of conflict and therefore peace. Here the suggestion is that 'positive identity' construction whether on an individual or collective level, implies the adoption of an identity that as Davies suggests, acknowledges 'ambiguity, complexity and hybridity within an individual self, and similarly the avoidance of stereotypes portrayals of 'the other' (Davies, 2004: 82) In contrast, 'negative identity' construction implies either adoption of or coercion into an identity that supports vengeful, mono-ethnic/religious viewpoints, that discourages hybridity and tolerance of 'the other'.

The inner circle reflects the potential influences of information acquisition and identity construction/shifts on conflict, which are received through different educative processes. The representation of identity based, localised or national conflicts is provided as an example not as an exhaustive list. Similarly there are other levels of peace building beyond the ones presented as examples in the model.

This model highlights the first two assumptions of the research, which suggest that various educative processes – in particular informal educative processes – affect information acquisition likely to affect identity construction/shifts which influence conflict or peace.

1.5.2 *Graphic representations of possible inter-relationships between 'structural levels' and educative processes (Models B and C)*

The two models below aim to show how possible 'structural levels' both of East Africa and refugee camps (Models B and C respectively) inter-relate with educative processes. This reflects the third assumption of the thesis (cf 1.3 p. 26) that the synergy between educative processes, information and identity is located within a framework of 'structural levels'. The research has largely confirmed the existence of these 'structural levels' and respondents identified

these through a process of social mapping (explained in Chapter Five and reflected in the findings in Chapter Eight). The original Model B has therefore been revised to accommodate some of the perceptions of the respondents towards 'structural levels' and reflects the proximity of social groups to the source of information. This was revised further (Model E) and is presented as part of the findings in Chapter Eight.

These models reflect the potential and perceived gaps between different levels in terms of both information acquisition and influence i.e. power to affect change. They also signal how these gaps might influence conflict and/or peace.

Model B: Possible 'structural levels' in East Africa



Model B shown above represents the wider picture of hierarchies in East Africa. The right hand side arrow of the framework indicates the variety of

educative processes that might be experienced at different levels, e.g. military training at Level Four and community theatre at Level One. The assumption is that these are some of the forms of educative processes, but it recognises that they are provisional and non-exclusive. On the right-hand-side of the model, examples are provided of possible levels of information acquisition, identity construction/coercion/shift and the type of conflict that may be common to each level and their equivalent peace mechanisms but recognises that these may also be found in one or all of the levels. The colours at the right and below this model relate to those found in Model A and represent Educative Processes, Information, Identity and Conflict/Peace.

There is recognition that within these structural levels, identity construction and shift (sometimes through coercion or indoctrination) can occur at any level. However, it is suggested that more powerful members of a particular society are better able to 'coerce' others into a shift of identity than those who are the least powerful. For example, a child soldier undergoes an identity shift when he/she is forcibly recruited, but the process of recruiting the child is undertaken by influential military leaders (albeit often informal leaders).

Only three structural levels are indicated in the model The assumption is that Levels Two and Three are sufficiently close that the educative processes can be combined. There is no significance in the shape of the pyramid, which has been adapted from Lederach's triangle to allow for a wider representation of groups to be included.

Model C below (derived from Model B) represents Camp level, District level and National level, as the three levels that I perceived reflected refugee hierarchies. These were later confirmed by the respondents, but revised again according to the findings as outlined in Model D (p. 208).

Model C: 'Structural levels' identified in the camps



Although the 'Camp' level represents the refugee population, similar 'political' hierarchies (indicated in Model B of the wider East African context) also exist. These however are 'hidden' within the overall administrative structures of the camps and their authorities. The hierarchies relate not only to the traditional powerbases in existence in their villages of origin, but also to their hierarchical relationships with the implementing agencies and camp management. New power bases arising out of refugee camp life often subsumed traditional authority structures.

The 'District' level represents the position at which the various agencies and governmental organisations operate to run the camp and its infrastructure. Most agencies are based at the district headquarters. This level perhaps has the most authority in the camp and is the conduit for information from national level to camp level. These represent the information passed in a variety of ways by the agencies working in the camps with the refugees. The 'National' level refers to the national and international organisations and government agencies with responsibility for and authority over the refugee camps at policymaking level.

The groups identified within each structural level were provisional and have been confirmed and revised further during fieldwork (and are reflected in Chapter Eight). In addition, as the arrow running horizontally in Model B indicates, the relationship in terms of educative processes and information transmission is considered from a horizontal as well as vertical perspective. The provisional model anticipated that considerable information would be passed between groups within a particular level, which may be more significant than information that is vertically transmitted. The potential for power differentials between the different groups within the horizontal levels is also expected to highlight where the most effective mechanisms for information transmission lies.

Whether within the camp or within their home context, these different power relations were frequently referred to by the respondents. The differences were often associated with the gap perceived between 'educated people' and 'ordinary people', i.e. people who had power and those who did not (cf: 7.2.1 pp. 191-195). As this statement by a Burundian commercial worker illustrates:

> The ordinary people have no problem. Those big bellied are the cause of our misfortune. Without them there would be development among the people.

1.6 Expected outcomes of the research

Any research hopes to have outcomes that are productive and useful. This research emphasises the necessity for greater international attention to situations of conflict in Africa and to the mechanisms by which prevention and resolution are best approached. Arising from findings of the research there are certain key outcomes which are applicable to a refugee camp context in the Great Lakes. These are outlined below.

1.6.1 *Increased understanding:*

Increased understanding of issues relating to education and conflict within academic and international circles might be enhanced by the focus on the interrelationship of the following areas:

a) The examination of the critical nature of the relationship between educative processes, information acquisition, identity and conflict may determine how this dynamic affects the way in which the conflict is played out (this is covered in Chapters Ten and Eleven). How are certain types of information presented to individuals within society, which are then internalised to influence country level violence? Conflict in this context is a national and societal action, where elites and powerful individuals might manipulate members of a community to commit acts of violence that under normal circumstances would be inconceivable.
b) Understanding how different societal levels view a conflict and respond to it (as seen in Chapter Eight), is critical in identifying potential information gaps, which in turn may influence conflict and/or peace.

1.6.2 *Identification of alternative mechanisms for peace building:*

Some alternative mechanisms for information transmission have been identified in the research as indicators of potential conduits for peace building. These are explored in detail in Chapter Ten. Formal education is not necessarily the most significant mechanism for transmission of information. However, many educators perceive formal education as an effective change agent for young people. As a result, peace building programmes are frequently located in schools. This is despite the gap between the knowledge that community members utilise, (and base their behaviour and practices upon) and the knowledge that schools promote. Some organisations have recognised that

a school-based approach is not necessarily the most successful means to affect change and are seeking alternatives. The recommendations outlined in the final chapter try to complement these with some alternative approaches to peace building which are appropriate in a refugee or similar context.

1.6.3 *Benefit to practitioners:*

Education practitioners working or living in refugee or similar settings in the South may benefit from the review of how information can be transmitted more effectively through formal and informal mechanisms and how education institutions can become involved in community dialogues and partnerships.

Those engaged in peace building programmes and peace educators in refugee or similar contexts may benefit on a longer-term basis, as again they need to examine the most effective mechanisms for information transmission at different levels to ensure that peace initiatives are sustained.

Academic Researchers working within a refugee or similar context might benefit in the timely examination of a topic of research that to date has received limited academic attention. They may also benefit from the data collection methods utilised e.g. the development and use of 'social maps' and training of research assistants for interviewing purposes.

1.6.4 *Contribution of the research to the body of knowledge:*

Very little substantive research has been undertaken on informal educative processes that affect information transmission and identity construction/shifts that influence conflict. Even the investigation of how formal education impacts on conflict is a relatively new field of study, although Davies draws attention to many aspects of this issue (Davies, 2003). There is even less research or documentation that examines both formal and informal mechanisms to determine where the most effective strategies for peace building should be placed within the different 'structural levels'.

The individual arenas of education, information and identity have substantial literature behind them, but when the interrelationship of all elements is examined, the literature is scarce. In addition, while many practitioners may understand how effective information transmission strategies can be utilised particularly at grass roots level either on an informal or formal basis; this area has not been well documented beyond the agency or practitioner arena.

Therefore this research will contribute and further existing knowledge and research regarding the role of informal educative processes and oral transmission of information for use as mechanisms for peace building.

1.7 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is divided into ten chapters which present the background and context of the research (Chapters One-Two), the literature that contributed to it (Chapters Three-Four), the methodology and research design (Chapter Five) and the findings, analysis and conclusion emerging from the data collection (Chapters Six-Ten). These are outlined in brief below.

Chapters One and Two provide the reader with a background to the thesis and the context within which the research is set. The first chapter presents the rationale for the thesis, why the research is being undertaken and what the outcome of the research would be. It also sets out the context of the refugee camps where the research is located. The diagrammatic models presented in this chapter illustrate the possible inter-relationship between educative processes, information acquisition and identity and their influence on conflict. This is presented within a framework of 'structural levels' found within an East African and refugee context. The second chapter focuses on some of the historical developments leading up to the present situation in each of the three countries under study and other contributing factors considered by various authors to have affected conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and in Africa.

Chapters Three and Four present a review of the literature that is particularly relevant to the research context which reflect the key areas of the research i.e. a) educative processes and its impact on information acquisition and b) identity construction and shifts. The review does not aim to cover all the available literature on each of these components but highlights recent and relevant literature in an attempt to identify the key contributions and gaps in relation to educative processes, information acquisition and identity and the influence of these on conflict. It introduces the concept that better synergy between informal and formal educative processes could present alternative mechanisms for community peace building strategies. The review of literature on educative processes focuses primarily on formal and informal educative processes and their relationship with conflict. The fourth chapter explores some key identity theories and investigates the way identity is constructed, and can shift through changes either in context, or through coercion or indoctrination. It also examines some of the relationships between identity and conflict.

Chapter Five presents the methodology of the research and the issues related to its design and implementation, as well as the process by which the data were analysed. It reflects on the methodology of qualitative research and the need for a reflexivity of response. The sample groups were selected from refugees from Rwanda, Burundi, and DRC primarily for security reasons and ease of access. The different groups came from a cross section of refugee society and were largely self-selected. As I was unable to speak Kirundi and spoke limited Kiswahili, research assistants were selected and trained to conduct the interviews on my behalf. During these training workshops on interviewing skills (see Annex II) the topic guides for the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) were also developed (see Annex III). The prime method of data collection was through FGDs and individual depth interviews. Some of the constraints experienced during the process of data collection are explored including the difficult research conditions. The chapter concludes with an outline of the ethical framework used and some of the ethical issues concerning the context of the research.

Chapters Six-Ten present the findings, analyses and conclusions to the thesis. The first chapter frames the context in which the research data were collected. It highlights some of the perceptions and narratives of the refugees; their stories and experiences of conflict and of life in exile. It also examines their notions of how peace might be built. Chapter Seven aims to give the reader an insight into the refugee perceptions of how educative processes have affected information transmission on conflict. The chapter considers the paradoxical role of formal educative processes through 'educated people' as well as examining the various informal mechanisms such as the oral tradition, rumour and radio – thus following the framework of the literature review. Chapter Eight looks at the different 'structural levels' identified and their influence on the conflicts. Different power groups were identified and the relationship of the powerful to conflict. Chapter Nine presents a visual explanation of the critical issues of educative processes, trust and identity, and how the synergy between these influences conflict and/or peace. The final chapter examines how the research questions have been addressed and the impact the research may have for refugee or similar contexts in finding mechanisms for peace building.

1.8 Conclusion

Peace agreements are often brokered at the highest level, but rarely account for the dissatisfaction at grassroots level. This dissonance was one of the motivating factors that initiated my research. This chapter presented the rationale and motivation behind this research, which was to outline how formal and informal educative processes might affect information acquisition contributing to identity construction/shifts and how these may influence conflict.

The research examines the perceptions and narratives of respondents from Burundi, DRC and Rwanda - currently exiled as refugees in Tanzania. The consequences of the civil wars in these countries for the respondents were

highlighted in this chapter, where the reliance on food aid and dependency on outside agencies have stripped the refugees of dignity and independence.

The provisional diagrammatic models presented in section 1.5 illustrate the synergy between educative processes, information transmission and identity. Hopefully the identification of this synergy may promote greater understanding of the nature of conflict in the Great Lakes and (within refugee contexts) might benefit practitioners working in this field.

Identifying effective mechanisms for peace building is notoriously difficult. As the next chapter confirms, the nature of conflict is extremely complex. By presenting an overview of the wars affecting the Great Lakes region, the following chapter provides an opportunity to reflect on the key issues that different authors suggest have contributed to these conflicts.

CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND TO THE CONFLICTS IN THE GREAT LAKES REGION

2.1 Introduction

One of the motivating factors for my research has been my past and present involvement as both practitioner and researcher in the Great Lakes region of Africa (which for the purposes of this study, comprise the countries indicated in Figure 2.1 below). These countries have a unique interrelationship in terms of the role each has played in the civil wars that have existed in their neighbouring countries, as well as the ongoing ethnic tensions that have characterised the exacerbation of violence within them. As one local Tanzanian journalist suggested:

> …conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are characterized by a complex interaction between localized rebellion, a clash of interests among countries in the region, and a lack of will on the part of the international community to avert the crisis (Lyimo, 2004).

Figure 2.1: Map of Great Lakes Region[2]

[2] (BBC, 2004a)

As I have worked closely with refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, the focus of the research is on these three countries. The map of the Great Lakes Region in Figure 2.1 above includes Uganda and Tanzania as part of the Great Lakes Region as they have had considerable involvement in the conflicts and peace brokerage in the region.

While the solution to the conflicts in the Great Lakes region should be seen from a regional perspective, it is important to consider some of the historical aspects of the three countries under study in order to see the connections more clearly. This chapter traces some of the chronological developments leading up to the present situation in each of the three countries, before focussing on some of the factors - such as identity - that have been attributed by different authors to the development of conflicts in the Great Lakes Region and in Africa.

Identity, whether this is ethnic identity or socio-identity (a broad definition of identity which encompasses ethnic, religious, social identity) is presented by some authors as one of the most critical factors in the Great Lakes conflicts. In Burundi and DRC, as well as the Rwandan genocide, identity issues are presented by many as the core factor in the historical interplay between these three countries. Certainly it can be said that much of what happened before, during and after the genocide in Rwanda has had profound effects on both Burundi and the DRC.

The conflicts in the Great Lakes Region are extremely complex, and a single account is not sufficient to cover the multiplicity of historical, political and economic factors behind such complexity. Therefore, it is not the purpose of this thesis to present a definitive account of the conflicts in the region, but to present an overview of each of the conflicts. The accounts below are designed only as snapshots in order to a) provide a means of identifying some of the critical factors that influence conflict and therefore peace building and b) to give readers an insight into the perceptions from different authors on the conflicts in this region.

2.2 Rwanda: the genocide and conflict within the Great Lakes

This section summarises much of the literature in this specific area, and is further informed by material from a book I wrote for UNESCO-IIEP on education for Rwandan refugees from 1994-1996 (Bird, 2003a). It outlines the build up to the genocide in Rwanda and some of the historical consequences of the manipulation of identity differences in terms of the past conflict and present reconstruction of the country. It is not a definitive account of the causes of the genocide – but presents a brief synthesis of some of the critical factors that other authors have identified as contributing to the build up, agency and aftermath of the genocide.

Genocide in this context refers to the Convention on the Crime and Prevention of the Crime of Genocide of 1948 – United Nations Article II - which cite a number of acts that contravene the Convention such as those which are

> ...committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:
> (a) Killing members of the group;
> (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
> (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
> (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
> (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group
> (UN, 1948).

A more recent and perhaps more relevant definition of genocide for the Rwanda context can be found from Chalk and Jonassohn for whom genocide is:

> A form of one-sided mass killing in which a state or other authority intends to destroy a group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perpetrator (Chalk and Jonassohn, 1991: 23).

In the context of the genocide in Rwanda, it is the 'one sided mass killing' of mainly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, which classifies it as genocide. The definitions of 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' have been very clearly defined by various 'other' authorities throughout the history of Rwanda (and similarly for Burundi). The fact that hundreds of thousands of one ethnic group were killed in less than four months appears to warrant the definition of genocide, whereas the slow systematic killing of four million in DRC for example, does not. Similarly the Kibeho massacre of Hutu refugees in the DRC in 1996 was reported not as genocide (even though it was one-sided mass killing), but reprisal killings of '...all who were associated with the *génocidaires* – which means a high number of innocent civilians and children...' (Pottier, 2002: 57). The slowness of the international community to recognise even these events in DRC and Rwanda as genocide, leads one to suspect that the definitions adopted by Northern governments are based more on political interests than humane concerns.

There are many authors (Berkeley, 2000; Danida, 1996; Duffield, 2001; Gourevitch, 1999; HRW, 1999; Lemarchand, 2001; Mamdani, 2001; Pottier, 2002; Prunier, 1995; Reyntjens, 2004) who have written extensive and varied accounts of the genocide in Rwanda, so the outline below is a brief overview that draws together some of the factors presented from these different sources.

Although the ethnic divisions that fomented the genocide in Rwanda are typically ascribed in the literature to the colonialists, the roots of the genocide stretch back to pre-colonial times. In particular they connect to the reign of the Tutsi King Rwabugiri in the second half of the 19th century. The regime he instituted between 1860 and 1895 introduced a feudal system that largely discriminated against the Hutu peasantry who were not cattle owners. This Pottier suggests was just '...one mechanism in the development of a complex set of social and political relations under Rwabugiri...' (Pottier 2002: 65). Furthermore, although the differentiation imposed by Rwabugiri was initially wealth related, it was almost impossible for a Hutu to achieve the level of wealth required to 'become' a Tutsi. In this way, ethnic differentiation based on social positions was institutionalised by Rwabugiri in a way that was easily

exploited by both the German colonists and Belgian trustees in the early part of the 20th Century. By introducing identity cards in 1933 to indicate each person's ethnicity, (Hutu, Tutsi or Twa) the Belgian colonists further reinforced the divisions established by Rwabugiri. This emphasised what they perceived as Tutsi superiority (Tutsis were regarded as more aristocratic and educated) over the Hutu peasantry. The colonists then educated the Tutsis to become skilled administrators and leaders in the country (Danida, 1996).

Following the Second World War, a new generation of egalitarian, anti-Walloon, Flemish missionaries reversed this policy of favouring Tutsis by educating increasing numbers of Hutus. As a result of this the two ethnic groups (one educated by the former Belgian regime to believe in their superiority and the other through recent education provision beginning to resent their perceived enslavement), became more polarised and the potential for conflict exacerbated (Pugh, 1998: 2). Such examples of how formal education contributed in different ways to the construction of identities which exacerbated conflict can be seen in all three countries in this research.

The subsequent 'revolution' by the Hutu majority in 1959 led to widespread massacres of Tutsis, tens of thousands of whom fled to neighbouring countries, including Uganda and Zaire. In an attempt to regain control, the Rwandan Peoples Front (RPF) - a rebel Tutsi army - spent years strengthening their forces in Uganda with the aim to overthrow the Hutu governmental regime in Rwanda. They staged an insurgency in 1990 through incursions from Uganda, but this failed and they were forced to retreat. A civil war ensued in early 1990, which Mamdani suggests was the precursor to the genocide (Mamdani, 2001). The ongoing incursions and military victories by the RPF, who gained control of large tracts of land, resulted in reprisal massacres of Tutsis by government 'death squads' during the early 1990s. The subsequent investigation into massacres of Tutsis in Gisenyi and Bugesera for example, led to warnings from the international community that 'the rising tide of political extremism could easily develop into unprecedented chaos and violence' (Pottier, 2002: 23). These warning however were ignored, even in the face of the rise of 'Hutu Power', a militant Hutu group opposed to the

'ethnic reconciliation' process planned by the moderate Hutu government under President Habyrimana. Optimism was the preferred approach, particularly when peace appeared to be within sight in 1993 after the Arusha Peace Accord was signed by President Habyrimana and the RPF in Arusha, Tanzania.

Some of the literature suggests that it was the extremist elements in the divided Hutu groups who were determined not to support a power sharing structure and planned to undermine the peace agreement (Gourevitch, 1999; HRW, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995). These groups had already been building up the Interahamwe (militia) and controlled the presidentially appointed mayors (the infamous bourgemestres) who initiated and maintained a highly centralised system of political and social control. On the 6th April 1994 President Habyrimana's plane was shot down, possibly by the extreme elements of the Hutu Power groups (although the current President of Rwanda Paul Kagame has also been accused of the same). These groups in combination with the Interahamwe proceeded to dictate developments within the country. The strong social control, combined with the highly effective public information system through the local and national radio networks, then enabled the systematic killing of over 800,000 people, mostly Tutsis and moderate Hutus, to take place in the space of 100 days (HRW, 1999).

Mamdani however, questions the emphasis placed by many authors on social control as the significant factor leading people into mass killing, and also the 'unquestioning obedience to authority' that Prunier for example presented. Alternatively, Mamdani highlights the high level of incentives that were offered to poor peasant farmers. He quotes a survivor: "It was politics. Politicians told the people: kill and you will get your neighbours' goods and land." (Mamdani, 2001: 201). To many who had been displaced by the RPF appropriation of their land, this was an attractive mechanism for expanding their wealth or reclaiming lost land. Mamdani also highlights the role of local authorities who made violence against former friends and neighbours palatable. To do this, the local leaders reaffirmed the traditional 'customary'

apparatus which had been employed during and after the colonial regimes. Mamdani states that this enforced

> ...obligations on entire communities...in the name of serving custom...When it came to pressing ordinary people into a violent political campaign, it was not at all surprising that the *genocidaire* tendency decided on "customary" power as the agency most suited to cleanse the community of threatening alien influences (Mamdani, 2001: 194).

The language of 'customary' obligation was also one that was utilised consistently throughout the genocide. The terminology adopted by the instrumentalists in promoting the genocide supported the dehumanisation of the enemy. As Mamdani suggests:

> Killings became referred to as *umuganda* (communal work), chopping up men as "bush clearing", and slaughtering women and children as "pulling out the roots of the bad weeds." (Mamdani, 2001:194).

Terminology was also a critical factor in schools, and the role of the education sector is mentioned by many as being a contributory factor in fuelling the social and identity divide. Accusations that children were manipulated through the curriculum and indoctrinated with hate messages against the Tutsis have been numerous and well documented elsewhere (Mamdani, 2001; Obura, 2003; Rutayisire et al, 2004). However, one example from a Tutsi girl's experience in school highlights the level of insidious manipulation and fear that was transmitted building up towards the genocide:

> I remember in school we were afraid. They said, "Tutsis, raise your hands." But we were afraid to raise our hands, because the Tutsi was always described as a snake. A snake is dangerous and it should be destroyed. I can never forget this, because this story was repeated year after year in school, from the first to the sixth grade (Blackside Inc., 2000).

This repetitive negative stereotyping experienced in schools and as part of daily life through radio, failed to alert the international community to the seriousness of the ensuing tensions. While education, as Roger has suggested can be used as a 'barometer' of hope (Roger, 2002), it could also have been

used in this instance as an early warning system for the conflict about to emerge. But both during the build up to the conflict and at its onset, the international community repeatedly ignored warnings of the impending disaster. The moral authority of the international community was absent.

Six months before the genocide, General Dallaire the Canadian UN commander in charge of the UN peacekeeping force, informed the United Nations about the forthcoming genocidal preparations. He had sent repeated warnings about an imminent massacre and requested assistance and authority to take action. The United Nations and the international community ignored his pleas. As Amnesty International reported:

> In one of the great historical betrayals of conscience, the Security Council, led by the United States at the urging of Belgium, voted to withdraw the peacekeepers, leaving a small contingent of 270 in Kigali who protected some refugees in a stadium and who assisted with protection of expatriates. The flight out of Rwanda had begun for anyone who could escape (Amnesty International, 1995: Chapter 16).

The resulting massacres and frenzied butchering of hundreds of thousands of people devastated a nation which many others have documented (Berkeley, 2001; Gourevitch, 1999; HRW, 1999; Prunier, 1995). The horrific stories of death, torture and rape that others have told will not be covered in detail here.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), waiting for their opportunity to regain control of the country, took little over three months to assert their ascendancy and oust the Hutu extremists. These fled, along with hundreds of thousands of civilians, the majority of whom were women and children, into neighbouring countries during the period from mid-April to the end of July 1994. Many of those who fled claimed there was butchering of Hutus in reprisal attacks during the days when the RPF were taking control. One refugee respondent in the research claimed that RPF soldiers deliberately killed Hutus and placed them under the bodies of Tutsis to make it look as though more Tutsis had died. 'After all,' he said 'how can you tell what is a Tutsi skull and what is a

Hutu skull.' Another Rwandan woman hiding amongst the Burundian refugees told a similar story:

> All together those massacred by the Ikotanyi [RPF] themselves and those killed by Interahamwe were collected and put on the back of Interahamwe. They called the world and said "Come and see what Interahamwe have done" So the International community would believe that Interahamwe are really killers while Ikotanyi had killed more.

The similarity of the stories of massacres by both sides is an indication of the reluctance of both sides to admit culpability.

As the RPF managed to restore some stability from chaos, the war in one sense was over, with a nation left reeling and half empty from its aftermath. The new leadership under President Paul Kagame began the long struggle towards reconstruction in Rwanda, while neighbouring countries coped with the influx of close to two million refugees fleeing the RPF and possible consequences of capture. It was not until two years later that the refugees were forced to return after events unfolded in neighbouring Zaire.

During the days of the forced repatriation of refugees from Tanzania – an operation I personally observed while working for UNICEF – many refugees told of their fear of return. Few admitted culpability to crimes they described as 'part of the madness' or as inevitable. One teacher elaborated: 'my baby was held up with a knife to her throat – what choice did I have?' The choice was between your own life, and that of your family, or the life of your neighbour. The majority of civilians in the camps were less the orchestrators than the victims of violence. However, some infamous *génocidaires* from the Interahamwe resided in the camps with impunity, where as Pottier indicates, 'Not once had the [humanitarian] operation attempted to separate extremists from innocent civilians' (Pottier, 2002: 77).

The fear by the majority of refugees of return to the expected reprisal killings was not reflected in the media at the time which had presented the refugees as 'liberated' from the camps and returning home 'happy and singing'. A Rwandan teacher explained that the song families were singing on the trucks

taking them back across the border – was 'we are going home, we are going home, we are going home....To our deaths.' This was not a voluntary repatriation based on the return of refugees in dignity and safety, but a forced one engineered between the governments of Rwanda and Tanzania with the tacit approval of the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR).

After the mass return and attempted reintegration of refugees, the subsequent move towards reconstruction of the country was slow, with considerable tensions still marring activities implemented to minimise the underlying ethnic divisions. One positive move was the revival in 2002 of the *gacaca* court process, which is based on a traditional participatory justice system that builds on the community's ability to solve their own disputes. The *gacacas* differ from Western ideas of justice, as the objective is not just to find and punish the criminal, but to find appropriate solutions in order to restore a sense of balance in the community. However, the system has been dogged by difficulties including the lack of sufficiently trained judges, and the potential for false accusations or revenge. Despite these problems, many see the *gacaca* process as having potential to give a voice to survivors and offer some hope of justice. The *gacacas* have also taken pressure off the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), initiated by the UN and the Rwandan courts to bring justice to major genocide suspects. This Tribunal held in Arusha, Tanzania has proven to be woefully inadequate for the task and has only managed to 'convict a small number of high-ranking suspects' (Havermans, 1999: 249). Perhaps if similar levels of funding had been invested in the *gacaca* system as have been poured into the ICTR, there may have been quicker resolution to many of the pending court cases in Kigali.

However, at the time of writing, (September 2005) despite the many positive reforms, the Rwandan government has had no apparent wish to broaden their power base to accommodate a more equitable arrangement for Hutus. This is reflected in the highest political and military levels of the administrative structures where Tutsis control the government and armed forces, as well as the majority of high-ranking or powerful administrative positions. The ruling

party also blocked the development of a political opposition. The army is controlled by Tutsis and is accused of committing many violations both in Rwanda and in DRC where Rwandan forces have supposedly committed acts of rape and sexual violence (OCHA, 2002).

Reyntjens expresses similar sentiments about the current Rwandan regime, which he likens to a dictatorship:

> Ten years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda is experiencing not democracy and reconciliation but dictatorship and exclusion. Although the government led by the Rwanda Patriotic Front has achieved rapid institutional reconstruction and relatively good bureaucratic governance, it has also concentrated power and wealth in the hands of a very small minority, practised ethnic discrimination, eliminated every form of dissent, destroyed civil society, conducted a fundamentally flawed 'democratization' process, and massively violated human rights at home and abroad (Reyntjens, 2004: 177).

While not to undermine some of the positive aspects of reconstruction that the current Rwandan regime has achieved, Reyntjens' critique, while harsh, is complemented by some of the reports coming out of Rwanda by refugees who fled to Tanzania in recent months. My research uncovered unconfirmed narratives of intimidation and 'disappearances' admittedly only from anecdotal evidence of Rwandans who fled into Tanzania and who remain in hiding. However, these stories are sufficient to make the tensions in Rwanda still palpable and fear of speaking out against the regime a reality. The guilt that the international community still feels over the genocide, has allowed the Rwandan government to operate with impunity. As Pottier indicates when discussing where some of the responsibilities for the Rwandan situation lay:

> While the failings of the international community were deservedly underscored, the absence of a critical look inside the Rwanda government was equally striking (Pottier, 2002: 79).

2.3 Burundi and the ongoing conflict

Historically, like Rwanda, Burundi society has been characterised in the literature as being ethnically divided into Hutu, Tutsi and Twa, the latter being the indigenous ethnic group of the region. When the Bantu tribes migrated to Central Africa in the 10th or 11th Centuries, they dominated the Twa - who currently form just over one percent of the population. The Bantus were said to form what is now known as the Hutu ethnic group – which constitute approximately eighty five percent of the population. From the 16th Century onwards Tutsi pastoralists reportedly arrived initially from the North and in the 17th and 18th Centuries from the East and asserted their dominance over both the Hutus and the Twa, establishing several states that were ruled by the Tutsi kings or '*mwami*'. Tutsis comprise fourteen percent of the population and have vied with the Hutu majority for political and social control over many decades. Like Rwanda the colonial period compounded the dominance of the minority population who were adopted by colonialists as de facto administrators.

Burundi had been under German control as part of German East Africa from 1890, until the end of the First World War, when Belgium was mandated by the League of Nations to take control of what became known as Rwanda and Burundi. Independence was granted to Burundi by the Belgian colonialists in 1962 to the Tutsi King Mwambutsa IV, who some years later - when parliamentary elections were held in 1965 - refused to appoint a Hutu Prime Minister despite the overwhelming Hutu majority in the election result (BBC, 2003). Further fighting between Hutu gendarmerie and Tutsi leaders resulted in a failed coup that led to a major purge of Hutus in the armed forces and the political class, and power became an exclusively Tutsi preserve.

Mwambutsa attempted to preserve the monarchy, through his son Charles, who declared himself *mwami* as Ntare V. Ntare appointed Michel Micombero prime minister, but Micombero however succeeded in a military coup in 1966 and declared himself President (Reyntjens, 1995). Any later attempts by Hutus to retaliate were cruelly suppressed by Micombero, and in April 1972, a Hutu

insurrection in which two thousand to three thousand Tutsis lost their lives, resulted in the armed forces launching genocidal reprisals and the massacre of more than one hundred and fifty thousand Hutus (ISS, 2005). Over three hundred thousand Hutus fled into neighbouring Tanzania, Rwanda and DRC. The virtual dismissal or removal of all Hutus from the armed forces allowed the Tutsi army to carry out reprisals against Hutus with impunity, in particular those who were educated. It was a 'watershed' period in the history of the country as it polarised the Hutu and Tutsis increasingly on ethnic rather than the traditional kinship lines. Some authors have argued that these pre-colonial kinship ties indicated that there had previously been more to unite than to divide the two groups (cf: 2.6 pp 68-74) (Obura, 2003).

By the post-colonial era, the Hutu perception of the political situation focussed on what they saw as the 'genocidal' Tutsis who wanted to suppress the majority through fear and murder. The contrasting Tutsi view believed that if the majority Hutu came to power then Tutsis would be exterminated as a minority. Subsequent systematic killings by both groups led to a culture of impunity which tolerated routine massacres by either side in which no justice was administered to the perpetrators (BBC, 2003; Reyntjens, 1995).

Political instability continued throughout the 1970s. In 1976, President Bagaza came to power through a military coup, and maintained an uneasy peace until 1987, when Pierre Buyoya replaced him in another military coup. Buyoya was a shrewd political statesman who after another round of massacres of Hutus in 1988, saw the need for some form of power sharing, and appointed a Hutu Prime Minister allowing equal numbers of Hutu and Tutsi as members of the National Commission for National Unity (Lund, 1999). Buyoya also insisted that through the new constitution, issues of discrimination against Hutus in education, employment and the armed forces would be addressed. This led to a period of positive involvement by Hutus during the late 1980s and early 1990s. There was expansion in the freedom of speech, an increase in the number of Hutu students attending secondary and higher education and more Hutus serving in the civil service - previously the preserve of Tutsi elites (Reyntjens, 1995). In 1992, Buyoya reformed the country's constitution to

allow a multi-party political system to be established after decades of military dictatorship and single party leadership.

Although the main political parties declared themselves to be non-ethnic and included members from both ethnic groups, the government backed party UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National), typically represented the Tutsi interests. FRODEBU (Front Démocratique de Burundi), as the main party in opposition, represented the interests of the Hutus. The democratisation process that Buyoya had instituted culminated in parliamentary and presidential elections in June 1993 when Melchior Ndadaye succeeded by a two-thirds majority to become the first democratically elected Hutu President to rule Burundi. However, just a few months later in October 1993 he was assassinated in a failed and confused military coup, causing massacres of Tutsis as part of a 'popular resistance'. Subsequent vicious reprisals by the Tutsi army killed over a hundred thousand Hutus (Prunier, 1996). Consequently, approximately seven hundred thousand Hutu refugees fled from Burundi into Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC. The assassination of the first democratically elected Hutu President had sparked off yet another round of ethnic tension which Havermans sees 'as the starting point of the current phase in Burundi's civil war' (Havermans, 1999: 198).

The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 alarmed Tutsi hard-liners further, afraid that similar actions might be taken against Burundian Tutsis. Although another Hutu president was appointed in 1994 - after the plane carrying both the Rwandan and Burundian Presidents was shot down - the violence escalated, especially between Hutu militias and the Tutsi controlled army. Hutu guerrillas attacked government posts and swept through villages, attempting to increase the recruitment of rebels within their factions. Tanzania was regularly accused of hosting Hutu rebel groups and extremists who were said to operate from the refugee camps in North Western Tanzania.

The escalating violence and clashes between the different factions and the loss of control by the government comprising moderate Hutus and Tutsis created a power vacuum and consequently Pierre Buyoya led another military coup and

succeeded in overthrowing the government in July 1996. The cyclical nature of the rebel attacks followed by army reprisals became a consistent feature of the following years. In an attempt to bring control and security to areas engaged in insurgencies, the government initiated a policy of *'regroupement'* in 1996. These were effectively concentration camps, which enabled the army to separate the rebels from the civilian population and assert their control over rebel held regions. The conditions in the camps were abysmal, with little or no access to humanitarian assistance. The eventual international outcry at the forced removal of the Hutu peasantry into camps led to their closure in 2000. An estimated five hundred thousand were displaced because of the civil war and over three hundred and fifty thousand Burundian Hutus fled as refugees to neighbouring Tanzania (OCHA, 2000).

Coming under increasing international pressure and suffering economic sanctions from the international community, Buyoya eventually agreed to a transitional constitution under which he was sworn in as president in 1998. Former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere attempted to broker a peace deal between the different factions in 1999. At every stage of the peace talks there were one or more groups that refused to participate or to sign the cease-fire accords. This was the case even in October 2001, when the installation of a power sharing government - brokered by Nelson Mandela - was supported by a UN peacekeeping force. Fighting intensified despite successive attempts to bring the warring factions together under power sharing agreements (BBC, 2002).

In 2003 under a power sharing agreement inaugurated in 2001, Domtien Ndayizeye – a Hutu - succeeded Pierre Buyoya as President. Despite continuing rebel action during that year a peacekeeping deal was brokered in November 2003 between President Ndayizeye and the FDD leader Pierre Nkurunziza and was signed in front of a summit of African leaders held in Tanzania. The deal, which gave ministerial posts to Hutu rebel leaders, appears to have stabilised the country sufficiently for large numbers of refugees to return home, even though the faction of the Forces for National

Liberation (FNL) remains active and eleven parties failed to sign the power sharing agreement of August 2004.

According to an interview with a diplomat engaged in the peace negotiations between different factions in Burundi, the agenda of the FNL remains different to that of other rebel groups. This difference has led to the continuation of insurgencies against the government forces. FNL leaders argue that they are interested 'only in truth' not in power sharing. They state that their main concern is for both sides to admit culpability - in the form of a truth and reconciliation process. Similar views were reflected in the data collection from Burundian respondents who asserted the need for 'truth' and for Burundians to 'stop telling lies'. As one refugee educator working for an NGO stated: 'Until we tell the truth, there will be no peace.'

Burundi has entered into what looks like a relative period of peace, despite sporadic insurgencies around the capital Bujumbura. Over ninety percent of the country is now stable and refugees are returning in their tens of thousands. The challenge for Burundi will not only be in maintaining the fragile peace accord, but also assimilating the hundreds of thousands of refugees in exile, into an infrastructure which is already over-stretched.

2.4 The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the two wars

DRC is a vast land of over fifty million inhabitants. It has had a turbulent past and has been ruthlessly and consistently exploited for its mineral wealth since the time of the Belgian colonists. After independence in 1960, Patrice Lumumba the popular socialist leader, became head of state, but was regarded as a threat to US interests in the region and assassinated in 1961, by troops loyal to Joseph Mobutu, a US backed army colonel. After four years of unrest (including a civil war in Kitanga the rich south-east region of the country), Mobutu seized power in 1965 renaming the country Zaire. To ensure continued US backing he allowed Zaire to be used as a base for anti-Soviet operations in Angola. He then initiated what amounted to a thirty-year

kleptocracy, which stripped the nation of billions of dollars of mineral wealth, before the events of the Rwandan genocide sparked the civil war that brought Mobutu's reign to an end. As mentioned above, many Tutsi from Rwanda had fled the pogroms in Rwanda in the 1960s, and it is often believed that these groups of Banyarwanda were the group that form the 'Banya – Mulenge' the people residing in Mulenge.

This view ignores the previous migrations of Tutsis during the mid-Nineteenth Century when cattle owning Tutsis, avoiding the taxation system imposed by King Rwabugiri of Rwanda, crossed to Eastern Congo. Furthermore, after the creation of the Belgian Congo in 1855 (with 'Ruanda-Urundi' as effectively annexes of Congo), large numbers of Rwandan migrants were sent from Rwanda and Burundi as cheap labour for the mines and plantations in the east of the country (ICG, 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004).

The migration of Rwandan Tutsis was compounded during the ethnic purges of Tutsis in Rwanda in the 1960s, when large numbers of relatively wealthy Tutsi elite fled to Congo. Many of these were encouraged by Mobutu to join his party the '*Movement Populaire de la Révolution* (MPR). Barthélémy Bisengimana became his powerful cabinet director, while other Tutsis obtained positions in his central office' (ICG, 2005: 13). The subsequent granting of citizenship rights by Mobutu in 1972 protected many of the pre-1950 Banyarwanda immigrants further and gave them even greater political access and land ownership. Under increasing popular pressure Mobutu rescinded his earlier law of 1972, and their national citizenship rights were based on a case by case basis, so that by 1981 the Banyarwanda had to apply individually for naturalisation. However, as Pottier suggests the

> '...wider significance of 1981...was the context in which it was passed: with the elections looming, heightened political struggle easily turned into scapegoating against 'foreigners'...Control over land became fully ethnicised and exceedingly aggressive. (Pottier 2002: 28).

The combination of the different generations of Banyarwanda many of whom had lived in Eastern Zaire for generations, along with those who had fled Rwanda and Burundi in the late 1950s and early 1960s, are often referred to as the 'Banyamulenge', lumped together in what Pottier suggests

> ...became the omnibus term for referring to all Tutsi who resided in North Kivu, South Kivu and Shaba; a group much larger than the descendants of the original 'Banya – Mulenge (Pottier, 2002: 43).

Pottier further suggests that it was Rwanda's Vice-President Paul Kagame, 'who with Kabila in mind as leader of this civil conflict, masterminded the revolt...' of Banyarwanda Tutsi and Banyamulenge (Pottier 2002: 44). Laurent Désiré Kabila and his Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) took just a few short months to reach Kinshasa – perhaps with the backing of the US government, who were anxious to secure mining rights to some of Zaire's vast mineral wealth (Pottier, 2002).

An alternative viewpoint – one coming primarily from the US – was that the build up of hostilities arose during the 'first' civil war because of Hutu extremist refugees expelling locally born Tutsis in early 1996 (Reiff, 1996:1). It was suggested that these were backed by the Zairian army and local Zairian officials who were already anxious to oust the unpopular President Mobuto Sese Seko. The refugee influx itself was considered by some as one of the key factors in the build up and initiation of the conflict, destabilising a region that was already fragile and on the brink of implosion. However, as in the case of the genocide in Rwanda, the international community did nothing to prevent the exacerbation of the consequent civil war from going to scale (Reiff, 1996).

Threatened with expulsion, the Rwandan backed Banyamulenge seized the opportunity in September 1996, to oust Hutu extremists in the east of the country. The resultant fighting factionalised the conflict into a battle between Hutu extremists, who had the support of the Zairian military, against Tutsi Zairian rebels supported by Rwanda. When the Zairian army and Hutu extremists were driven out of Goma, Bukavu and Uvira regions in November

1996, as many as four hundred thousand refugees returned to Rwanda in the space of a few days (Reiff, 1996: 1). Many more refugees decamped into the forests, where large numbers remained to continue their insurgencies. However, Laurent Kabila, the leader of ADFL, defeated the poorly disciplined Zairean forces and swept to power in 1997 as President of the renamed Democratic Republic of Congo. The country returned to a brief period of apparent stability until the rival factions within Kabila's ADFL group split, and the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie or Rally for Congolese Democracy (RCD) was formed.

By 1998, internal pressures from within the DRC forced Kabila to expel numbers of his 'Rwandan' advisors. In a reaction against their ousting by Kabila, these RCD 'rebels' backed by Rwanda and Uganda rose up against Kabila and advanced on Kinshasa. This sparked the 'second' war. A number of other countries became involved at this time, whether to protect their own borders, or to try and exploit the vast mineral wealth of the country is not clear. However, the subsequent plundering of the country by foreign troops is perhaps an indication of their reasons for intervention. Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia among others sent troops to assist Kabila and resist the Rwandan/Ugandan backed rebels who took control of much of the east of the country. The situation became even more complex when 'stalemate in the war and lack of progress in the peace process led to a de facto partition of the country under four regimes, each depending on foreign troops for its survival (HRW, 2001: I).

The Congolese government initially under Laurent Kabila and then after his assassination, under his son Joseph, controlled the west of the country with increasing reliance on foreign assistance. The rebel group the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo, MLC), controlled the north and were backed by Uganda. They later merged (but only temporarily) with the Congolese Rally for Democracy-Liberation Movement (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie-Mouvement de Libération (RCD-ML), which claimed to control some provinces in the east. Human Rights Watch suggest that 'this merger brought together several of the RCD-ML leaders and created the Front for the Liberation of the Congo (Front pour

la Libération du Congo (FLC)' which continued to be backed by Uganda (HRW, 2001: I). The remaining provinces in the east of the country were controlled by a third rebel group, RCD-Goma, who were backed by Rwanda. What these divisions highlight is the complex and volatile nature of the conflict in DRC which is heavily influenced by the involvement of foreign actors, whether as belligerents, exploiters of mineral wealth, or as suppliers of arms.

The involvement of foreign actors in the illegal extraction of mineral resources from DRC was of such significance that a UN investigation was established in 2000 to examine the link between resource exploitation and the conflict. Although clear links were established after the reports from the 'expert panel' (between April 2001 and October 2003), there was little effort on the part of the international community to intervene in the prevention of further exploitation (HRW, 2005). The panel also established obvious connections between

> ...the exploitation of resources and international business. The minerals and other resources from Congo were predominantly destined for multinational companies based in Europe and North America (HRW, 2005: IX).

There was an expectation that after the UN panel's report, member states would ensure that companies involved in supporting the illegal extraction of mineral wealth, in particular gold, would be held to account. This was not to be the case and illegal extraction continues and has funded directly, or indirectly, many of the rebel groups still engaged in the conflict in the east of the country.

The international community only reacted with any real degree of interest when events during 2003, including the systematic rape, torture and murder of civilians by rebel groups in Bunia, Eastern Congo, sparked a wave of humanitarian and UN intervention in an attempt to curb the worst atrocities. However, the supply of arms from Uganda and Rwanda to the rebel groups has yet to be addressed by the international community. The UN imposition of

an arms embargo on Congo in July 2003 was not extended to Uganda and Rwanda at the request of Britain and the US (Kiley, 2003). Although the UN Security Council warned Rwanda over its incursions into DRC, they have refused to institute any sanctions. The action of Rwanda in the latest invasion (in November 2004) has yet again been dismissed by the international community as propaganda.

In the eyes of many Congolese refugees suffering in exile in Tanzania, the US and the UK are responsible for arming the factions currently fighting in DRC, and in particular, Rwanda. Many of the respondents in the research asked the same question: "The US and the UK could stop this war tomorrow, so why don't they?" The presence of mercenaries from the US, UK and South Africa in DRC was further confirmed during an interview with a senior diplomat who had spent many years in the Great Lakes Region. It perhaps also explains the reluctance of these countries to become involved in a major peacekeeping initiative.

According to Pottier, this reluctance is largely due to the acceptance by the international community of the 'dominant narrative', which has been constructed by Rwandan President Paul Kagame. Pottier suggests that Kagame has successfully exercised his hold on the construction of knowledge concerning the conflict in Eastern DRC. This narrative Pottier claims has focused on a

> ...single cause – aggression by an external force (refugees) – and had an attractive, simple solution: 'the Banyamulenge'. As found in the American press, the dominant version of why Kivu had become 'a problem' stressed the work of Hutu refugee militias (Pottier, 2003: 218).

The consequence of this complex interplay of warring factions, the scramble for mineral resources, interference by external forces and the lack of concern by the international community is a deeply divided nation. Despite a number of peace talks, the country remains in a state of confusion with an ongoing civil war in the east of the country (at time of writing February 2005). The

international community have failed yet again, as they did in Rwanda, to take affirmative action to stop the civil war in DRC. In Pottier's opinion, the 'culture of impunity' is compounded by the regard in which the UN and other nations are held by the Rwandan President Paul Kagame, as perhaps one of the most significant external players in the DRC conflict. Pottier suggests that in the Rwandan culture there is a perception that people caught 'red-handed' (as the UN was caught by its failure to intervene in the Rwandan genocide), have '...lost face, must not be taken seriously and can be lied to...[and which makes] repeated mass killings and genocide possible' (Pottier, 2002: 156). The signal failure of the international community to bring the Rwandan government to task over its involvement in DRC, or to stop the deaths of over four million Congolese citizens, confirms this statement.

The lack of political will from all sides to put an end to the DRC conflict is summarised clearly by the UN Security Council Report of December 2005. This indicates that despite supposed gains in the peace process,

> The transitional process remains fragile and plagued by:
> • corruption;
> • difficulties in disbanding foreign forces and militias, particularly in the Kivu provinces and in Ituri;
> • the continuous flow of weapons; and
> • the illegal exploitation of natural resources in Congolese territory.
>
> The intimate connection between the illegal exploitation of resources, whose revenues continue to be used to maintain the dominance of military players in the DRC including through the purchase of weapons in violation of the arms embargo, and the perpetuation of conflict has all along been a prominent characteristic of the situation (UN, 2005: 5).

2.5 The role of Uganda and Tanzania

In the attempt to find credible and sustainable solutions to the types of conflicts described above, there have been many attempts at peace brokerage which have encountered difficulties at different levels. It took the shock of

genocide for relative stability to return to Rwanda, Burundi is still emerging out of conflict with a peace that has yet to be tested and DRC is still in turmoil, despite national and international peacemaking efforts. This section briefly considers the neighbouring countries, Uganda and Tanzania, in the dynamics of the Great Lakes conflicts and their role in both conflict exacerbation and peace brokerage.

While nearing completion of this thesis a new report was published by Human Rights Watch (HRW) 'The Curse of Gold'. This is a documentation of the involvement of various external forces in the control of the gold fields of DRC. Their summary below dramatically highlights some of the issues outlined above and demonstrates the continuing role both Uganda and Rwanda have to play in the outcome of the conflict in DRC.

> The Ugandan army withdrew from Congo in 2003, following Rwanda, another major belligerent, which had withdrawn the year before. Each left behind local proxies, the Lendu Nationalist and Integrationist Front (Front des Nationalistes et Intégrationnistes, FNI) linked to Uganda, and the Hema Union of Congolese Patriots (Union des Patriotes Congolais, UPC), supported by Rwanda. With continued assistance from their external backers, these local armed groups in turn fought for the control of gold-mining areas and trade routes. As each group won a gold-rich area, they promptly began exploiting the ore. The FNI and the UPC fought five battles in a struggle to control Mongbwalu, each resulting in widespread human rights abuses. Human Rights Watch researchers documented the slaughter of at least two thousand civilians in the Mongbwalu area alone between June 2002 and September 2004. Tens of thousands of civilians were forced to flee from their homes into the forests to escape their attackers. Many of them did not survive (HRW, 2005).

Both Rwanda and Uganda still deny their role as external backers and refuse to admit culpability for the systematic human rights abuses committed over the fight for gold and mineral resources in DRC.

2.5.1 *Uganda*

As noted above, Uganda in particular played a critical role both in the build up to the genocide in Rwanda and in the escalation of conflict in DRC. Uganda housed and armed the Rwandan Patriotic Front, the Tutsi rebel faction that attempted a coup in Rwanda first in 1990 and then successfully expelled the Hutu extremists during the genocide in 1994. Uganda was also fully involved in the support of rebel factions in DRC, in particular the Congolese Liberation Movement (MLC) which controlled the Northwest of the country. The argument of the Ugandan Government for keeping troops in DRC was based on national security. However, the fact that Ugandan officials have been implicated in the plundering of mineral resources from DRC suggests their involvement in the war has an economic as well as political motivation (van de Veen, 1999). DRC has since sought legal retribution and compensation for what it regarded as illegal acts of aggression on the part of Uganda. The hearing, which was to have taken place in the International Court of Justice in The Hague in November 2003, was suspended after talks between Presidents Yoweri Museveni and Joseph Kabila were mediated by the United States in November 2003.

2.5.2 *Tanzania*

Tanzania's involvement in the region stretches back to the time of the overthrow of Idi Amin in the 70s. Tanzania was also a main supporter of the East African Community in its early days, arguing for greater regional integration. By virtue of its borders with Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda and DRC, Tanzania has always been a concerned neighbour and has been affected directly or indirectly by the events in these countries.

Tanzania hosted a massive influx of over five hundred thousand Rwandan refugees in 1994, and after their subsequent repatriation in 1996, received mass influxes of Burundian and Congolese refugees totalling over four hundred and fifty thousand at the end of 1996. These influxes have resulted in

an increasingly belligerent stance towards refugees in general, which in some cases has resulted in the *refoulement* of both Burundian and Rwandan refugees. Tanzania currently houses over three hundred and fifty thousand refugees of mainly Burundian and Congolese extraction, with small numbers of Rwandans and Somalis (time of writing December 2005). This is still one of the largest refugee programmes in the world, yet has received very limited international attention after the return of the majority of Rwandan refugees in 1996, despite the intensification of demands by the Tanzanian Government for more recognition and compensation from the international community.

Tanzania has also played a key role in peace brokerage for both the Rwanda and Burundi conflicts. In 1993, Tanzania assisted in the development of the peace accord in Arusha, Tanzania between the RPF rebel movement, who had their base in Uganda, and the Rwandan government of President Habyrimana. Negotiations led to an accord based on a transitional power sharing government, integration of all military forces into a united national army and agreement to democratic elections (Havermans, 1999). Unfortunately, the possibilities for peace were destroyed with the death of the Rwandan President in April 1994, which sparked off the genocide of Tutsis and moderate Hutus.

Tanzania also played a key role in the attempts to negotiate peace settlements in Burundi between Hutu rebel factions and the Tutsi government. Again held in Arusha Tanzania, the mediation was led by former Tanzanian President, the late Julius Nyerere. After his death, the former South African president, Nelson Mandela was appointed as mediator for further talks, but the later peace deal signed in December 2002 also failed, and fighting continued.

As mentioned above, Arusha hosts the ICTR, which deals with war criminals from Rwanda. However, despite the millions of dollars incurred each year, this court has succeeded in sentencing only twenty-five out of the thousands suspected of involvement in the genocide. While the *gacaca* courts may have their faults, had similar funds been poured into supporting the internal prison and justice systems within Rwanda, one wonders if the wheels of justice would have ground more quickly.

More recently the series of talks and conferences leading up to the Great Lakes Summit held in Dar es Salaam in November 2004, indicates the significant role that Tanzania has to play as perhaps the only truly peaceful country in the region. It is a potential role model for countries emerging from crisis towards political and economic stability.

2.6 Identity issues in the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region

Until the populations of the three countries in this research are convinced that the deep-rooted needs and wishes of all groups are recognised and representatively addressed through effective democratic elections, it is unlikely that the region will emerge into stability in the near future. In a region where identity issues are considered one of the prime motivating factors in the ongoing conflicts, this section examines the specific identity issues considered by different authors to be a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts. It complements Chapter Four which approaches the issue of identity from a more theoretical standpoint.

Much of the literature on the Great Lakes Region suggests that the deep-rooted ethnic divisions, which many authors suggest underpin the conflicts in the region, were systematically exploited by colonial rulers (Lund, 1999; Prunier, 1996; Reyntjens, 1995). According to Reyntjens both German East Africa and later the Belgians, capitalised upon the supposed ethnic differences of the Hutu and Tutsi tribes, which had been based traditionally on political clan ties rather than pure ethnic distinctions. In this way, ethnicity, while being a mobilising force in the development of power structures, was 'manipulated by elites in their political strategies' (Reyntjens, 1995: 6). The colonialists further manipulated the potential for ethnic division by developing the power base of Tutsis through provision of education and of instrumental positions in the civil administrative structure. This reinforced the myths and stereotypes that had been built around the three ethnic groups of Rwanda and Burundi. It

emphasised the 'superiority' of the Batutsi, over the 'peasant' Bahutu, with the third 'tribe' the Batwa hardly featuring as an ethnic group to be considered. Ethnicity is often considered one of the key issues concerning the conflicts in the Great Lakes, but Bigagaza et al argue that ethnicity is 'a cover for competition to control scarce land' (Bigagaza et al, 2002: 52). In Rwanda where the ethnic dimension is considered by many as the most important factor in fuelling the genocide of 1994, Bigagaza et al assert that:

> Ethnic differences were less important in understanding the dynamics of the conflict than were elite competitions to dominate critical environmental decision-making processes through control of the state. In turn, elite groups characterised these competitions in ethnic terms (Bigagaza et al, 2002: 52).

Prunier also argues that cultural mythology surrounding the ascription of ethnic tension in the war in Rwanda was a critical factor in determining the ethnic definition of the genocide. He cautions against artificially imposed definitions on Rwandan culture where traditionally the different tribes had coexisted in relative harmony (Prunier, 1995). Despite the peaceful co-existence that Prunier asserts was a feature of pre-colonial life in the region, the complex nature of ethnicity and identity, of clashes between Hutu and Tutsi have dogged the region for the past two centuries. Prunier suggests that any existing tensions were exacerbated by colonialists not only through divisive border divisions, but also by ascription of ethnic identities, which traditionally had not been a cause for tension. In contrast Pottier argues that this view is convenient for those who want to place the blame squarely on the shoulders of the colonists rather than accepting the role of their Tutsi forebears.

> The intellectual challenge academics face today is that they must see through the smokescreen of sameness (same territory, same language) and must appreciate the divisive institutions and practices which preceded European rule (Pottier, 2002: 116).

Some other authors however suggest that although divisions did exist before colonial rule in Rwanda, they do not explain the collective violence of the genocide. In support of this assumption, Rutayisire, Kabano and Rubagiza,

suggest that although 'ethnic differentiation was a social reality in pre-colonial Rwanda' (Rutayisire et al, 2004: 324) it does not sufficiently account for the violence that ensued. They contend that there is little evidence to suggest that ethnicity caused the level of tension between the ethnic groups, who shared a common language and culture. They had much more in common than is generally recognised.

Whichever viewpoint one ascribes, to, what is evident is that the colonial policy of 'divide and rule' ensured that any differences that did exist were fully exploited in order to strengthen the colonial power base. In this way as Mamdani suggests, the identities of the different groups have changed over time. He suggests that Hutu and Tutsi should 'be seen as *political* identities that changed with the changing history of the Rwandan state' (Mamdani, 2001: 73).

Mamdani concisely summarises the argument between these differing opinions regarding the nature of conflict in East Africa:

> The two sides of the controversy can be summed up as follows. One recognized the existence of ethnically defined movements (tribalism) but saw them as some sort of a primordial carryover, a traditional or atavistic residue, to be cured or erased with the march of modernity. The other viewed tribalism as the result of a modern conspiracy either external or local. Those who saw it as a foreign inspired conspiracy marshalled evidence to show that many of the tribes of Africa were an arbitrary colonial creation, whereas those who held the roots of this conspiracy to be local traced them either to tactical manouvers by the state to divide the people or to elite strategies to "use" popular allegiances to gain advantages for themselves. Whereas the conspiracy theorists saw tribalism as a kind of cancer introduced from without and above, the primordialists regarded it as an ahistorical original sin afflicting African peoples from below. Both agreed that tribalism is a curse of which Africa must be rid (Mamdani, 1996: 187).

The effect of such ascribed 'tribalism' was to ensure that in the eyes of the North, any conflicts in Africa could be ignored as 'tribal' or due to 'ethnicity'. In order to move beyond the emotiveness associated with these terms,

particularly ethnicity, I distinguish between ethnicity and identity in my research findings. Identity encompasses political, 'clan', religious and social identities which are often more flexible and inclusive than the notion of ethnic identity. Some of these issues relating to the formation or shifting of identities through subscription, force or indoctrination are explored in depth in Chapters Four and Nine.

Obura recognises the nature of what she terms 'socio-identity' in Rwanda as being a more apt term than ethnicity. By utilising this term she implies a broader concept of identity that encompasses a range of identity-defining factors, beyond mere ethnicity. She suggests that recent Rwandan historians are increasingly challenging the 'myth' of ethnic division in Rwanda. She states:

> The historians of Rwanda have convincingly argued that the Bahutu, the Batwa and the Batutsi are socio-identity groups. That is they know themselves and are known by others as belonging to specific groups. They therefore have a group identity. These identities seemed to have changed over time...More importantly they say that historical evidence points to the mutability of the groups and to the fact that these identities did not play as predominant a role in the past as colonizers believed (Obura, 2003: 105).

However, it appears that the notion of ethnic identity has become internalised through the process of history, resulting in the swinging of power from one group to another. As one Burundian teacher in this research said, 'it matters little what is the history or where it came from, it is the reality of now that counts.' In order to understand the nature of the supposed ethnic conflict in the countries under study, it is therefore necessary to consider how the schisms of the two groups have emerged over time. If one looks at the opposing perceptions that the Hutu and Tutsi have constructed and internalised both historically and more recently, two distinct and polarised images emerge.

The Hutu position is best explained from a study of pre-colonial times when Hutus believed they were treated as inferiors by the 'lordly' pastoralist Tutsis. This sense of inferiority and exploitation was bolstered during the initial

colonial period when Hutus were denied access to education and Tutsis were empowered as skilled administrators. Any historical or recent killing of Hutus is seen as 'proof of the intrinsic perfidy of the Tutsi' (Prunier, 1996: 10). Retaliation or reprisal against the Tutsis, and even genocide, is considered justifiable as a legitimate response to their oppression by Tutsis. For example a paper circulating amongst the refugees interviewed, was first distributed in 1998 (provided by one of the Burundian respondents in my research[3]) and highlights what Hutus perceive as the intention of the Tutsis to establish a 'Hima Empire'. This was a common perception by Hutu respondents who insisted that there was a regional Tutsi plot to take over the Great Lakes Region as a Tutsi stronghold. The paper supposedly written by a member of the RPF from Rwanda, exhorts Tutsis to unite across the region, by

> ...posting our best human resources in services dealing with security, economics, finance and administration, particularly in the Provinces of north and South Kivu which are an integral part of our homeland.

While the provenance of the document might be questioned, the fact that such text is believed and circulated is evidence of a sophisticated propaganda machine.

The alternative construct of the Tutsi standpoint supposedly arises from an historic memory of being superior to the Hutu who were perceived as peasant farmers and less intelligent. The Belgians supported the dominance by the Tutsis who believed themselves successors to white rule. Killings of Hutus are downplayed while the massacres of Tutsis and in particular the genocide in Rwanda are seen as the Hutu genocidal plan to eliminate all Tutsis. Hutus are seen as bloodthirsty killers. Therefore, democracy is to be avoided, as it would give victory to the majority Hutu, who would then eliminate the Tutsis both politically and physically (Prunier, 1996). The fear of the extermination as a minority either physically or politically is the driving force behind the Tutsi rationalisation for maintaining control.

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[3] Something similar can be found on http://burundi-sites.com/agnews_tip.htm

This polarisation of viewpoints impinges on all aspects of life and perceptions of historical and current events. This is particularly the case within Rwanda and Burundi, but also in the East of DRC where ethnicity formed the basis of the escalating tension that led to the first of the civil wars of 1996. One narrative asserts that Tutsi settlers, (formerly from Rwanda but who renamed themselves Banyamulenge – 'people who live in Mulenge') were being expelled in a systematic 'ethnic cleansing' strategy familiar to Tutsis in neighbouring Rwanda. The Tutsi rebellion against this strategy initiated the full-scale civil war, which eventually led to the downfall of Mobuto Sese Seko. The opposing narrative from the indigenous Congolese refutes this accusation insisting that the 'Banyamulenge' or 'Banyarwanda' (as they are referred to by the Congolese 'nationals') 'demanded citizenship by force' and had systematically taken over land traditionally owned by indigenous tribes. The resistance to the appropriation of land and violent demands for citizenship sparked the war in 1996.

What these opposing narratives demonstrate is the significant role of identity in forming these narratives. Identity issues also impinged heavily on the education system, which was used by some as a tool to engender hatred and violence based on ethnicity. A common example given in the case of Rwanda was that all children were taught that Tutsis were 'snakes' or 'cockroaches'. An example given by a senior Ministry of Education official in Rwanda stated that before the genocide, it would be common for a teacher in a mathematics lesson to say to a class of schoolchildren, "You have five Tutsis, you kill three. How many are left?" When interviewing Hutu refugees from Burundi, similar 'enemy' stories were narrated describing how Hutu children were discriminated against at school, or how Tutsi children would bring arms into the school ready to kill their Hutu peers the next day. The importance of these 'enemy' stories lies in the strength they have of affirming existing stereotypes. Children did not just learn these stories at school, through teachers, but they were part of the fabric of life around them. They would be passed on from one generation to the next. The creation of an enemy culture in terms of identity construction is explored further in Chapters Four and Nine.

The schisms identified above, between the different identity groups are overplayed according to some authors. For example Obura, in her analysis of the education system in Rwanda pre- and post-genocide, suggests that in pre-colonial times

> ...there was a high degree of assimilation and integration of the groups, although they retained some distinct socio-identity features. The concept of cohabitation and common interests is a theme that the government would like to emphasise (Obura, 2003: 104).

Mamdani concurs when he states:

> My *second* conclusion is that the predecessors of today's Hutu and Tutsi indeed created a single cultural community, the community of Kinyarwanda speakers, through centuries of cohabitation, intermarriage, and cultural exchange (Mamdani, 2001: 74).

Although as mentioned above, Pottier points to the convenience of this view for the existing leadership in Rwanda (Pottier, 2002), many respondents (particularly those from Burundi) indicated that at grassroots level, there has traditionally been peaceful co-existence, often based on traditional clan kinships. One suggestion from some of the Burundi respondents was to enhance these ancient clan structures, as potential future 'entries of peace', which might perhaps focus on cultural unities and the crossing of ethnic divides.

What is seen as an overemphasis by some authors on identity issues is supported by those who suggest that there were significant economic and resource factors that contributed to conflict in the Great Lakes. While other authors might perceive identity as less important than economic or resource based factors in causing conflict, the narratives gathered from this research indicate the contrary. Whether the conflict-inducing identity issues suggested by respondents would be mitigated by an absence of poverty and an increase in land is a different question. Some of these resource based issues and other

factors affecting conflict in the Great Lakes and in Africa are explored in more detail below.

2.7 Other factors affecting conflict in the Great Lakes Region and Africa

In order to set the issues of identity within the broader context of conflict in Africa, it is necessary to look at some of the specific theories in the literature considered as additional factors affecting conflicts in the Great Lakes and in Africa. This section recognises however, that the conflicts in the Great Lakes and Africa are extremely complex and presents a brief overview of different issues merely to place the research within a specific context, rather than to explain conflict theory in depth.

2.7.1 *Economic and resource based factors*

In contrast to the belief by some authors that identity is one of the primary motivations for conflicts in Africa (as outlined above), alternative viewpoints suggest that economic and resource factors have more of a role to play than ethnicity. It is suggested that the role of rich nations in terms of the debt burden and their interference in the economies of poor nations and in control of natural resources has more of an impact. In many cases, it is against the interest of national parties and international collaborators for the war to cease – as in the case of DRC – until the wealth of a nation has been fully exploited.

Tandon for example suggests that the debt burden of African states is a key 'root cause of peacelessness' in Africa. He presents a critique of another widely held view that conflict in Africa is due to the lack of economic growth and poor governance. He questions whether these factors are really the cause of conflict in Africa and whether conflicts are the 'fault' of the rulers of Africa and their inability to govern effectively (Tandon, 2000). Instead, Tandon argues that the debt burden imposed on African states is a key factor in

conflict causality. Creditors can use debt as a lever to impose structural adjustment programmes on African nations and ensure an open door policy that allows a free market of foreign goods and capital that is to the advantage of the creditors and the detriment of recipients. Tandon further argues that when one considers the link between a) debt and economic development, and b) the link between the lack of economic growth and conflict, it is evident that:

> One of the significant causes of conflict in Africa is the struggle for survival in a situation of scarce resources. Add to this the argument that the struggle for resources manifests itself in the struggle for state power...(Tandon, 2000: 176).

One might dispute his suggestion that the cancellation of the debt burden would reduce conflict significantly and give rise to sustainable development. The level of corruption in many African states has not been considered in his argument as a factor that influences the economic debate. Furthermore, the priorities of many African states, which favour high military and low social sector expenditure as part of their strategic budgetary plans, do not provide an environment in which the basic social as well as economic needs of the population can be met.

Rogers sees the problem as less to do with the debt burden and potential for economic growth but more with the divide between rich and poor, not only between nations but also within nations. He asserts that the

> ...widening rich-poor divide contrasts markedly with an implicit assumption of most current economic thinking that economic growth is part of the world-wide phenomenon of globalization that is delivering economic growth for all (Rogers, 2000: 12).

He counters this assumption suggesting that there is an increasing division between small numbers of rich and large numbers of poor countries based on new investment focussed on already rich or growing economies. He suggests that

> ...one of the crudest measures is that the 300 or so dollar billionaires in the world are collectively as wealthy as the poorest 2.4 billion people (Rogers, 2000: 12).

Federici indicates the link between structural adjustment policies of the World Bank and IMF in the 1980s and a state of ongoing conflicts in the African continent as a factor in the development of conflict in the region (Federici, 2000) and concurs with Nathan who suggests that African states

> ...lack the resources or expertise to resolve disputes and grievances, manage competition, and protect the rights of citizens, [in which case] individuals and groups may resort to violence (Nathan, 2000: 190).

Many states therefore rely on external agencies to support or manage their financial affairs if conflict breaks down the internal infrastructure necessary to sustain the country independently. The dependence upon, and economic polarisation of poor countries from the rich, may exacerbate and heighten tensions and disparities, leading to the desire for change against inequity. This desire for change is often manifested through armed struggle.

This viewpoint highlights the 'winner takes all' mentality that characterises the power brokers of conflicts in Africa where the exploitation of resources and wealth by the most powerful is commonplace (EPCP, 1999). This is contrary to the belief that stability and peace is the desired outcome for all parties. In some cases, continuing the conflict is in the interests of those perpetrating it. For example in DRC the protagonists of the conflict and more crucially their backers, have little interest in a stable state while they are still able to plunder the mineral resources of the country with impunity. Miall et al suggest that the belief that altruism is behind the process of peace building in many of these countries is a naïve assumption (Miall et al, 1999). The recognition that maintaining conflict might be in the interests of a powerful few is highlighted by the comments of the respondents in this research. This statement from a Congolese teacher in the refugee camps is similar to many from others interviewed in the research:

> Politicians are good at fanning trouble. They use us for their own interest. We have become their project to get what they want: power and wealth.

2.7.2 *Theories of conflict in Africa*

Nathan, in opposition to much of the writing on contemporary conflict in Africa, contends that conflict per se, is not necessarily negative. It can be a positive, energising part of human existence and can be managed as such by open and responsible states that do not repress or deny opposition (Nathan, 2000). Rogers also builds on the positive potential of conflict by suggesting that in some cases conflict is necessary as a 'regenerative' force to oust an oppressive regime (Rogers, 2000). Similarly, Lund argues that there is a possibility for the regenerative power of conflict and cites Yoweri Musevyni's regime in Uganda as an indication:

> ...bloody internal conflicts such as in Rwanda and the earlier struggle he [Musevyni] waged in Uganda simply reflect how regenerative forces are transforming feudal, undemocratic societies into meritocratic, democratic ones. The conflicts are not cause for pessimism but signs of hope, because forceful overthrow is often the only way to get rid of unjust regimes who follow the old beliefs and policies (Lund, 1999: 55).

Unfortunately, Lund's analysis of Uganda as a 'meritocratic, democratic' country fails to recognise the ongoing civil war that has affected Uganda for the past ten years, where the Lord's Resistance Army in the north of the country continues its insurgencies. He further fails to acknowledge Uganda's role in the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo since 1996, where Ugandan troops played a significant part in backing rebels groups in the ongoing civil war.

This dialectic between the two sides of culturally accepted or non-accepted violence has survived throughout history. The war on Iraq in 2003 demonstrated how Saddam Hussein was an ally and trading partner one year, and then demonised and reformulated into a terrorist a decade later. Nelson

Mandela was considered a terrorist by many international regimes before his release and rise to national and international hero. As Nef suggests, 'terrorism and counterterrorism are often dialectically intertwined as two explicit or implicit sides of the same coin' (Nef, 2003: 55). Socially constructed violence where armies give legitimacy to war is often accepted by many nations, as Nef contends,

> This pro-violence attitude has long crossed the cultural, ethnic, and gender divides...All around us violence is glorified in the name of history, destiny, or patriotism (Nef, 2003: 55).

If social violence is a learned behaviour through societal approval of state violence, 'the professionalization of violence' adds a new dimension to the arguments of how educative processes have affected the development of conflict particularly in the Great Lakes region of Africa. As Nef argues:

> There are two basic manifestations of the pedagogy and culture of violence. One is the explicit induction of individuals and groups by means of professional or paraprofessional training in "best practices". The other is a more implicit, subtle, and systematic pedagogy, seemingly outside intentional settings. In the second case, the culture of violence is imbedded by multiple influences, from peer groups, to daily activities, to the media, games...and above all by the allegedly neutral education system (Nef, 2003: 56).

Educative processes in this way have a critical role, both in a formal sense through 'intentional' training for war, or via informal mechanisms that contribute to a socially acceptable culture of violence. It is this embedded culture of violence that Nathan suggests leads to further escalation of conflict in Africa. He argues that repression of constructive conflict has the potential to exacerbate violence rather than developing a liberating experience. Such escalation, Nathan asserts, can arise out of the lack of institutional capacity of a weak or impoverished state to contain or manage conflict within its borders. He proposes that crises,

> ...arise from four structural conditions in particular: authoritarian rule; the exclusion of minorities from governance; socio-

> economic deprivation combined with inequity; and weak states that lack the institutional capacity to manage normal political and social conflict. These conditions – the "four horsemen of the apocalypse" – are the *primary causes* of large scale violence (Nathan, 2000: 189).

Nathan argues that the combination of these four 'horsemen' permit the conditions for violent conflict to thrive in countries in Africa, where all four conditions prevail. He suggests that countries become even more vulnerable to conflict when these conditions possess additional structural and historical legacies from the colonial era. These include the colonial imposition of borders without regard to cultural or ethnic ties as well as the colonial tradition of ethnic favouritism or discrimination (Nathan, 2000). The colonial influence in terms of ethnic favouritism is one of the accepted features of the conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC and is recognised in the narratives of the respondents of the research. Some see their plight as a direct result of the interference of 'whites'.

2.8 Conclusion

Issues affecting conflict in the Great Lakes Region (for the purposes of this research, Burundi, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)) formed the basis for this contextual background to the conflict. Although connected along political, economic and social lines with the three main countries, Uganda and Tanzania have not experienced the same level of conflict that sparked the massive exodus of refugees from Rwanda, Burundi and DRC, and therefore have not been considered in detail in this chapter.

The chapter indicates that much of the literature concerning the conflict in the region suggests that the ongoing conflicts in the region are the result of ethnic divisions. These are said to have dominated the region for several centuries. The existing divisions were later exploited further by colonial rulers, who through their divide and rule policies set the foundation for the subsequent 'ethnic' wars in Rwanda and Burundi. These wars destabilised the region further when over a million Rwandan and Burundian refugees surged into

Tanzania and DRC after the genocide in 1994. The effect of the remaining Rwandans in DRC 'exported the Rwandan ethnic and political conflict into Zaire' (Havermens, 1999: 237).

Others however view the ethnic divisions as political or social identity constructs rather than ethnicity per se, while some authors suggest that economic factors also contributed to the continued conflicts in the region. This was particularly so in DRC, where despite the kleptocratic exploitation of mineral wealth on a grand scale, there has been no international impetus to halt the war.

Although education is seen by many respondents as a 'way out' of conflict and of life as a refugee, as will be highlighted in the following chapter, it is often perceived in a negative light – contributing to and fuelling conflict. This paradoxical nature of formal education is explored in depth in the following chapter and is a significant feature of the findings, which indicated the contradictory role 'educated people' played in the conflict.

CHAPTER THREE: THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS

3.1 Introduction

My assumption in this thesis is that there are formal and informal educative processes which are contributory factors in the transmission of information and the construction of identity and that these influence the development of conflict. The term 'educative processes' is used in preference to the more institutionally invested term of education and refers primarily to formal and informal learning mechanisms. It was decided that 'non-formal' mechanisms, which have an informal but often institutional basis, would be analysed within the literature relating to formal and informal processes, where there is considerable overlap. Thus while there is a recognition that non-formal mechanisms are important educative processes, the representation of these are embedded within the examination of formal and informal learning.

In order to clarify the term 'educative processes' further, the following definitions of formal and informal learning were adapted from a European Commission classification:

Formal learning: learning typically provided by an education or training institution, structured (in terms of learning objectives, learning time or learning support) and leading to certification. Formal learning is intentional from the learner's perspective.

Informal learning: learning resulting from daily life activities related to work, family or leisure. It is not structured (in terms of learning objectives, learning time or learning support) and typically does not lead to certification. Informal learning may be intentional but in most cases it is non-intentional (or "incidental"/ random) (EC, 2001: 32-33 in Colley, Hodkinson and Malcolm, 2002).

'Educative processes' therefore encompass all of these elements, both formal and informal, as all-encompassing life-learning processes.

The review of literature in this chapter highlights the contributions and gaps in the existing literature concerning educative processes within the contexts of the countries concerned in this research. Most significantly for this research, the literature reviewed on informal educative processes within a Southern context, provided the basis for the analysis of findings on informal educative processes in Chapter Seven.

This review does not claim to provide a comprehensive review of education theories in general. Nor does it enter into a comparative debate on education practices in the 'North' compared with those of the 'South'. The chapter is more concerned with the totality of educational experiences that individuals undergo throughout their life whether formal or informal – and the potential of these to influence conflict and/or peace. Through these formal and informal processes, the transmission of societal values invests educative processes with the potential for transformation which may or may not be benign.

Much of the literature that examines the relationship between education and conflict recognises both the positive potential of education - usually in its formal sense – to build peace, but also acknowledges the possibility that education can also exacerbate differences that lead to conflict. Bush and Salterelli (2000), Davies (2003), and Smith (2002), for example, all reflect on how these 'two faces' of education highlight both the positive and negative potential of education. Others place increasing emphasis on the positive and transformative potential of education and the possibility for using education as a mechanism for peace building (Boyden, 1996; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2001).

3.2 The education dialectic: a right of protection or preparation for war

Although many authors supported by the international conventions cited below, assert that education should be 'the right' of all children, this is more difficult to sustain particularly in an environment of conflict. The

contradictory nature of formal education, presents education on the one hand as a 'safe haven' from conflict, and highlights the potential harm that some formal education systems can engender, on the other (cf: 3.3 pp. 87-91).

Much of the development literature states that the right to basic education is a *primae facie* principle for most agencies engaged in assistance to Southern countries, particularly those ridden by conflict (Bird, 2003a; Bush and Salterelli, 2000; Nicolai, 2003; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Smith and Vaux, 2003). This is supported and guided by a number of international conventions and human rights acts to ensure that education is available to all children in all circumstances, as both a place and a system of protection from harm and abuse. The key protocols are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951), UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child (1959), Convention against Discrimination in Education (1962), International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination against Women (1981) (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 11). One recommendation not covered by Smith and Vaux's list is the UNESCO 'Recommendation Concerning Education for International Understanding, Co-operation and Peace and Education Relating to Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'. All member states of UNESCO unanimously adopted this recommendation - later known under the title 'Recommendation on International Education' - at its 18th session of the General conference on 19th November 1974 in Paris.

Critically, the UN Convention of the Rights of the Child Article 28 (1989) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 26, both state that education is a universal right for all children and these conventions are the most cited by international agencies concerned with education in difficult environments. Because of the emphasis placed on education within these two conventions, the importance of education provision in all countries including those engaged in, or emerging from conflict is recognised by educators all

over the world (Machel, 1996; Pigozzi, 1999; Sinclair, 2002; Sommers, 1999; UNESCO, 2000; UNHCR, 1995). Education in emergencies is often seen as

> ...not only providing essential social cohesiveness for adults and children alike; but also ensuring the potential for future economic and social growth (Bird, 2003a: 33).

Unfortunately, despite the rhetoric and good intentions of many educators in emergencies, in times of conflict, education rarely features as a priority issue among the major humanitarian agencies. Survival needs tend to be the priority for most agencies engaged in humanitarian relief work, and few recognise that education can be provided in tandem with health, food and water. For example, the department head of one major relief agency stated clearly in an interview that education in emergencies was not a necessity. Survival needs came first and his agency was not willing to consider education as a funding priority.

Such attitudes survive even though much of the literature concerning education in Southern countries confirms that education is regarded as 'a rightful safe haven for children' (Boyden, 1996; Machel, 1996; Roger, 2002; Smith and Vaux, 2003). Roger adds that through the provision of 'quality' education, children and families can be protected from some of the worst excesses of conflict. Schools or their equivalent can also be a place for psychosocial healing and reconciliation and can act as the community's 'barometer' of hope for the future (Roger, 2002).

Many agencies and practitioners working in emergencies argue that education needs to be sustained for functional as well as social reasons. They suggest that the future prosperity and reconstruction of a nation is a significant factor in the justification for provision of education in situations of conflict. Another similar rationalization is Sommers' argument that education has a critical role to play in occupying large numbers of young people in order to avoid the potentially volatile consequences of large numbers of idle youth roaming around refugee camps (Sommers, 1999). This reduction of education to a functional perspective fails to acknowledge the fundamental right of all

children to basic education regardless of circumstance. The UN Millennium Development Goals in contrast recognise the importance of education as a right for its own sake when they state that by 2015 Universal Primary Education should be available to all. This was declared in the Jomtien Declaration of Education for All in 1990 and reiterated in the Dakar Framework for Education of 2000, which states:

> ...that all children, young people and adults have the human right to benefit from an education that will meet their basic learning needs in the best and fullest sense of the term, an education that includes learning to know, to do, to live together and to be (World Education Forum, 2000b).

In contrast to these declarations, much of the literature in development circles emphasises the increasing demand for school systems in Southern countries to be more responsive to economic development (more productive workers and thus more 'adaptive' students). Spring for example argues that the debate is concerned with the dependence on education to supply successful employees. In a world where employability becomes the driving force for education, Spring suggests that there is an

> ...increasing demand for high levels of literacy, numeracy, technological skills and the competencies, such as problem-solving and team-working abilities that are required for successful work (Spring, 1999).

This functionalist perspective has increasingly become part of the Southern education agenda and characterises the ideological position of many engaged in provision of education in emergencies. It contradicts the 'rights approach' to education, which is integral to the human rights conventions mentioned above; where education is perceived as a right for its own sake, for the benefit of the individual, not the state or the state economy.

However, whether taking a functionalist perspective or a human rights approach, education in this context is still regarded as a positive force, whether it is for economic growth and reconstruction or for peaceful transformation. There is an alternative body of literature emerging however, which focuses on

the potentially negative impact of some types of education in conflict-ridden societies. This paradoxical nature of education is explored below.

3.3 The paradox of formal education and its role in conflict

The recognition of education as a force for positive change as discussed above is often counteracted by the perception of education as a failure and a causal factor of children's involvement in war. Krech and Maclure examine this argument, saying that the contradictions of education are

> ...problematic, largely because they hinge on deterministic notions of education as an autonomous force for change... [instead of being]...highly constrained by political, economic, and ideological forces that are national and international in scope (Krech and Maclure, 2003: 141).

This paradox of formal education, its potential for breeding violence or for promoting social and civic reconstruction is reiterated by several authors. It is also a significant factor in the findings, which present 'educated people' as possessing paradoxical roles in relation to conflict (9.2.1 pp. 233 -237).

In the collection of works edited by Tawil and Harley, authors were asked to assess '...the ways in which formal schooling may be seen to have undermined social cohesion.' but this was contrasted with the examination of '...how education can also contribute to reconstructing and renewing social peace based on justice' (Tawil and Harley, 2004: 7). This duality of roles within formal education is also highlighted by Bush and Salterelli who refer to the paradoxical nature of formal education as the 'two faces of education'.

In their analysis of whether education can alter the 'rules' of ethnic conflict by early educational and social interventions, Bush and Salterelli indicate how the negative face of education has the potential to exacerbate conflict while also highlighting how good quality education can have cumulative benefits as a mechanism for conflict prevention. They argue that the 'conflict-dampening' impact of educational opportunity can encourage the promotion of linguistic

diversity, the nurturing of ethnic tolerance, and the 'disarming' of history (Bush and Salterelli, 2000). However, they also recognise, as does Nelles, that education can counter the positive when it is

> ...used to preserve and in some ways promulgate an identity, concentrating on differences in socioeconomic status, language or nationality. [Therefore,]...education presents a paradox for those examining it with a view toward understanding conflict (Nelles, 2003: 131).

In emphasising the paradox of education, Bush and Salterelli similarly argue that:

> If it is true that education can have a socially constructive impact on inter-group relations, then it is equally evident that it can have a socially destructive impact (Bush and Salterelli, 2000: 9).

The potential for negative manipulation embedded in some education systems is perceived in the literature as being a significant factor in influencing conflict. This was indicated at the outset of this thesis in reference to Nazi Germany. In his comprehensive review of Nazi Germany's education system, Wegner presents the historical development of the curriculum materials developed by theoreticians and pedagogues as an

> ...ambitious project to transform curriculum along racial anti-semitic lines through the union of myth with science...Nazis were the first political culture to legitimize racial anti-Semitism in school curriculum with the full legal support of the state (Wegner, 2002: 3-5).

The legitimisation of prejudice – the licit demonisation of the 'other' - through the formal education system is something that is common in the conflicts dealt with in this thesis. Schools and teachers become part of, or subject to, manipulation and control, as repressive regimes often regard education either as a threat to their power or as a tool for indoctrination. Not only can educational institutions become a target of war, but education can also be a contributor to the causes of war. Bush and Salterelli for example point to education as a contributory factor in conflict through the uneven distribution of education provision - which creates or preserves privilege - as a weapon of

cultural repression, and through the production or doctoring of textbooks to promote intolerance (Bush and Salterelli, 2000).

Similarly, Davies argues that there are a number of dimensions to the 'education-conflict interface', one of which is the potential of education to contribute to social inequalities which may in turn generate conflict. She suggests that school can actually be a preparation for war, through violence either in the school or through the curriculum. The competition and examination systems of many schools also subject children to fear, and anxiety, where failure may lead to frustration, low-self esteem, and a predisposition towards violence or tension (Davies, 2003).

Likewise, Smith and Vaux suggest that education can be used in a negative and harmful way through the manipulation of textbooks either for political purposes or through inculcation of attitudes of superiority of gender, culture, religion or race. They assert that because education can contribute to and even exacerbate conflict, the relationship between education and conflict should be a core component of educational planning in countries undergoing or emerging from conflict (Smith and Vaux, 2003).

The political and social manipulation of history education has been well documented elsewhere and a number of authors provide examples of negative elements that they believe have exacerbated recent conflicts in Africa (Arthur and Phillips, 2000; Baranovic, 2001; Bird, 2003a; Bush and Salterelli, 2000; Davies, 2003; Obura, 2003; Slater, 1995; Smith and Vaux, 2003). However, Obura's illumination of history teaching in Rwanda is of particular interest to this research and is discussed briefly below.

The teaching of history and the manipulation of historical facts was a key factor in the Rwanda genocide according to Obura. She states:

> Rwandan nationals are pointing also to how the education system was used over several decades as an instrument for fomenting exclusion and hate (Obura, 2003: 98).

In her examination of the reconstruction of the Rwandan education system after the genocide, Obura indicates that dealing with the sensitivity of teaching history in an objective but meaningful way is proving to be a very difficult task as 'there have been no history textbooks written or published since 1994' (Obura, 2003: 99). She suggests that the historical myths that were perpetuated before, during and after the genocide have constructed an erroneous worldview of the dynamics of Rwandan society. These 'myths' as she explains them suggest that the three 'tribes' of Rwanda, i.e. the Bahutu, Batutsi and Batwa, were from different origins. The supposed 'indigenous' Batwa were dominated by the later arrivals in the mid to latter part of the last millennium by the Bahutu and then by the Batutsi who were regarded as coming from a more sophisticated and educated culture. Colonialists perpetuated these myths as part of their justification for placing Tutsis in positions of administrative power. Obura argues that this view of how the different tribes arrived in Rwanda is 'untenable' given recent Rwandan historical evidence, which suggests that the 'ancestors' of the three groups lived in Rwandan territory and the Great Lakes region for over two thousand years.

Obura also points to the comments of Rwandan elders who have described their common heritage as descendants from a shared ancestor 'Gihanga' (Obura, 2003). This view of Rwandan history – as discussed above in Chapter 2.6 – Pottier argues is the predominant view of the leaders of the current Rwandan government. They have chosen to ignore decades of historical evidence prior to the genocide, in preference to the expedient assertion that the colonists were primarily responsible for instituting the Twentieth Century ethnic divisions (Pottier, 2002).

Obura suggests that the view that created the Banyarwanda as separate ethnic groups is based on the misperceptions and misunderstandings of

> European explorers, missionaries and colonizers, which they created for themselves in an attempt to explain African cultural phenomena through their own world view (Obura, 2003: 101).

Rwandans were then in effect forced to take on the European perceptions of Rwandan society and to learn the European view of their own history in the classroom. An interesting parallel to this can be seen in Northern Ireland, where in the past, the education system reflected the divisions within the society. The history curriculum in Protestant schools for example, taught only the history of Great Britain. Schools it seemed 'attempted to exclude engagement with issues related to the divisions and conflict in wider society' (Arlow, 2004: 278).

The manipulation of history and textbooks highlights just one of the factors indicating how formal educative processes can contribute to the exacerbation of conflict, where '...versions of "official history" are often integral to the roots of the conflict, thus making history a highly charged concept' (Tawil and Harley, 2004: 12).

What few of the authors mentioned above have examined is the interface between formal and informal educative processes, in the prevention, mitigation and reconstruction of what Tawil and Harley have termed social cohesion, during conflict and post-conflict situations. The potentially transformative aspects of informal education are examined in the section below where informal educative processes are perceived as part of a life process.

3.4 Informal Educative Processes

Much of the literature suggests that informal educative processes – usually described in the literature as informal learning – is typically unstructured and does not lead to certification. Using the learner's own experience (instead of externally imposed curricula) is how Livingstone describes the process of informal learning, which he suggests is

> ...any activity involving the pursuit of understanding, knowledge or skill which occurs without the presence of externally imposed curricular criteria...in any context outside

> the pre-established curricula of educative institutions (Livingstone, 2001: 4).

Billett argues however that the term informal learning is misleading as all actions imply some from of learning. He suggests that most learning takes place outside educational institutions (Billett, 2001 in Colley, Hodkinson and Malcolm, 2002).

In the Southern context, this assertion is particularly valid, as in most traditional societies the knowledge and experience has been handed down through the generations. As Obanya suggests:

> ...in traditional African societies, the venue for learning was the entire society...Generally speaking, general education was given by parents, elders, and within age groups and castes. The "teacher" in this case would be anyone who was older than the "pupil" and so knew more about the world (Obanya, 1995: 4).

Informal educative processes are part of life experiences and as a result face similar accusations laid at the door of formal education i.e. that they have the potential to breed violence. As Nelles argues, informal educative processes can equally be

> ...complicit in, or directly responsible, for the reproduction or mitigation of violence, including specific formats or responses such as terrorism and war (Nelles, 2003: 239).

He also points to educative mechanisms, which although within a formal learning environment, are informal in nature. He highlights the role of the 'hidden curriculum', i.e. informal values that are part of educational institutions, which are often stronger in terms of inculcating attitudes and beliefs than the formal structures. He suggests that

> ...the hidden curriculum concerns itself with school values, rituals, group loyalties, peer influences and friendship patterns (Nelles, 2003: 131).

He also argues that these patterns from the basis 'on which society later builds a superstructure of political, demographic, recreational and social segregation' (Nelles, 2003: 131). The findings of this research reflect Nelles' arguments

regarding the strength of the hidden curriculum, where informal peer networks and organisational structures formed within the school grounds were identified as significant learning conduits (in relation to conflict), sometimes more so than formal class teaching.

Out of these informal educative processes, the social construction of reality and the development of information societies are created. Critical social theorists such as Freire and Habermas perceive educative processes as part of the social construct of power. They suggest that these maintain the inequalities of relationships within society. In this way, the manipulation of knowledge through control of education by central power structures and elites also ensures the control of knowledge (Freire, 1970; Habermas, 1968). The control of knowledge if viewed on a global basis is certainly centred upon literate rather than oral cultures, where power structures are maintained by dictating whose knowledge counts and whose 'discourse' is the most powerful. The oral tradition in this context is frequently given less status and recognition than a literate tradition. The value placed on whose knowledge counts and the value placed on orality when compared to literacy is explored in more depth below.

3.4.1 *The oral tradition*

Much of the research literature acknowledges that literate societies, typically in the North, place greater emphasis on information and knowledge that is received through the written form (Goody, 1987; Kimmerle, 1997; Mafu, 2004; Ong, 1982). In the era of globalisation, oral cultures tend to be disempowered by the importance placed on information that is derived from text. This is despite the fact that there is a strong oral tradition in the majority of African cultures, which often possesses greater significance than text. As the findings illustrated, the oral transmission of information was particularly critical for the refugees in passing down stories relating to the perceived historical causes of the conflict. Oral transmissions were also refugees' main source of information about the current situation in their countries of origin. Pottier similarly points to the importance of the oral tradition in developing

and maintaining *dominant narratives;* as the remembrance of things past and passed down is also critical in the accepted narratives of international aid organisations and journalists (Pottier, 2002).

Vansina also indicates how oral tradition is part of the remembrance of things past, and therefore the source of history. He defines these as 'verbal messages which are reported statements from the past beyond the present generation...[which are] spoken, sung or called out on musical instruments only' (Vansina, 1985: 27).

Learning in a traditional African culture is part of everyday life in an informal sense. Individuals, as part of a community, are continually learning through the environments they are placed in and the hardships they face. Traditionally the acquisition of wisdom was respected and young people looked to elders to assist their progress towards acquiring knowledge. Traditional knowledge was passed down through the generations though a culture of oral tradition. While in many countries these traditions are eroding, this educative relationship between the young and old has been given greater significance in the refugee camps of this study. It is typically women, children and the elderly who are first to flee from conflict, and elders on arrival in the camps are frequently left as caretakers of the young. Some of the historical prejudices passed on to children from their grandparents were visible in the paintings that children produced in a series of printmaking workshops conducted in the camps (cf: 5.7.5 pp. 157-158). Some of these children had not been involved in the conflict, but had learnt about it from their elders and presented visual representations of conflict that they had never witnessed, but which were graphic in their violence.

In contrast to some of these negative aspects of oral history passed down in the refugee camps, many authors writing on oral tradition focus on its positive elements as provider of entertainment through stories, myths and legends, and as a strong educative process that imparted moral, societal or tribal skills and values. This was often through the 'apprenticeship' of the younger generation to older members of the tribe or group (Mafu, 2004). The learning of skills

through clan associations was another significant mechanism for young people to learn skills from their elders.

These skills would invariably be taught orally, and would bind members of the same clan together in strong kinship networks (Mafu, 2004). The traditions of clan culture were rarely written down. Mafu, describes certain clans who he said were

> ...held to be endowed with supernatural powers and here too the transmission of the knowledge needed to exercise these powers was always by face-to-face communication. The secrets were not written down (Mafu, 2004: 54).

The clan networks that Mafu describes, were also found in Burundi, and were mentioned by respondents as possible entries for peace. Some respondents argued that as clans spanned ethnic divides, thereby mixing ethnic groups, there was a possibility of utilising clan culture for peace building. One Burundian educator for example in an individual interview discussed the relationship of clans in Burundi many of which still exist, and some of which cross the ethnic boundaries:

> These are more clans than tribes and are not based on family or other lines, but more through common interest. For example there might be a clan of potters, or a clan of basket makers. These might not be from the same region, although there are some clans which do reside together. A lot of times the members of the clan don't know each other, but if they find out that they are from the same clan then there is an automatic bond/friendship.

Another example of how ethnic barriers can be crossed was the example provided by the same educator of the 'joking tribe'. He describes how the

> ...joking tribe while joking the other clan also has a responsibility to them as well which are taken very seriously. So for example if a person dies from one tribe and the joking tribe comes to the funeral, they will say to the coffin, 'get up you lazy man, what are you doing down there you're not dead' but at the same time they will be providing maybe money or food for the funeral feast or one person will have to help the family for the whole week.

Again most of these traditions would be passed down as part of the oral culture. For some societies, including that of Tanzania where Mafu's research is located, formal education and the development of a written language came into force during the colonial era. Mafu suggests:

> ...formal education organised by Christian sects gradually replaced the indigenous traditions for educating and training young people. The missionaries, and later the state in the form of the colonial government, dislocated traditional education (Mafu, 2004: 56).

This overriding of indigenous culture forced the oral tradition towards the written form, which rarely considered the preservation of the traditional practices and folklore, focusing instead on the moral and cultural values to be imparted through a largely Western education system (Mafu, 2004: 56). This not only affected the oral tradition but also the language in which that tradition was held. The introduction of formal education and the need for textbooks required a standardised language, thereby undermining the traditional languages of various tribes.

In his article on written text in an African oral tradition, Kimmerle indicates this undermining of oral cultures is a hierarchical perspective that highlights the 'opposition of oral and literate' societies. He summarises Jacques Derrida's argument suggesting that the dominance of the literate culture is typically a recent Eurocentric phenomenon. Derrida points out that traditionally there was a preference for the oral over the literate dating back to the time of Plato, which has been largely ignored. In cultures where writing was traditionally only an aide memoire, one would expect that 'orality' should be preferred over 'literacy' and that cultures with strong oral traditions should be preferred over literate societies. As Kimmerle indicates however, this is not the case and

> ...paradoxically the valuation is vice versa. Mainly literate cultures are highly preferred above mainly oral ones (Kimmerle, 1997).

In situations of conflict where there is little opportunity to engage in or develop a literate society – as access to printed texts is limited – orality and the

oral tradition is particularly significant. It not only provides a strong social function in cementing community networks, but also is sometimes the only mechanism by which some marginalised groups receive their information about the conflict. Local knowledge and local traditions are similarly highly valued. Elders have a particular status and role to play in traditional societies. Although in the refugee camp, they saw their status eroded because of the changes in administrative structures of the camp, there was still recognition that 'wise men' had the moral authority to judge others – even in the camps. For example in Burundi, *'abashingantahe'* like the *gacaca* courts of Rwanda, is a long-standing common-law system of justice practised among Burundians. Under this system, jurors are trained to dispense justice to breakers of community laws and codes of acceptable conduct. The jurors are typically 'wise men' who have been selected from the 'moral members' of the community as being particularly knowledgeable and fair minded. Their age and wisdom is valued.

While the status of elders and of the oral tradition is still recognised in African cultures, many Southern countries are increasingly aware of the development discourse that is required in order to receive much needed funding and are very clear whose epistemology counts. The literature suggests that the rhetoric of development agencies encourages the use of indigenous knowledge through the promotion of partnership dialogue and 'ownership' of indigenous led projects (Kampe, 1997; Obanya, 1995; Pottier et al, 2003; Robinson-Pant, 2001; van der Velden, 2003). However, most countries or communities adapt and subsume their own knowledge in favour of what a particular development agency wants to hear (Robinson-Pant, 2001; Pottier et al, 2003).

Similarly, Visvanathan suggests that it is rare that development agencies consider the variety of different knowledges, the relative values of each and their link to livelihoods. He suggests there is a need to consider 'cognitive justice' where different knowledges exist on equal terms (Visvanathan, 2001). Only if all partners in the dialogue are equally recognised in terms of their contribution can true partnership be implemented. Van der Velden also questions whether the 'Development Gateway' (the World Bank led

knowledge repository for developing nations) really allows various knowledges to meet on an equal basis as its slogan insists (van der Velden, 2003). Traditional knowledge for development is rarely given the same value that it possesses in its own culture.

The limited value placed on indigenous knowledge is also reflected in education provision, which has traditionally failed to meet the needs of indigenous groups. The Education For All drive tends to strengthen standardisation, for a 'quick fix' education that fails to cater for the needs of minority groups, or recognise indigenous knowledge as education in its own right. As Kampe suggests,

> ...indigenous education has been denigrated by outsiders for so long that the people themselves now rate it as insignificant (Kampe, 1997: 157).

Such reductionism Kampe suggests has translated into a lack of acknowledgement of local knowledge or conditions in the formal school system. These he suggests

> ...implicitly [promote] urban values, and by ignoring indigenous knowledge and skills also appears to dismiss the likelihood of an important contribution being made by indigenous leaders and others whose job it is to carry and pass on the accumulated traditions of the culture (Kampe, 1997: 157).

The disrespect surrounding information and knowledge that is not within the globally accepted norm highlights the polarity of values placed on different knowledges. Until people can take control and power over their own information, then the dialectic between 'knowledge, people and power' favours what van der Velden terms, 'a corporate framework of knowledge management' (van der Velden, 2002: 3). She contradicts the World Bank view that knowledge can be neutral by suggesting that

> ...the new development paradigm is likely to be shaped by the institutions and experts positioned to exert the greatest influence and control. It is their knowledge and their understanding of the role of knowledge in development that

> informs the new development discourse (van der Velden, 2002: 3).

Few development agencies go beyond the rhetoric of partnership and ownership to ensure that indigenous knowledge and traditions are fully recognised in the development discourse. The knowledge that is accepted as the most valid typically comes from those countries delivering development assistance not those receiving it. Despite their rhetoric, few development projects are truly accountable to their local counterparts. As mentioned above, the reality of the development discourse is dependent on whose knowledge counts.

Although access to internet, radio and television in Southern countries may increase access to wider forms of knowledge than before, there are still issues of power and control over these media, particularly when related to development. As McGrath asks 'who constructs, defines and controls knowledge for development?' (McGrath, 2001: 5). Those societies which have less access to knowledge will be increasingly marginalised and unable to take up their own position in the knowledge development race. Their inputs will be defined by those who have greater power and control over the media that controls knowledge for development. This is particularly so for countries engaged in conflict as they have less access to media that is independent of state control or manipulation.

Van Der Welden also recognises the importance of capacity in the knowledge development process by suggesting that

> How people will actually use information, integrate it in their knowledge, is more a function of people's capacities, opportunities, education, experiences, senses, values and intuition, than of the information that reaches them. The availability of information or knowledge alone does not change behaviour (van der Velden, 2003: 8).

In order that knowledge creation for development can truly work, she argues that it must be 'generative', taking account of people's contexts, culture and

diversities when examining their existing knowledge capacities (van der Velden, 2003: 8).

Much of the literature surrounding the knowledge for development discourse focuses on knowledge economies, knowledge societies, and knowledge management. Without 'knowledge' nations cannot 'develop'. Once again, this view ignores the historical and traditional cultures of societies where countries are seen to be 'developing' because they have yet to reach the required norm of what a 'developed' society looks like. Therefore 'developing' nations must acquire more knowledge – the 'correct knowledge' in order to develop. Samoff and Stromquist challenge this assumption that transition towards a knowledge economy will reduce the disparities between rich and poor nations, suggesting instead that

> There is no reason to think that a transition to a knowledge economy will necessarily be better for poor people or poor countries than whatever preceded it. Indeed, those who are currently powerful and influential will be best placed to manipulate the new setting and new rules to their advantage (Samoff and Stromquist, 2001: 632).

This manipulation and control of information, and therefore knowledge, as outlined in the arguments above, not only applies to rich and powerful nations, but also within the countries under study. The powerful and influential people are the gatekeepers of essential pieces of information. This is reflected in the findings from this research on 'structural levels' in Chapter Eight where respondents clearly identified different levels of society in terms of their access to, and utilisation of, information and therefore knowledge. The marginalised of society, the lowest level according the respondents' own definitions of 'structural levels', were perceived to have little or no access to information and therefore knowledge and power. They knew that the knowledge of people they described as 'outside the circle' did not count.

For locally adapted knowledge strategies to be effective it is also necessary to recognise the mechanisms for passing on information and knowledge in traditional societies and provide opportunities for new knowledge to be transmitted by traditional means. The traditional culture of learning in African

societies was through information and knowledge passed down from generation to generation through an oral tradition. Specialised knowledge residing in libraries, museums or laboratories was restricted to few educated individuals and the knowledge and skills required to access this knowledge 'was a long and arduous' process (Obanya, 1995: 5). The challenge is for development agencies to ensure their strategies that claim to respect local knowledge, also respect and utilise traditional mechanisms for transmitting that knowledge.

When information and knowledge is received and transmitted through traditional mechanisms, it implies utilisation of a primarily oral culture. This includes the mechanisms by which individuals and communities communicate on a daily basis through gossip and 'street talk'. However, there is limited literature available regarding the influence of gossip and rumour, which as indicated below is highly influential both socially and psychologically.

3.4.2 *The power of gossip and rumour*

In all societies, gossip and rumour are part of everyday existence that define our reality and the constructs of the world around us. We extract meaning and learn through the practice of believing or disbelieving, trusting or not trusting the information that is given to us, whether it is in written form, or through gossip and rumour. As indicated above, the power of the oral tradition is significant in African societies, and gossip and rumour in the African oral tradition - as with any other society - has a powerful role to play, psychologically, socially and culturally.

Despite the obvious role that gossip possesses within every culture there is limited literature available that focuses on the discourse of gossip. This is particularly the case for research that focuses on gossip in African cultures. Wickham in his analysis of gossip among the medieaval peasantry argues that

> There are almost no cultural or historical analyses of actual gossiping sequences or practices, even in the present day. (A new, systematic, analysis of such sequences is spoilt by its amazing assumption that gossip is always regarded as `morally contaminated') (Wickham, 1998: 3).

Wickham further suggests that one of the reasons for this might be because the disciplines

> ...most capable of generating an adequate gossip theory, oral history and cultural studies, have suffered so much from having the stigma of being about 'mere' gossip thrown at them that they have for the most part worked fairly hard to avoid overt links with studying gossip at all (Wickham, 1998: 3).

Gossip is typically imbued with certain malign influences that ignore its potential for social bonding that result from gossiping within and between social networks. It is seen as undermining, 'as going behind one's back', as creating tensions, accusations and a culture of fear. However, a small body of literature counteracts this popular perception of gossip. It emphasises the more positive aspects of gossip i.e. that it helps to establish working and social relationships and cement social ties (Levin and Arluke, 1987; Rosnow and Fine, 1976; Wickham, 1998). This cementing of social ties is particularly important in African cultures where there has been a long tradition of gossip as part of the fabric of daily life, whether through families gathering at the water points, elders sitting under the mango tree or families chatting after church. All are places where gossip is a natural and important function of finding out new information or confirming existing anecdotes. It is not considered as idle or malign, just normal.

Some of the literature indicates that gossip is part of the social construction of reality for most socio-identity groups. Wickham for example asserts that cultural identity and group identity is defined by 'talking'. He suggests that the way gossip defines group identity is of interest to historians, because:

> Groups construct themselves by talking. Some of this talking is about shared memories, what I have elsewhere called social memory: the socially relevant past, which legitimates or gives meaning to the present for the group which commemorates it (Wickham, 1998: 3).

The social interaction and construction between individuals and groups which define gossip is by its nature paradoxical. As Field highlights there is potential for 'rejection' or 'affirmation' depending on the type of social interaction that contextualises the gossip. He suggests:

> Gossip defies rigid and closed scientific truths and therefore requires open-ended conclusions that affirm its elusive and paradoxical characteristics...The manner in which gossip acts as both mechanism for rejection *and* affirmation, exclusion and inclusion, is not given sufficient acknowledgment. Social boundaries are as paradoxical and equivocal as the social activities that happen behind and through them (Field, 1996).

The definition of identity through social interaction, a large part of which centres on gossip was reflected clearly in the research findings. Many of the respondents said that they had discovered their ethnic identity not only from their parents - as one might have expected - but also from neighbours 'gossiping' about them, or people talking about them or to them in the street. In this way, gossip acted as either, social cement within an ethnic group, or as a mechanism by the opposing group to warn others to steer clear of the 'enemy'. Vansina suggested this was 'a traditional technique for discouraging the enemy and for rallying faithful followers, which consists of spreading false rumour for this purpose' (Vansina 1961: 118, in Malkki, 1995: 307).

Rosnow and Fine also indicate the importance of talk, of gossip, as a mechanism for social inclusion, for forming and maintaining social networks. They suggest that there is something 'wrong' in life if people are not talking about other people. It is a sign of social alienation (Rosnow and Fine, 1976). Similarly, Wickham argues:

> What people gossip about, what stories they tell, will also tell you how their group socially constructs the world outside as meaningful, and about how it understands the processes of practical behaviour, `habitus', as Pierre Bourdieu calls them, which structure the way everyone deals strategically with that world (Wickham, 1998: 3).

The daily process of gossip is becoming increasingly supported by technology and is explored in more detail in section 3.4.4 which outlines how in most modern cultures (and now in the refugee camps), technological advances have moved the culture of gossip away from the street corner to the mobile phone and internet chat room. In her summary of research into the role of mobile phone gossip, Kate Fox likens gossip to 'social grooming' among primates, a form of social bonding that builds alliances and networks. Mobile phones have facilitated the process of gossip in the fast-paced modern world of technology as demonstrated in the case of Paul Cooper a young British man beaten to death because of local gossip that had branded him as a paedophile. He was totally innocent (The Independent, 2005). The gossip fed on the community's 'fears of crime' which also is a feature of rumour as described below.

Rumour is sometimes perceived as different from gossip, as rumour is believed to have an underlying motive attached, which is not typically benign. Rumours tend to deal with people's anxieties; and are frequently a reflection of societal hopes and fears. Rosnow and Fine separate these kinds of rumours into two distinct categories, those that we wish are true and others that we dread and 'pray are false'. (Rosnow and Fine, 1976). The example that Ssereo provides of Somalis (which until the early 1980s was an oral culture), highlights the anxiety factor embedded in rumour 'in maintaining tribal allegiances, creating fear and intimidation' (Ssereo, 2003: 32). State security officers were not required to produce written reports, only daily oral submissions. Arrests were made without written warrants. The judicial system therefore was based on unsubstantiated oral communications, which could often be little more than rumour or gossip. Ssereo points to the fact that:

> The private and state information service also relied upon rumours and hearsay for their information. The source of oral information was neither investigated nor confirmed (Ssereo, 2003: 33).

The fact that rumour plays so successfully on people's fears and anxieties, is the reason why rumour is often treated with suspicion, and its success is particularly dependent on who is spreading it. Consequently those rumours

that come from within one's own trusted network are more likely to be believed and more likely to be transmitted to others. The findings in the research confirmed that rumours from trustworthy sources – typically from 'own group networks' – were believed more readily than 'fact' from sources considered doubtful. Trust plays an important role in the successful spreading of rumour. In this way, rumour shares similarities with gossip in terms of its tendency to spread information within rather than across social groups. Rumour spreads most rapidly along pre-existing networks rather than among persons of unequal social status. As Colletta and Cullen suggest:

> These civic networks foster norms of reciprocity that reinforce sentiments of trust within a society and improve the effectiveness of communications and social organization. Trust, improved communications, and the flow of information enhance the efficiency of institutions (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 7-10).

This relationship of trust as the cementing factor between social networks, and the 'glue' that binds collective identities is explored in more depth in Chapters Nine and Ten.

In their classic book on the Psychology of Rumour, Allport and Postman created a formula to try to deal with the spread of rumour and how to counteract it. Their definition of rumour is pertinent to this research:

> A rumor, as we shall use the term, is a specific (or topical) proposition for belief, passed along from person to person, usually by word of mouth, without secure standards of evidence being present. The implication in any rumor is always that some truth is being communicated. This implication holds even though the teller prefaces his tidbit with the warning, 'it is only a rumor, but I heard...' (Allport and Postman, 1947: 15).

Allport and Postman's formula tried to establish how a rumour could be scotched by providing what they term 'secure standards of evidence'. They suggest that a rumour can only exist where there are no secure standards of evidence available. As soon as something is verifiable and facts established the rumour dies as a rumour and is recreated as either fact or fiction.

Most critically for this research, it is the element of truth and trust that are the essential ingredients for a rumour to be taken seriously. Vansina similarly recognises the need for truth in the distinction between narratives that

> ...belong to two different classes according to the criterion of factuality. Factual traditions or accounts are transmitted differently – than are fictional narratives such as tales, proverbs or sayings. The criterion hangs on the notion of truth...(Vansina, 1985: 13).

The respondents in the research consistently stated the desire and need for truth. For rumour - as well as other information - to be believed, truth was a necessary element. Truth was also related to trust and trustworthy sources. The importance of trust is a significant element in the 'life' of a rumour. The recent examples over the build up and execution of the Iraq war from 2002-2004 have highlighted this graphically. The British government provided a great deal of 'evidence' about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq as their central argument for going to war, but the population were still not convinced of the veracity of much of the information. Their suspicion over the truth of the 'evidence' was illustrated by mass anti-war demonstrations in 2002 and 2003; suspicion since proven to be justified.

3.4.3 *Belief systems: propaganda, 'magic' and the use of the media*

Thomas (1971) suggests that once initial belief systems are accepted, nothing will shake them, but this has not stopped propagandists and others from attempting to influence and alter popular belief systems. Their techniques aim to make enemies acceptable targets, to justify war, to demonise the enemy in order to make it palatable to kill them as an inevitable consequence of the intended war. Propaganda was powerfully evident in activities such as the 'mass motivation' of peoples e.g. Christianity, Islam, as well as figures such as Cromwell, Mussolini or Hitler.

The level of mass motivation and co-operation, Thomson asserts, is determined by the capacity of leaders to effectively utilise and control

different forms of media (Thomson, 1999: 6). Control of media by either manipulation of business and commercial interest or through state run media houses, ensures that leaders are able to guarantee the nature and timing of the information and propaganda that is broadcast.

Although media is no doubt a powerful mechanism for transmitting important propagandist information, Ellul suggests that there is a level of consent achieved between the propagandist and the propagandee which reflects the reciprocal needs of both. He states:

> There is not just a wicked propagandist at work who sets up means to ensnare the innocent citizen. Rather there is a citizen who craves propaganda from the bottom of his being and a propagandist who responds to this craving...propaganda is not just a deliberate and more or less arbitrary creation by some people in power...it is a strictly sociological phenomenon, in the sense that it has roots and reasons in the need of the group that will sustain it (Ellul, 1966: 121).

Propaganda in this way works - as rumour also does - on people's existing beliefs and fears to build a form of consensual legality which legitimises what the propagandists want to promote. The fear factor was used to such effect by the propagandists in Rwanda through the notorious Radio Milles Collines. As Mamdani highlights:

> For Hutu Power propagandists, the Tutsi question was not one of rights, but of power...that the real aim of the RPF was not rights for all Rwandans, but power for the Tutsi. This is why one needs to recognize that it was not greed-not even hatred-but *fear* which was the reason why the multitude responded to the call of Hutu Power the closer the war came to home (Mamdani, 2001: 191).

Propagandists therefore in this instance were manipulating the existing Hutu psyche and working upon it to build up the fear of Tutsi repression as palpable, closer and more dangerous. As Ellul asserts, propaganda does not come out of nothing, it has to

> ...attach itself to a feeling, an idea; it must build on a foundation already present in the individual (Ellul, 1966: 36).

Thus for propaganda to be successful it must touch the individual's sense of self-affirmation and identification with the propagandist. Typically nowadays, this is through means of mass communication such as radio, television and internet. It is for this reason that Ellul suggests propaganda rarely succeeds with organised groups, because the values of the group overrides the individual. For mass propaganda to work it needs to appeal to the individual sentiment or need. While propaganda within a group can be highly successful, Ellul identifies this as a different issue, which is more akin to political or religious indoctrination (Ellul, 1996).

Such group identification is often a factor in strongly held belief systems such as Communism or Christianity, which are very rarely changed by 'psychological manipulations.' Ellul argues that for example

> ...a Communist or a Christian with strong beliefs is very little, if at all, shaken by adverse propaganda. Similarly, a prejudice or a stereotype is hardly ever changed by propaganda; for example it is almost impossible to break down racial prejudice by propaganda (Ellul, 1996: 33).

One of the outcomes of this research is hopefully to uncover more effective mechanisms to shake entrenched values and prejudices. To do this one has to understand some of the cultural contexts and belief systems in which the research is embedded. For example 'magic' and 'witchcraft' stories hold particular significance for the respondents in this research.

The belief in myth or 'magic' is classed as knowledge that is not based on known fact or truth, but which arises from a human belief that problems of the natural world can be overcome through supernatural means. This power of myth and 'magic' should not be underestimated particularly in explaining the willingness of certain groups to go to war. As seen above, propagandists and state leaders are well aware of this power of myth and use it effectively to support their cause. As Taylor asserts:

> Propaganda is about persuading people to do things which benefit those doing the persuading, either directly or indirectly.

> In wartime that usually means getting them to fight or support the fight (Taylor, 1995: 6).

As explored in Chapter Eight leaders in the DRC conflict also used the power of myth and 'magic' to their advantage in persuading their people to fight. This included the notorious Mai-Mai soldiers, a nationalist military reserve created to face rebellions and occupations by foreign armies too widespread and numerous for the army-proper to handle. 'Mai-Mai' literally means water – magic water, which, when applied, is said to protect a soldier from bullets. The soldiers were convinced not only by the 'magic' but also by their leaders that they would be invincible in battle, regardless of any physical evidence to the contrary. Similar stories are recounted by Bergner in his account of people affected by the civil war in Sierra Leone. He describes his introduction to the 'power' of the hunting society priests.

> ...I had been invited, one afternoon, to a display of power by a hunting society priest...Artillery could not strike him, could not even fire in his direction, because of his whisk. The rounds would fly back towards the one who had shot them. Sometimes, he explained, he fought naked except for a headpiece (Bergner, 2003: 57).

Similar stories were relayed to me of the 'power' of the Traditional Kings' from DRC and their ability to 'transport themselves' to avoid bullets, or to use the 'magic water' to deflect them.

The importance of 'magic' was recognised by Malinowski in his research with the Trobriand Islanders in the 1930s and 1940s. He asserted that 'magic' served to fill the void of the unknown, to reduce anxiety, particularly for those with low technological development. He claimed that 'magic' is to be found where there is a 'gap' in knowledge or understanding of the world, when undertaking an activity over which one has no control (Malinowski, 1948). Therefore, in order to reduce anxiety and sometimes abdicate responsibility for the outcome, one invokes 'magic'. Similar invocations of 'magic' of a different kind are to be found in modern Northern countries where the almost 'magical' belief in the power of medicine and science suffers from a similar gap in understanding and knowledge. Although this gap is being narrowed by

the increasing amount of information on the internet, there is still a belief system that encourages patients to accept that the 'doctor is always right'.

Belief systems including those that involve 'magical' elements are also buoyed up by myth, traditional story telling and name-calling. Thomson calls these 'tricks of the trade', which are frequently used by propagandists and the media to demonise or ridicule powerful figures in society. The chant of 'Hey, Hey, LBJ, how many kids have you killed today?' was familiar during anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the US and almost every nation has similar examples of name-calling and ritualised ridiculing of hate figures (Thomson, 1999). In Rwanda, there was a reduction of Tutsis to insects and 'cockroaches' through name calling and propaganda, which distanced the perpetrators from their crime. They were expunging a pest and the radio reinforced this with a constant barrage of comments that cast Tutsis as inhuman and therefore easier to kill.

The power of the media in this context of belief manufacture is significant as is the increasing role of the media in determining public thought and reaction. For example, the horror of the pictures of starving babies during the Ethiopian famine of 1984 produced an unprecedented outpouring of goodwill and funds across the world with Band Aid and then Live Aid. This was entirely because of television coverage. However as Taylor suggests while some politicians respond to media and television, this is not always the case. Often they only respond when the consequences affect their political position. The Rwandan genocide is a case in point. As Taylor points out, despite the horrific pictures

> ...from Rwanda beginning in April and May 1994, including scores of bodies floating down rivers and the hacking to death of a woman, for twelve weeks 'of terrifying tribal genocide the Clinton administration and other western governments...actively resisted the flow of horrific pictures that documented the mass slaughter' (Gowing). Nor was anything done about the particularly evil Radio Mille Collines in Rwanda which called for massacres of the Tutsis (Taylor, 1995: 301).

Therefore, while propaganda through the media may often make a difference to *public* opinion, it does not always affect *political* opinion. The role of the media as an informal educative process is explored in more depth below.

3.4.4 *New technologies: the roles of different media for informal learning*

The role of the media both as weapons of war and as sources of information has long been recognised within various conflict situations. Radio has been used for decades as a mechanism for learning, for transmitting knowledge in many forms for both good and ill. The field research carried out for this thesis confirms this. Radio was significant not only in the genocide in Rwanda, but also in terms of Burundian and Congolese refugees learning about the current conflicts and the status of peace negotiations in their countries. Despite the increased use of internet and other media, radio is still a powerful medium through which people involved in this research access information.

A wide body of literature exists that has already documented the role of Radio Milles Collines in Rwanda, and it is unnecessary to reiterate it in full here. This radio station was used by Hutu extremists to foment a culture of fear and hatred within the Hutu population against the Tutsi minority (Berkeley, 2001; Gourevitch, 1999; Mamdani, 2001; Prunier, 1995; Obura, 2003). It was this fear that Mamdani believes was one of the most powerful factors in allowing the Hutu extremists to prevail. It was not only about greed or the promise of more land, but also the fear promoted by extremists that if Hutus did not kill their Tutsi neighbours, 'the alternative would be to let the RPF take their land and return it to the Tutsi who had been expropriated after 1959' (Mamdani, 2001: 191). This is not to suggest that the genocide would not have taken place if Radio Milles Collines had not existed, but that it made the job of the extremists easier to promote the culture of fear that was an important feature in the build up to the genocide. This culture of fear was enhanced by the rumours circulating about various plots by Tutsis to take over Hutu lands and to exterminate Hutu intellectuals. These rumours are referred to later in the thesis

and highlight the perception by many of the respondents of an ongoing Tutsi conspiracy to take overall control of the Great Lakes region.

As a force for 'good', education, radio, television and more recently internet have been used as part of the expansion in distance learning. These media offer opportunities for learners to engage in a style of flexible learning that is more reflective of their needs and conditions than traditional formal education. Increasingly, development organisations recognise the potential of this form of learning and are investing funds in Southern countries to establish distance education and online networks. The research findings also highlight the importance of radio at the forefront of information acquisition. Refugee respondents almost universally cited radio as being one of the most important mechanisms for finding out trustworthy information. They depended on a certain number of reliable stations, particularly foreign stations for accurate and truthful information, which they then compared with other sources.

A similar example of the need for verification from different media sources was related to me by an aid worker who had worked in Somalia in the 1980s:

> In Somalia, during Said Barre's era [1969-1991] the locals would get together in tea-shops every day at four o'clock to listen to the BBC Somali service. They discussed the general news items, but in the case of important news the listeners waited until the next morning to find out the reaction of the official government-controlled radio. 'If the government strongly denies the item broadcast on the BBC then we know it must be true!' they said. 'Items not denied are only rumours, so we do not believe them'.

While print and radio based distance-learning has been in the forefront of new technology for learning in many Southern countries, the use of the internet particularly in situations of conflict has not been fully explored. Learners can get accurate and varied information, which can counteract the often biased national media coverage of the conflict. UNESCO have supported this viewpoint in their study on education in situations of emergency and crisis when they suggest that education for crisis-affected and post-conflict regions should be included in new international initiatives using electronic and satellite communication technologies (UNESCO, 2000).

An innovative project conducted in Camp M, a Burundi refugee camp in Tanzania, highlights the possibilities for populations affected by conflict to expand into the world of new technologies. Linking with the local Tanzanian community, Burundi and Congolese refugees access solar-powered computers and internet, allowing them to communicate with their fellow compatriots in Burundi and DRC.

The use of mobile phones in these camps has also exploded exponentially, and after a feedback mission to the camps in March 2005, information transmission regarding the situation in Burundi and DRC was largely through mobile phones. Mobile phones have dramatically changed the nature of communication and the ability of families to be connected. As mentioned in 3.4.2 above, this has also affected the role of mobile phone use in relation to gossip. In a study commissioned by BT Cellnet on the role of mobile phones and gossip, the researcher for the Social Issues Research Centre (SIRC), Kate Fox, investigated some of the ways in which mobile phones have replaced traditional mechanisms of gossiping. Fox suggests that:

> Mobile gossip restores our sense of connection and community, and provides an antidote to the pressures and alienation of modern life. Mobiles are a 'social lifeline' in a fragmented and isolating world (Fox, 2003).

For refugees, mobile phones are less a means to gossip, than literally a 'lifeline'; determining the safety of their home countries and their decisions to return. However, despite the rapid explosion in technology and the desire of the populations of the South to access and be part of the technological revolution many development agencies are still reluctant to invest in the expansion of technology in Southern countries. This is despite recent examples such as India, which has demonstrated how technological transformation can convert a country formerly dependent on aid, into the status of business partner.

3.5 Conclusion

Formal education is now widely regarded as a 'right' and a force for positive change. A number of conventions, which promote the right of all children to a basic, quality education, support this. In conflict situations, schools are perceived by many emergency educators as places of 'safe haven' for children. However, many educators point to the apparent paradox of education as exemplified in its positive and negative aspects – its 'two faces'. The positive face of quality education can offer cumulative benefits for children in helping them understand the context of violence and provide coping strategies. Alternatively, the negative aspects of a poor, unequal education can preserve and increase difference, strengthen social injustices and manipulate the past and present through the biased teaching of history.

Informal educative processes also have either the potential to act as malign or benign contributions to a life experience. Informal educative processes - by which we mean learning experiences outside of a formal institutional base - form the largest part of a person's socialisation process through a variety of different mechanisms. The informal learning mechanisms identified in the literature review informed the process of data collection and form the basis of the analysis of findings on informal educative processes in Chapter Seven. The most important of these mechanisms in the African context appear to be:

a) *oral tradition* which is particularly strong in African culture, but receives limited recognition as a valuable contribution to knowledge acquisition. This is determined by the way traditional knowledge is viewed within the development discourse. The control of both informal and formal mechanisms through often politically or socially biased media is part of the social construction of reality.
b) *gossip and rumour* which are part of the oral tradition and are likewise largely ignored in the literature. There has been little recognition of the value of gossip as a societal bonding mechanism, which can define social networks at a local level through talk.
c) *new technologies for informal learning* in particular radio, which has a powerful impact on societies in Africa; for example, the role of the

infamous Radio Milles Collines in the Rwandan genocide is well known. Similarly, internet and mobile phone use, which are becoming increasingly important components of African society and are likely to revolutionise information transmission.

Learning therefore is seen to be multi-faceted and complex. This chapter has highlighted the sometimes conflicting sources of information that help – or hinder – people trying to make sense of the conflict in which they are embroiled. The types of educative processes people undergo and information they receive, influences the way their identities are eventually constructed, and this issue is examined in more depth in the following chapter.

CHAPTER FOUR: ISSUES OF IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION AND SHIFTS

4.1 Introduction

By the very nature of the language we speak, we are defined, or define ourselves – the terms I, me or us define our personhood. However, post-modernists might add that identity is in constant flux, changing according to circumstance, time and place. A name can be changed and an identity with it. This chapter highlights some of these key issues surrounding identity. Identity was a critical issue within the context of this research in terms of the conflicts between identity groups in Rwanda, DRC and Burundi. The warring factions identify and assert themselves because of a particular identity, that of a Hutu or Tutsi, or as a Banyamulenge or Congolese national. These claims to identity are based on a number of factors that are explored in this chapter in terms of the construction of identity, both individual and collective. It also explores the shifting of identity and how in situations of conflict, identities may be shifted through coercion or indoctrination. It investigates the relationship between identity and conflict in terms of how the acquisition, shifting and shedding of identities can affect peoples' perceptions of conflict and their engagement in it.

4.2 Identity Construction

A number of authors have struggled with the construction and acquisition of identity and all that is implied within 'the *contextuality* of social life and social institutions' (Giddens, 1984: 132). Giddens for example places the identity construction within the development of social structures, as part of a social identity that is constructed through the repetition of social action and inclusion of these actions as part of everyday social life and activities. This he suggests not only forms the basis for social identity but also for the larger structural systems of society. Giddens' '*structuration*' theory provides a mechanism for

explaining social identity and the potential for social change, which is bound within the constraints of social action. These are in turn determined within the confines of '*time and space*'.

Similarly Rutherford places the acquisition of identity within a structural framework, where identity

> ...marks the conjecture of our past with the social, cultural and economic relations we live within...Making our identities can only be understood within the context of this articulation, in the intersection of our everyday lives with the economic and political relations of subordination and domination. There is no final deciding logic that masters and determines this complex structuring of identity (Rutherford, 1990: 19-20).

The acquiring of an identity through social structuration is a consistent theme, and many authors explore the social context of identity. Within the research, the narratives of the respondents (highlighted in Chapters Six to Nine) indicate how their own social context and social structures have affected the construction of their identities largely through informal educative processes.

In a similar way, Castells also suggests that identities are formed through social 'construction of meaning' and utilises Giddens' argument that these are 'rooted' in a time and space dimension:

> ...individuals, social groups, and societies process all these materials, and rearrange their meaning, according to social determinations and cultural projects that are rooted in their social structure, and in their space/time framework (Castells, 1997: 7).

While acknowledging that identities are formed through cultural and social processes, Castells distinguishes between 'roles' or 'role sets' and identity or plurality of identities. Roles, such as mother, churchgoer, smoker, etc, he suggests are not determinants of identities but roles that can be assumed or discarded at will. One may therefore play a number of roles at any one time. Identities he suggests are

> ...sources of meaning for the actors themselves, and by themselves, constructed through a process of individuation...In simple terms, identities organize the meaning while roles organize the functions (Castells, 1997: 7).

Many authors link social/cultural identity with individual identity. Larrain for example perceives the two aspects of cultural identity and individual identity as closely related:

> The issue of cultural identity is closely related to the issue of personal identity in two senses. On the one hand culture is assumed to be one of the main determinants of personal identity. But on the other hand culture usually entails such a great variety of ways of life, such a rich diversity of social relations that one can speak of its continuity, unity and self-awareness only by analogy with personal identity (Larrain, 1994: 143).

Cultural identity is particularly important in relation to the respondents of the research, perhaps more so than individual identity. The historical and cultural heritage passed down through the generations was extremely powerful, and certainly within their countries of origin formed the basis for much of the identity construction of the younger generations. The identity shifting that took place because of the respondents' lives of exile is explored in more depth in 4.3 below.

In contrast to the view that individual identity is determined by one's cultural heritage, Joseph distinguishes himself from other authors who he says

> ...have explicitly or implicitly, viewed changing forms of subjectivity or identity as consequences of wider social and cultural transformations – modernity, late modernity, the risk society (Bauman, 1991; Beck, 1992; Giddens, 1991; Lash and Friedman, 1992) (Joseph, 2004: 130).

Instead, he locates identity within a context of 'personhood' where identity is only one of the characteristics of 'personhood' that have been built up through genealogy and history. These he calls

> the diversity of languages of 'personhood' that have taken shape – character, personality, identity, reputation, honour,

> citizen, individual, normal, lunatic. Patient, client, husband, mother, daughter...- and the norms, techniques and relations of authority within which these have circulated in legal, domestic, industrial and other practices for acting upon the conduct of persons (Joseph, 2004: 131).

One might argue that these characteristics of 'personhood' are the same manifestations of roles and identities presented by other authors. His argument differs slightly as his definition of construction of the characteristics of personhood suggests that language forms the basis for the different representations of identity. He argues that: 'an identity exists by virtue of the assertions of it people make' (Joseph 2004: 20). Therefore, an identity cannot exist if there is no language in which to describe, make sense of, or communicate it. As seen in the previous chapter, language in different forms can also define how a person is perceived and perceives him/herself. The 'naming' of Tutsis by Hutu Power as 'snakes' or 'cockroaches' served not only to dehumanise the 'enemy', but was also a means of undermining the individual and collective identities of Tutsis as powerful people.

A classification of identity acquisition that differs somewhat from those above is that of Jonathan Friedman, who identified three 'variants of the structure of civilised identity' in *traditional*, *modern* and *post-modern* structures. These are summarised in brief below.

Friedman claims that *traditional* structures of identity are based on concrete social categories 'such as blood, age, sex etc'. Direct interpersonal relations characterise the formation of individual identity, which is dependent on the wider social group for its moral authority. In contrast, civilisation is perceived as an abstraction and the dissolution of primordial ties, which in turn presents a rationalised identity construction.

Modern structures of identity he suggests are characterised by rationality as the dominant principle. Culture is perceived in terms of a bourgeois culture based on the code of individual liberty and the capacity for self-realization. Meaning lies in movement (as in progress) itself, the future of liberated self-

fulfilment equated with the values of fairness, basic equality and democracy and the goal of self-fulfilment through development. Modernity is considered as the cultivation of the new, the sophisticated and the capacity to change. In contrast, traditionalism is seen as barbaric, inflexible and lacking in freedom for the individual (Friedman, 1994).

Post-modern identity structure is based on a bourgeois culture of the individual in contrast to both traditional and modernist identity structures. This exists in independent spheres of social and cultural activity based on status and etiquette of impersonal relations. Individual boundaries within this context are blurred, and there is an absence of control and total freedom of expression. It becomes an identity free for all (Freidman, 1994).

Friedman summarises by stating:

> Both traditionalist and post-modernist structures of identity are opposed to the modernist position, the classical definition of civilised identity. The abstract, the state and self-control are here resolved into the rational and progressive. Authentic culture tends to be seen as blockage and superstition, and is lumped together with the natural, irrational, savage and juvenile, also relegated to the spatial and temporal periphery of civilised identity (Friedman, 1994: 82).

Although Friedman recognises an intermediary structure in terms of the level of technological engagement with the techno-economic world, he fails to consider the potential for ongoing transformation of identity within these structures. He underestimates the intermediary structure of identity that can be 'authentic' in nature, but has leaped into the technological age, thereby transforming an identity into a modern and even post-modern world, but within a traditionalist framework. The identity formation for example in the case of the refugees in the research is based on traditional mechanisms, but a number of factors have transformed these: becoming a refugee; access to different thinking through national and international NGOs; provision of education at different levels; access to the internet and use of mobile phones.

These have radically altered the way individual and collective identities have formed because of conflict and its consequences.

Friedman does however acknowledge the shifting nature of identity when he argues:

> The constitution of identity is an elaborate and deadly serious game of mirrors. It is a complex temporal interaction of multiple practices of identification external and internal to a subject or population (Friedman, 1994:.141).

He further suggests that this temporal interaction also implies a negotiation with history,

> ...since history is the discourse of identity, the question of who 'owns' or appropriates the past is a question of who is able to identify him – or herself and the other at any given time and place...Multiple identities imply multiple histories (Friedman, 1994: 142).

In terms of the research, this factor is critical, as the construction and 'reconstruction' of history both through oral history and through formal schooling forms part of the social construction of reality for many of the respondents from the research. Listening to, reading and interpreting what Friedman calls 'objective history', the enemy stories, the rewriting of the 'story' is, as Friedman indicates, '...just as much a social construct as any other history...' (Friedman, 1994: 143).

By creating a shared history through the oral tradition mentioned in Chapter Three, individuals are linked through shared meaning and interpretation. As people share the historical stories of their communities so history is embellished, linking people in time and event as actors, tellers and audience. Stories are not merely chronicles of what happened; they represent and determine meaning. As people talk about the past in a subjective and embellished way, the past is continually reconstructed (Chaitin, 2003). This history is judged as true or false, not solely with respect to its adherence to

empirical fact, but with respect to narrative criteria such as believability and coherence.

Malkki in her discussion of the 'mythico-historical' accounts of Burundian Hutu refugees in Tanzania, and their creation and recreation of the past, also suggests that history is reconstructed and invested with meaning through narrative. She suggests that,

> In this particular case, as with any other collective past, there exists "no God's-eye view" of history. The "worlds made" through narrations of the past are always historically situated and culturally constructed, and it is these that people act upon and riddle with meaning (Malkki, 1995: 104).

The construction of history and events through narrative, applies equally to revenge or 'enemy stories' which as noted in Chapter Seven featured strongly in the narratives of the respondents. Davies indicates that 'Long historical 'memories' are implicated in revenge' (Davies, 2004: 81) and I would suggest that these 'memories' are consistently reinforced by the oral tradition.

While the literature points to the formation of identity through history, there is an apparent lack of literature on coercion as a mechanism for constructing or shifting identities. Little has been mentioned in the literature critiquing the notion that there is an automatic freedom to be 'oneself' to build and retain one's own identity, albeit within the social construction of reality. In the context of some of the lives recounted by respondents in this research, one might question if this freedom and the choice to conduct one's life through one's own self-formation really exists. Where is the choice, the freedom to construct or shift identity for the *child-soldier* forced into combat and to kill his own parents as a sign of solidarity? What identity choice has the *sex slave* kidnapped by rebel soldiers? These young people have been plunged into new identities and had their former identities stripped from them in a brutal fashion that brooks no alternative.

Although this form of coercion of identity acquisition has not been fully explored in the literature, the transformation of identity through religious

indoctrination has been examined by many authors. The relationship between religion/faith and identity formation has never been so apparent in the world of Al Qaeda and is explored in more depth below as part of the formation of collective identities.

Similarly, an area less well explored in the literature is the identification of the different mechanisms by which identity is sustained and continued. In relation to this research, this applies in particular to the role of gossip as a social bonding mechanism and a means of sustaining group identities. This was discussed more fully in Chapter Three, where the function of gossip is recognised as a means of developing and maintaining social and cultural bonds that promote the formation of a collective identity.

4.2.1 *Formation of collective identities*

The collective cannot be seen without reference to the individual and vice versa, but Joseph suggests that

> Group identities would seem to be more abstract than individual ones, in the sense that 'Americanness' does not exist separately from the Americans who possess it, except as an abstract concept. Yet combinations of such abstractions are what our own individual identities are made up of...The group identities we partake in nurture our individual sense of who we are, but can also smother it (Joseph, 2004: 5).

The formation of individual identity through others, through 'partaking' of group identities, implies what Robins calls 'allegiances' to groups or certain characteristics such as religion, sexuality, gender etc. These assert the definition of an individual's identity as part of a group. It is through this 'buying into' collective identities that a 'cultural identity' emerges. Robins suggests that cultural identity is ever changing, that 'there are always several 'versions' of what constitutes the contents of a cultural identity.' Cultural identities constructed from different historical and social perspectives, often reflect individual, class or group interests (Robins, 1996: 162-164).

'Buying into' collective identity can arise either through fear, or through a desire to raise status and self-esteem. Even when the collective identity is 'ascribed' rather than 'achieved' and is in effect part of one's inherited or genetic make up, there is still the potential for change. The strength of the collective identity therefore lies in its ability to maintain cohesion and belief of individuals in the values, rules and obligations associated with the group.

The maintenance of cohesion and belief is particularly relevant when examining the construction of a collective identity through the identification with a religion or religious group. In conflict situations, this identification is particularly critical. Religion like other identity classifications can be exclusive and used as a mechanism for social determination by excluding other religions because of differences of social understanding (Reynal-Querol, 2002). Although there might be a danger of confusing national identity with religious identity, it is evident that many supposedly 'ethnic' conflicts have religious overtones. As Little states:

> ...why does the assertion of ethnic and national identity so frequently involve, as it obviously does, intolerance and discrimination in regard to religious and other forms of fundamental belief? (Little, 1995: introduction).

Reynal-Querol asserts that 'religious divisions are more important than language divisions and natural resources to explain social ethnic conflicts' (Reynal-Querol, 2002: 29). In an attempt to define the relationship of religion and ethnicity in conflict situations, he argues that it is the 'polarization' of religions, combined with animist diversity, that are primarily responsible in explaining ethnic conflicts. He strongly links faith and identity as a core factor in determining people's willingness to engage in conflict, which he suggests is a prime motivating force, more than 'political ideology or economic interests.'

> Faith and family, blood and beliefs are the aspects with which people identify themselves, the characteristics for which they fight and die (Reynal-Querol, 2002: 31).

The actions of the suicide bombers in London during July 2005 have provided a grisly testament to the truth of this statement.

Another example of how religion and identity have defined warring factions can be seen in the Sudan in Sub-Saharan Africa, where the North define themselves as Muslims, and the South along tribal lines and by default non-Muslims (in fact most are Christian). The effective domination of the North over the South arising from a colonially imposed integration of the Bantus in the South with the Arabs in the North has resulted in a civil war that has been ongoing for decades (Little, 1995; Mbaku et al, 2001). In early 2004, the simmering civil war exploded into what some have called genocide of the African Christian population by the Muslim Janjaweed rebel group in the Darfur region of Southern Sudan.

For these religious groups to continue, maintaining the cohesiveness of a collective identity is critical to their success. For many groups this implies ensuring that group members adhere to the categories of group beliefs mentioned by Bar-Tal below, i.e. that the group is always more important than the individual. To maintain the 'edge' over other groups, Worchel suggests that:

> Groups strive for their independence from other groups, and they struggle with group members to keep the identity of the group equal to, if not more important than, individual identity (Worchel, 1998: 65).

Being part of the 'group' enhances individual self-esteem and Bar-Tal suggests that in this respect:

> Of special importance is the assumption stating that individuals have a need to achieve positive social identity. Specifically, it is assumed that individuals strive for positive self-image and that in the course of identifying with a group this need translates into a tendency to view one's own group favourably. This view is achieved not necessarily through positive perception, but rather through comparison on appropriate dimensions. The comparison allows one to perceive the ingroup as 'better' than relevant outgroups (Bar-Tal, 1998: 93).

Bar-Tal describes the contents of group beliefs as having four categories, of group norms (effective codes of conduct), values (ideals to which the group aspires to), goals (the *raison d'être* for the group's future) and ideology (creed based on religious, political, social beliefs) (Bar-Tal, 1998). These are important in maintaining and developing the group culture, defining the 'ingroups' and 'outgroups'. In relation to this research for example, being part of an 'ingroup' might be one way of explaining the participation of large numbers of people in the Rwandan genocide. It might have been safer - to be part of the collective 'madness' of killing - than to be part of the 'outgroup' and risk one's own death or that of one's family. In addition, the sense of 'otherness' that is part of a collective identity implies a transcendence of individual identity and therefore of responsibility. Being part of a group abnegates culpability.

Maintaining group networks has become easier (for example the maintenance of global networks by Al Qaeda) and in some cases more difficult by the effects of technology and global interaction. As Robins indicates:

> The increasing transnationalization of markets, the growth of global media and communications, the mobility of populations (tourism, migration), have all worked towards the dissolution of the old rigidities in the national culture (Robins, 1996: 72).

Maintaining strong social control over a collective is more difficult when access to outside information and ideologies becomes easier. In contrast, groups based on a loose transnational network can maintain their links and collectivity through internet and mobile phone.

The implications of this broadening of communication networks for the 'collective identity' of groups engaged in conflict are significant. In the past, the automatic adherence to the collective identity of the 'clan' or tribe, where leaders remained unquestioned, permitted strong identity control. By access to opposing viewpoints through mobile phones, internet and radio, the traditional reasons for buying into the identity of conflict, as presented by leaders, can be undermined. Technology may also be responsible for encouraging shifts in

identity, for transforming beliefs and values according to new information or interaction via technology. The transformation of identities in different contexts is explored more fully below, through the examination of the potential of identities to shift.

4.3 Identity Shifts

Most authors writing about identity issues recognise that an identity shifts many times during a lifetime. There is an ongoing recursive nature to identity, which is bound up by the 'true self hiding in the many other' (Hall, 1996: 4). Hall suggests that these shifts in identity are inevitable within spatial and temporal dimensions and are complicated or influenced by power and difference. Hall argues that identity is constructed 'through' these differences, not 'outside' of them:

> Above all, and directly contrary to the form in which they are constantly invoked, identities are constructed through, not outside, difference...Throughout their careers, identities can function as points of identification and attachment only *because* of their capacity to exclude, to leave out, to render 'outside' (Hall, 1996:.4-5).

As Bauman aptly states there is less of an issue about assuming multiple identities in this fast changing world, where it is more problematic to maintain and keep an identity:

> And so the snag is no longer how to discover, invent, construct, assemble (even buy) an identity, but how to prevent it from sticking. Well constructed and durable identity turns an asset into a liability. The hub of post-modern life strategy is not identity building, but avoidance of fixation (Bauman, 1996: 24).

Malkki considers this aspect of retention versus malleable identities, in her interesting comparison between Hutu refugees in a camp setting, and those who stayed within the town. Her suggestion is that the retention of a collective, national identity was stronger in the camp situation, whereas in the

town, '...they tended to seek ways of assimilating and of inhabiting multiple, shifting identities – identities derived or "borrowed" from the township' (Malkki, 1995: 3). This was important for the township refugees to be able to 'facilitate numerous routine activities of daily life; avoiding harassment by immigration agents and other officials; securing jobs; travelling;...' (Malkki, 1995: 157). In contrast, for the refugees in Mishamo camp (a permanent refugee settlement),

> Exile did not erode collective identity...[instead, they] located their identities within their very displacement...The refugee camp had become the spatial and the politico-symbolic site for imagining a moral and political community' (Malkki, 1995: 16).

The fixing of identities within the camp setting could be related to the need for refugee leaders in the camps to retain a level of control not possible in the townships, where a defined collective did not exist in the same way. In situations of conflict for example, there is a need for leaders to fix or 'essentialise' identity (Davies, 2004), in order to maintain the pressure of conformity to the collective, whether through fear, coercion, bribery or belief. Leaders need to ensure that there is no empathy with the 'Other', with the enemy, in order to justify their actions during the conflict. Bauman suggests that in modern society there has been a shift away from an individual moral identity towards a socially constructed morality, which derives from others, from the state or society or from the collective. Therefore, as mentioned above moral responsibility is abnegated. Constructed norms and values define moral behaviour. This also applies to traditional societies, where I would argue that within traditional African, patriarchal society, moral identity is defined by a set of bounded rules and societal pressures. These pressures of course can change over time and because of circumstance. For example, in conflict situations there are many identity shifts that individuals and groups undergo because of either their engagement in the conflict or as a victim of conflict.

Malkki suggests however that exile and forced encampment do not necessarily result in a shift in identity, but more of an essentialisation of collective identity, 'that was drawn from an essentialized, collective unit, a people, and

personal identity was scarcely separable from the collective one' (Malkki, 1995: 169). I would argue however, that the identities of refugees from Mishamo, had been 'essentialized' through the length of their stay in the camps, (over thirteen years by the time of Malkki's research). Identities were perceived by the relative newcomers (particularly Congolese refugees) into Tanzania as having changed as a result of exile, as suggested by the narratives, that from being 'someone' in their own country they were reduced to 'mere refugees' upon exile. Malkki also recognises the 'insult' considered by many. She gives an example of her research assistant's statement, that '...if someone calls him a refugee, that hurts him in the head' (Malkki, 1995: 166). However, the 'refugeeness' and identification of the collective as 'refugees' is not at issue in this research, which looks more at the potential for shifts in identity arising out of conflict.

For example, where Gergen suggests that these multiplicities of identities are in constant flux and are part of the post-modern world, I would suggest that they are part of a conflict-ridden world, where identities are challenged or changed many times. Gergen argues that identities formed through traditional societies are more fixed, and shift less than modern societies, but fails to consider the full effect of radio, internet and television in a traditional context. However, he does acknowledge that

> The technologies of social saturation have also enabled a range of new voices to be heard, voices daring to question the old and institutionalized truths (Gergen, 1991: 86).

Gergen argues that in traditional life, there was less multiplicity, fewer demands and interconnections from outside sources that laid claim to divide our single self. With the approach of modernism, 'Increasingly we emerge as the possessors of many voices' (Gergen, 1991: 84). His argument focuses on the breakdown of a fixed, certain identity of self; everything is tenuous, formed according to changes and fluctuations in relationships. Identity thus becomes relational. He asserts that 'a firm sense of self' was only possible in traditional communities. In contrast, I would argue that conflict throws everything into flux and transformation, where influences from external

agencies and events can also result in the reforming of different and fluctuating identities. However, Davies contends,

> Our view of the world is controlled by our internal model of it, not simply by incoming data. Data will at best cause a perturbation, but it will be ignored if the internal model is not interested (Davies, 2004: 78).

She suggests that our identity construction is affected less by the noise of external influences, but through shifts in our internal model. The internal model of self is shifted by the very nature of conflict, but as Davies continues, 'The key seems to be whether we acknowledge our own fluidity and self-making' (Davies, 2004: 78).

Gergen points to the need to recognise the fluidity of identity when he suggests that in the modern world, because of the constant shifting of 'the firm sense of self', people start searching for something 'other'. Sometimes for a return to inner resources, to their own self or sometimes they are looking for strong group leadership, which replaces a need for individual self. In this way, individual self-identity is transitory and elusive, as Gergen proposes:

> Critical to my argument is the proposal that social saturation brings with it a general loss in our assumption of true and knowable selves. As we absorb multiple voices, we find that each "truth" is relativized by our simultaneous consciousness of compelling alternatives. We come to be aware that each truth about ourselves is a construction of the moment, true only for a given time and within certain relationships (Gergen, 1991: 16).

This returns to Giddens' argument that identities are constructed and reconstructed because of social action and interaction; through the doing and redoing of routine activities. He states:

> Human social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very means whereby they express themselves *as* actors. In and through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities possible (Giddens, 1984: 2).

Does this mean therefore that by merely undermining different routines, identities can shift? Perhaps under 'normal' circumstances one would assume not. However, the evidence from the research indicates that there has to be a very strong sense of inner identity to prevent identity shifting in situations where traditional social action and interaction are violently disturbed. This was observed particularly in the cases of *child soldiers* and *sex slaves* whose identities were forced to shift because of the conflict.

Featherstone recognises the shifting nature of identity formation and reformation as part of what he terms 'the global situation' when he suggests that:

> It is the capacity to shift the frame, and move between varying range of foci, the capacity to handle a range of symbolic material out of which various identities can be formed and reformed in different situations, which is relevant in the contemporary global situation (Featherstone, 1995: 110).

The 'contemporary global situation' has also defined identity shifts in terms of global and local perceptions of conflict and those perpetrating them. For example, Saddam Hussein, funded by the US in the 1980s to fight Iran, is the enemy in the 1990s; Nelson Mandela, ANC terrorist until 1992 and now Nobel Peace Prize-winner and international hero or Gerry Adams, terrorist in the 1980s, Member of Parliament in the 1990s. The shift in identity in this instance, is not through a shift in individual or collective action (Hussein remained a dictator from beginning to end) but through expediency and/or perception. This type of shift is common during conflict situations and the nature of identity shift in terms of its relation to conflict and the ways in which conflict redefines individual and collective identities, both internally and externally is explored below.

4.4 Identity, ethnicity and their relationship to conflict

Much of the literature concerning conflicts in Africa focuses on 'ethnic' elements. Ethnic conflict has been described as 'the most fashionable term and

last resort to explain contemporary social conflicts' (Jung et al, 1996: 61), although Mbaku et al (2001), argue that ethnicity is frequently ignored in academic literature. It is therefore essential to consider the nature of ethnic conflict and its impact on conflicts past and present. This section of the thesis complements the earlier section in Chapter Two in order to present a more theoretical base for issues relating to ethnicity and conflict. Ethnicity here is defined as a social construct that an individual or group affiliate themselves to. It is not necessarily fixed but is based on subscription (whether ascribed or chosen) to a common culture, history and set of values. Ethnicity is therefore an element of identity construction that is vital in the consideration of conflict.

Mbaku et al contend that one of the chief causes of the ongoing tensions in Africa is because of governments' weakness in dealing with diversity including ethnic differences (Mbaku et al, 2001). These 'weak states' commonly contain ethnic, religious or economic tensions that limit their potential to deliver political stability. Similarly, Sambanis argues that

> ...the protection of ethnic identity is much more closely associated with protecting political rights and supporting democracy than with economic gain (Sambanis, 2001: 267).

He separates ethnic war from revolutionary/ideological war by suggesting that ethnic wars are primarily caused by political rather than economic grievances. Horowitz also suggests that analyses of conflict based on economic differences ignore the 'emotional' investment that ethnic conflict portrays. He defines ethnic groups by

> ...ascriptive differences, whether the indicum is color, appearance, language, religion, some other indicator of common origin, or some combination thereof. . . (Horowitz, 1985: 17).

In attempting to define what characterises 'ethnicity' Porto suggests that there is a negotiable level of fluidity that can cross over supposedly proscribed ethnic boundaries (Porto, 2002). As noted above in relation to shifting identities, ethnicity also possesses a flexible element through changes in economic or marital status for example.

Similarly, the respondents of this research cited examples of the blurring of ethnicity through inter-marriage and the acquisition of wealth, indicating the potential for fluidity across ethnic boundaries. Also there were indications that traditional clan kinships encompassed different ethnic groups. These had been important in the pre-colonial era but during the colonial period were subsumed by the exaggeration of difference along ethnic lines. This negotiable and contextual element of identity has been open to manipulation and subsequent politicisation of ethnicity. Bush and Saterelli assert that this is perhaps more the cause of conflict than ethnic identity per se (Bush and Salterelli, 2000).

Bush and Salterelli also support the notion of ethnic fluidity in their argument that children are not born with ethnic hatred, they are taught it through a variety of formal and informal means. For children, the insidious socialisation process of ethnic differentiation and prejudice, via family, peers and school is the incipient cause of beliefs that gives rise to ethnic conflict. Prejudice and ethnicity are not automatically related, but evolve as part of the socialisation process, and are crucially related to time and place. The development of ethnic prejudice is within a specific context and is constructed within a relationship of power structures that maintain the appearance of ethnicity for their own ends (Bush and Salterelli, 2000).

Ethnicity like all aspects of identity construction is rooted in time and place where the situational aspect of identity is 'bought into', and is often based on trust. An individual uses trust to decide which identity (that may have been ascribed or achieved) to buy into. Groups of ethnic minorities often cling together for protection wherever they are located and seek protection in neighbouring countries where their own ethnic groups are also residing. For example, the groups of Tutsis who are located in many different countries across East Africa, ally themselves to other Tutsis rather than to their country of asylum. Because of this communal cohesion, an individual enjoys the protection of the group. However, it can also lead to negative consequences, whereby an individual instead of being protected by the group identity 'comes

to be targeted *because* of his or her membership in a particular community' (Bush and Salterelli, 2000: 5).

By buying into an identity, which carries with it certain obligations, rules and norms, individuals and groups therefore buy into an identity that may or may not accept the engagement in conflict on behalf of that identity. For a conflict to be embarked upon, competing factions must 'buy into' or be coerced into the justification for engaging in acts of aggression, for example suggests that the intractability of some conflicts are determined by certain qualities of identities. How warring factions perceive themselves and the 'other' they are fighting has a direct bearing on the nature of the conflict they are engaged in (Kriesberg, 2003).

In a similar vein, Bhabha also suggests that:

> We have entered an anxious age of identity, in which the attempt to memorialize lost time, and to reclaim lost territories, creates a culture of disparate 'interest groups' or social movements. Here affiliation may be antagonistic and ambivalent; solidarity may be *only* situational and strategic commonality is often negotiated through the 'contingency' of social interests and political claims (Bhabha, 1996: 59).

Mallaquias also asserts that ethnicity is an important 'social and political force' in conflict but contends that it 'must be understood in conjunction with other equally essential and related notions like ethnic groups and nations.' Ethnicity therefore is not purely about identity but also about gaining power; where ethnic groups can claim nationhood and therefore gain a legitimacy and power over other groups (Mallaquias, 2000: 97). However, nationhood according to Kellas should be distinguished from ethnic groups, whereby nations

> ...have 'objective' characteristics which may include a territory, a language, a religion, or common descent (though not all these are always present), and 'subjective' characteristics, essentially a people's awareness of its nationality and affection for it (Kellas, 1991 in Mallaquias, 2000: 97).

In African societies, the sense of 'nationhood' was imposed because of the colonial divisions that often disregarded traditional clan based boundaries. These traditional boundaries were critical in maintaining cultural and collective identities, which some authors suggest were not based along ethnic lines. Relationships were based on kinship ties and land occupation, and the colonial rulers failed to recognise the traditional and cultural ties between communities when they divided or formed 'nations' according to politically determined divisions. These often separated culturally similar groups into different nations (Reyntjens, 1995; Mallaquias, 2000).

Kinship and 'clan' ties as part of an identity were presented by respondents as being possible 'entries for peace building'. The responses from the research support the notion that ethnicity should be considered within the context of identity rather than a specific focus suggestive of race or tribe. As outlined in Chapter 2.5 Obura points to the need to regard Rwandans less along ethnic lines but along what she terms 'socio-identity' groupings. The groupings she suggests were not traditionally considered ethnic, racial or caste groups but were based more on socio-economic groupings, which often had clan associations spanning different socio-identity groups (Obura, 2003).

In this way, she would concur with Bowen who suggests that ethnicity is not sufficient to explain conflict. He argues against the notion that ethnic identity is ascribed and is traditional and unchanging. Instead, he suggests that:

> In speaking about local group conflicts we tend to make three assumptions: first, that ethnic identities are ancient and unchanging; second, that these identities motivate people to persecute and kill; and third, that ethnic diversity itself inevitably leads to violence. All three are mistaken (Bowen, 1996: 3).

In the context of this research, these three assumptions are common in terms of defining the nature of the conflict in the Great Lakes Region. In agreement with Bowen, there are an increasing number of authors such as Mamdani, Obura and others, who challenge these traditional assumptions. This research indicates that although identities might be flexible and shift according to

context, they are often one of the principle motivations behind violent and armed struggle.

4.5 Conclusion

Authors such as Giddens suggest that identity is formed through the repetition of social action and interaction, which is bound by time and space. Identity arises out of the structural framework of society through language, culture, history and adoption of the dominant values of that society. Collective identity construction similarly implies adoption of group values, norms and rules into which members of the 'ingroup' must buy, be coerced or indoctrinated. Maintenance of the collective identity implies ensuring the cohesiveness of an in-group which necessarily implies an 'outgroup'. This exacerbates difference by defining those who are in the 'outgroup' as 'other' and therefore the enemy. This is critical in terms of continuation of conflict where demonisation of the 'other' as enemy is commonplace.

Identities can and do shift over time and space. They are recursive and flexible, which some authors suggest is the nature of modern and post-modern societies where life is not stable or fixed. I argue that this is true of conflict-ridden societies where the life situation is in a continual state of flux and identities are challenged or shifted on a regular basis through either fear or coercion; a notion rarely examined in the literature. Many theorists highlight the element of choice in shifting identity, but the examples of the *child soldier* or *sex slave* indicate circumstances where individuals are forced into a different identity.

The relationship between identity and conflict is complex as it is often associated with ethnicity, and quoted as a root cause of many conflicts in Africa. Ethnicity focuses on a narrower range of attributes, identified by other groups as more physical than cultural. Sambanis however suggests that ethnicity is more concerned with political supremacy than purely ethnic division where states are intolerant of diversity (Sambanis 2001). Educative

processes in this respect are significant in confirming identities. Identity is also associated with power and nationhood, the desire of one group to gain control over another and maintain their legitimacy through the state control of nationhood. Although some authors challenge the assumption that the conflicts in Africa are concerned with identity, the research indicates that it is still a prime motivating factor in the continuation of violent conflict.

The issues relating to formation of collective identities and the factors that influence identity formation/shift, including the critical role that trust has to play, are reflected in the findings in Chapters Six to Nine.

CHAPTER FIVE: ISSUES OF METHODOLOGY IN A REFUGEE CONTEXT

5.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to highlight the rationale behind adopting a qualitative stance and indicates the need for reflexivity within a refugee context that is complex and fluid. It outlines why searching for meaning in this context is more appropriate for the type of research conducted than collection of statistical data. Generalisability is not required or expected, although it is hoped the research might benefit practitioners and other researchers in similar environments.

The rationale behind the selection of a case study approach is examined, whereby four refugee camps housing refugees from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC were selected. These are case studies of the populations *within* refugee camps not *of* refugee camps. The selection of refugee populations was made primarily for reasons of safety and access, and as a result, there is only limited explanation of the refugee context (although a description of the camps can be found in Chapter One). The sample groups were representative of a cross-section of refugee society and the chapter explains in detail the mechanisms for selecting these various groups. The refugee camps represent spaces of transition for the refugees, who are not currently embroiled in the current conflicts in their countries, but because the conflicts are ongoing, feel unable to return.

The chapter sets out the methods of data collection and examines the appropriateness of the methodology adopted. One of the primary methods of data collection was Focus Group Discussions and the chapter outlines the rationale behind this choice of method. Other methods such as drawing and essay writing with children are also examined alongside some of the

challenges of using such methods with inexperienced research assistants. The benefit of opportunistic data collection is also highlighted in this chapter.

There were many constraints working in the difficult environment of a remote Tanzanian village. Not the least of these was how, as an observer, my status as '*mzungu*' (white person) inhibited responses and changed the dynamics of group discussions. In all aspects of the data collections, respect for the confidentiality and anonymity of the respondents was guaranteed.

5.2 A reminder of the research questions

The research questions below were fundamental to the process of data collection and analysis. They formed the basis for the training programme and the development of the questionnaires and topic guides. They stem from an overarching question, which asks:

What factors in different educative processes affect information transmission and identity at different 'structural levels' and how do these influence the outcome of conflict?

Educative Processes

- *What types of formal and informal educative processes exist?*
- *Which of these are perceived as the most significant in the transmission of information in their countries?*
- *What factors within the most significant educative processes make them so?*
- *How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts?*
- *Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence conflict?*

Identity

- *Is identity as significant a feature of the Great Lakes conflicts as the literature suggests?*

- *How do identity construction and shifts in identity affect the outcome of conflict?*
- *Is identity the locus between educative processes, information transmission and 'structural levels' which influences conflict?*

N.B: In order not to pre-empt the responses on the issue of identity no direct questions were asked of respondents in the topic guides, on this issue. This was for two reasons, a) to ensure that respondents were not led into prioritising identity as the key issue in conflict development and b) to determine whether identity was in reality such a significant factor in conflict development as has been presented in much of the literature.

'Structural levels'

- *Do the 'structural levels' identified in the Model B (cf 1.5.2 pp. 32-33) reflect the reality on the ground?*
- *Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to exist?*
- *How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups)*
- *Is there a gap between the levels and if so what form does it take?*

Conflict

- *What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people's perceptions of the conflict?*
- *How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in their country might be resolved?*
- *How might educative processes used to learn about conflict be transformed into peace building mechanisms?*

NB: Conflict here is seen in the light of other processes that affect its likelihood. It is not the primary feature of the research to identify causalities of conflict, but to listen to the narratives of those most affected by it.

5.3 Why a qualitative approach?

A qualitative stance was taken in order to address the key research questions indicated above. This type of methodological approach was essential to

provide the reflexivity of response necessary to conduct research in countries where the unexpected is a daily occurrence. A quantitative or statistical approach would not provide the adaptability and opportunistic flexibility that was required to gather a variety of narratives through in-depth interviewing and focus group discussions.

The following statements from Woodfield sum up concisely the reasoning behind the use of qualitative data collection and analysis for this thesis.

- Qualitative Data (QD) are very varied and more complex than statistical quantitative data, which are already pre-structured according to defined codes.
- Qualitative Analysis (QA) looks at the dense text of transcripts etc, to unpick and work out what is the meaning behind what has been said – looking for the nuggets.
- QA seeks to understand perspectives, which are multiple and varied. It searches for variety and understanding diversity. It starts by managing the data provided and then provides explanations (Woodfield, 2004).

Through the narratives of this research, 'nuggets' of meaning have been revealed that illuminate the process and understanding of conflict as perceived by those most affected by it.

In the positivist arena this may raise the question of how generalisable, objective and valid such data are compared to a more statistical, experimental and quantitative approach. Positivists argue that research is legitimated by science or the scientific method in its ability to be objective and rational (Scott and Usher, 1999). In the study of human behaviour and social reality, positivists suggest that the only way to advance the knowledge in this arena is by observation and experimentation. In this way the methods of natural science may be applied to social science where analyses are expressed in similar 'laws or law-like generalisations that have been established in relation to natural phenomena' (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000: 8-9).

Alternatively Morse et al argue that reliability and validity of qualitative data collection emerges from the skilful use of verification strategies (Morse et al, 2002). Such alternatives to the positivistic methodologies of experimental or even quasi-experimental design are now largely accepted as equal partners in the social science research arena. In this sense,

> ...social science is...seen as a subjective rather than objective undertaking, as a means of dealing with the direct experience of people in specific contexts (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000: 20).

Qualitative research necessarily uses a 'meaningful' approach where the focus is on interpretation of meaning, while quantitative methodology employs statistics that rigorously test hypotheses through experimental methods (Dey, 1993). This highlights the ongoing debate of the past thirty years concerning the relative merits of quantitative versus qualitative approaches and the desire for meaning through numbers rather than numbers through meaning (Dey, 1993). My research therefore investigates the meaning attached to individual and community understanding of the processes by which conflict is initiated, prolonged and resolved. It is concerned with perceptions of a potential dichotomy in situations of conflict between the rhetoric (of political peacemakers) and actuality of experience (of participants who have been involved in conflict – albeit retrospectively). The use of a qualitative methodology and analysis provide a sufficiently open and creative approach to determining the meaning and understanding behind the data collected.

The research therefore while aiming for a rigorous approach does not focus on seeking of facts and certainty using the ontology of the positivists. Rather it engages in the investigation of a variety of possible meanings derived from interaction with the participants of the study. As Bryman suggests:

> ...the emphasis must be on how the interviewee frames and understands issues and events — that is, what the interviewee views as important in explaining and understanding events, patterns, and forms of behaviour (Bryman, 2001: 314).

Through detailed narratives from individuals and groups, this research has investigated the perceptions of refugees on how they understand and learn about conflict. Because of the personal nature of the narratives gathered, the research does not provide broad generalisations about the nature of conflict. Rather it illuminates existing literature on issues of educative processes and identity, and their relationship to conflict.

In addition to the arguments above in favour of using a qualitative approach, much of the educational research already conducted in developing countries has been statistical. This is particularly the case for those engaged in educational research on the access, management and funding of education provision in the South, which has largely focussed on gathering statistical information. As a result many studies have arisen that focus on the formal process, using large-scale surveys of schools (Shaeffer, 1986). My research has moved beyond statistics to the deeper levels of knowledge, attitudes and perceptions of people affected by conflict through informal as well as formal educative processes.

The research is based on the selection of four refugee camps and utilises a case study approach to research the perspectives of the populations *within* those camps. These are not comparative case studies in the sense that they do not offer distinct or different insights into particular situations of conflict. Rather the findings offer an opportunity for triangulation that highlights the regional perspective of the conflicts from which the refugees have fled. Not only are there similarities between the case studies in terms of the identity issues involved in the conflict, but there are also similar economic (in particular land) factors which have also contributed to the conflicts. These along with historical and political elements have caused the recent conflicts to continue. The research therefore benefits from the complementarity of the different populations affected by these conflicts, which allows for greater depth of understanding of each.

Although the case study approach used for this research sacrifices generalisation in favour of the possibility of detailed and accurate information

(Hammersley, 1992), generalisation in this sense is not the aim of this research. It is more concerned with the investigation of the 'unique instances' of the populations of the three countries in the study that have been engaged in conflict (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000). The complexity of the conflicts in these countries requires an approach, that through an holistic investigation, accounts for the uniqueness of each, while recognising their similarities in ethnic, political and economic relationships (Stake, 1994).

Case studies can also be seen as a form of 'condensed fieldwork' in the common-sense term of 'intensive study of one instance, person, institution or place' (Vuillamy, 1990: 14). For my own research, this implies intensive studies of three populations living in four different refugee camps. However, there is a distinct difference between case study and ethnography, which employs a similar notion of depth in terms of time and intensity (Vuillamy, 1990). A case study is naturally much shorter in duration, more of a snapshot and an elaboration of a developmental process. A short detailed and descriptive analysis through a case study approach is appropriate and valuable for gaining insight into the 'lived experiences' of the participants (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).

This research arises out of these 'lived experiences' and narratives from refugee populations in four refugee camps in North West Tanzania the selection of which is outlined in more depth below. A more detailed background to the camps, their location, numbers of refugees and environment, was provided in Chapter 1.2.2 pp. 18-21.

5.4 The research process

The research was undertaken in four refugee camps: Burundian Camp A, Congolese Camp B, and Camps C and D (for Rwandese respondents) over a period of four months from March to June 2004, during which time I conducted a number of training workshops to identify and train research assistants and develop topic guides, before conducting the final interviews.

Below is a summary of the broad chronological presentation of the research process, which is described more fully in the remainder of the chapter:

- *Interviewing Skills Workshops* (see Annex II for the training notes for the workshop) were conducted in Camps A, B and C. This workshop was adapted from the Social Research Association training programme on interviewing skills. Each workshop lasted three days and fifteen people were trained. Selected from those fifteen were two research assistants to work with adults and two research assistants to work with children. These were equally male and female.
- *Development of Topic Guides* (see Annex III for an example of a topic guide for adults, an adapted version was used for children). These were all translated into Kirundi or Kiswahili. The topic guides were developed during the training period, with the participants using an adapted version of the original research questions. The development of the social map also arose out of this process, examples of which can be found in Chapter Eight.
- *Finalisation, translation and distribution of questionnaires* (see Annex IV). Questionnaires which were developed prior to data collection were translated and later distributed by the research assistants. The research assistants were requested to try to ensure random distribution to the different societal groups outlined in section 6.4 below. Seventy-five questionnaires were delivered in all three locations. Fifty-five completed questionnaires were returned.
- From the responses to the questionnaires, participants were identified who were willing to take part in the Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) as outlined in the selection of respondents below in section 6.4.
- FGDs were conducted with the societal groups identified below in section 6.4. Each FGD lasted approximately two hours. They were conducted in parallel to save time, so the two research assistants ran two FGDs concurrently. A total of twenty-two FGDs were conducted apart from the trial FGDs in the training sessions. No FGDs were conducted in Camp C, because there were insufficient numbers of

Rwandan respondents. All Rwandan respondents were interviewed individually.

- Respondents for in-depth individual interviews were then identified from the FGD (see Annex V for the topic guide for individual interviews). These interviews were often conducted directly after the FGD unless as in the case of the Traditional Kings, they were being interviewed as individuals. Thirty individual interviews were conducted. These included twenty-two respondents from the FGDs in Camps A and B, plus two Traditional Kings in Camp B, plus six Rwandans from Camps C and D.
- All interviews with adults were recorded on digital recorders, except for three, which were hand written from notes. The data from children were often written or drawn. All data were transferred to computer and then to CD before being sent to Dar es Salaam for translation.

Table 5.1: Composition of sample groups and data collection

	Camp A Burundian	**Camp B Congolese**	**Camp C Rwandan**	**Camp D Rwandan**	**Total**
Population size (approx.)	35,000	46,000	100,000	56	181,056
No. FGDs	11	11	0	0	22
No. depth interviews	11	13	4	2	30
No. questionnaires	25	25	25	0	75 (55 returned)

5.5 Sampling

The selection of the sample groups from refugee camps was based primarily on the need for safe access to the identified groups. With the assistance of UNICEF (my former employer in Tanzania) there was no difficulty in gaining access to the refugee camps. Similar access would not have been possible in

any of the three countries under study, primarily because of security concerns (war was still ongoing in both Burundi and DRC). Also without the support of an umbrella organisation, the sensitive nature of the research would have made access to the necessary range of groups almost impossible. Therefore the sample groups were chosen from the refugee camps in Western Tanzania, which house a cross section of populations from Burundi, and DRC, with few Rwandans remaining in only two camps. There are ten camps in Western Tanzania for these different populations (see Annex I for maps of refugee impacted areas in Tanzania). Four main camps were selected as representative of the population group involved in conflict in their countries of origin, namely the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Burundi and Rwanda. These were Camp A, in K. district (Burundian), Camp B, also in K. district (Congolese), Camp C, in N. district (where the training of research assistants was conducted) and Camp D, also in N. district (where Rwandan refugees were held as protection cases in a transit camp). The basis for selection of the these camps was a) logistical reasons including access to transport for both the Congolese and Burundian camps and b) in the case of Camp D, in N. district, it was the only location where the few Rwandan refugees remaining were legitimately housed.

In N. where Rwandan refugees were interviewed, it was not possible to interview the range of groups indicated below. In 1996, the Tanzanian army had forcibly returned (*refouled*) the majority of Rwandan refugees who had fled to Tanzania after the genocide in 1994. Therefore, the number of Rwandan remaining refugees was very few, as the small population permitted to remain after 1996, had consistently been *refouled* to Rwanda by the Tanzanian authorities. A particularly severe incidence of this *refoulement* occurred in September 2003, when nine hundred people, mostly women and children, were forced from their homes in Camp C in the early hours of the morning and their houses burnt. This meant that the number of Rwandans who were interviewed was very small, six in total. There were some Rwandans hiding amongst the Burundian and Tanzanian populations but they were understandably reluctant to come forward for fear of *refoulement*. Many Rwandans were identified by the research assistants (one of whom was

Rwandan herself) but their fear was palpable when they were approached, "who told you I was a Rwandan, I'm not a Rwandan. Go away I don't want to talk to you." was the response of one man approached by the interviewer. Therefore, the Rwandan group is not comparable with the other two groups, although it has been essential to include Rwanda in the research because of its role in the Great Lakes conflicts over the last ten years.

As explained above, the refugee camps were selected for a number of reasons, including ease of access and security. However, because of this, there is a strong degree of bias in the representation and narratives of conflict given by the respondents. The sample groups chosen represent a single perspective. This reflects a Hutu outlook for the Burundian and Rwandan respondents and predominantly Bembe perception for the Congolese (this group oppose the primarily Tutsi 'Banyamulenge' or Banyarwandans who have been involved in conflict in DRC). Although the groups may not be representative in terms of guaranteeing the different perspectives from various identity groups, it is the case that refugee stories are rarely told. There are many instances particularly in the case of Rwanda, that Tutsi viewpoints have been presented, and rightly so, but there are few stories offered by the literature that reflect an alternative perspective.

The groups selected (as outlined below) were indicative of the grassroots level indicated in Model C, Chapter 1.5 (cf: p. 35). The sample groups from the Burundian and Congolese refugee camps were selected from different societal groups, and are considered a representative cross-section of refugee society. Although the original structure of the FGDs had intended that groups of six from each of the societal groups outlined below would be interviewed (1 x 6 represents one focus group of six people from a single societal group), the reality and constraints of the camp situation sometimes prevented this. Often two groups would be combined together, for example, traditional healers and health workers worked together in one FGD.

Family		**Civil Society**	
Parents/guardians:	1 x 6	Youth groups:	1 x 6
Elders	1 x 6	Women's groups:	1 x 6
Children:	2 x 6	Community Based	
(out of school and in school)		Organisations (CBOs)	1 x 6
Commerce		**Leaders**	
Cross section:	1 x 6	Cross section	1 x 6
		Religious leaders	1 x 6
		Traditional Kings/	
		Influential people	1 x 3
Professionals		**Media**	
Teachers:	1 x 6	According to availability	
Head teachers:	1 x 6	Internet users	
Health workers:	1 x 6		
Traditional healers:	1 x 6		

For these focus groups and later the in-depth interviews, the respondents were selected in the following way:

1) Questionnaires were administered on a random basis to the identified groups mentioned above. Those who were not literate were assisted by the refugee interviewer to complete the questionnaire
2) A box at the bottom of the questionnaire was checked if the respondent was willing to attend a Focus Group Discussion (FGD) and respondents were then approached by the refugee research assistants to attend the FGD on a certain day
3) Individual respondents were selected from the FGD for more in depth interviews after the FGD was completed
4) Due to the nature of the camp life, such as food distribution, market days etc. some respondents were absent from the FGD. In this case, the Research Assistant (a refugee) selected alternative candidates from

personal contacts. The majority of respondents however were self-selected through their participation in the questionnaires and the FGDs.

There was difficulty finding sufficient female respondents for each of the groups in order to ensure some kind of gender parity. While many women responded positively to the questionnaire, sometimes their heavy domestic workload restricted their availability. In the case of some groups, for example religious leaders, there were no women respondents as no religious leaders were women. In order to ensure a perspective from women, a separate group for women involved in civil society groups was also conducted.

5.6 Participants in the research

The respondents came from a variety of backgrounds within their own countries. These included farmers, trades people, university lecturers, doctors and politicians. The refugee camp is a microcosm of life in the countries of origin, but with different administrative structures and very different living conditions. Life in the refugee camps is extremely harsh. Refugees are not permitted beyond four kilometres outside of the camp without a pass controlled by Tanzanian government authorities, often only provided in exchange for 'favours'. The restrictions of food, water, work and travel is difficult for many people used to working and living freely. The majority of the respondents from all three countries described life in the camp as 'a prison' or trapped like 'a bird in a cage'.

The increasing lack of security, particularly in the Burundian camps, and the pressure from the Tanzanian authorities for the Burundian refugees to return, has resulted in the repatriation of some refugees to Burundi, even though the security situation is still unstable. Many respondents made statements similar to this Burundian teacher: "I would rather die in my motherland than here like some diseased dog." Almost all of the refugees wanted to return home. Apart from two Rwandan respondents, no other respondent expressed a wish to remain in the camp. As soon as their country is at peace, they insisted that they

would all leave. There is pressure from the Tanzanian government, before the presidential election of 2005, to push the Burundians back home, not by direct force, but by making life in the refugee camps increasingly intolerable and insecure. While Tanzania has been very generous towards refugees in the past, the issue of asylum seekers, as in many other countries, is a hot election topic.

Except for some of the younger children who had been born in the camps, all of the respondents in the research had experienced the conflict, most of them in a very direct and brutal way. Congolese respondents recounted fewer violent experiences than Burundians, but the paintings by participants in the printmaking workshops described below, indicated that they had suffered equally from the effects of the conflict.

5.7 Data Collection

The focus of data collection concentrated on Level One (grassroots level) of the hypothetical model in Chapter One. Examination of the higher levels was derived from a limited number of individual interviews according to access and availability, alongside analysis of grey literature. It was not within the scope of the study to cover every group at every level by interview.

While a basic questionnaire (see Annex IV) was administered to a cross-section of groups, the primary method of data collection was through Focus Group Discussions (FGDs) with the groups identified above. The questionnaire assisted in the selection of individuals willing to participate in focus group discussions. Additional in depth semi-structured interviews with individuals selected from the FGDs were also conducted.

5.7.1 *Selection of research assistants*

Rather than using interpreters who could disrupt the flow of communication, research assistants were selected and trained to conduct the interviews on my

behalf. This proved to be less intrusive and intimidating for the respondents. I participated in the interviews by observing and on occasion asking additional questions. Training on interviewing skills was conducted for three days in each camp for up to fifteen participants. Four research assistants (two male and two female) were selected from the training based on their competency. In Camp C however, only three research assistants were selected for the Rwandan interviews, one of whom was Tanzanian. Competency was judged on their understanding of the training and techniques of interviewing, their alertness and willingness to engage fully with the respondents. They also needed a certain level of fluency in English. The training was open to a number of refugees and Tanzanian NGO staff who might benefit from the interviewing skills passed on through the training. The research assistants were also trained in the use of digital recorders.

As mentioned above, two women and two men were selected as research assistants, not only to maintain gender parity, but also because of the cultural issues of male research assistants talking to women respondents. However, the women research assistants were less confident and frequently had domestic issues and employment responsibilities that interfered with the research schedule. They were also not as fluent in English, which sometimes caused misunderstandings. However, the benefits of having women research assistants outweighed these concerns.

The capacity of the research assistants varied across the different camps, particularly in their ability to probe and prompt using the topic guides. They also found it difficult to avoid the domination of one person in the FGDs. It is in the respondents' cultures to listen and not interrupt, so the research assistants rarely stopped a respondent who had taken up much of the group time, even though they had been trained in how to do this. In the case of N. where Rwandan refugees were interviewed, there was significant difficulty with both research assistants and respondents. The selection of research assistants was not as successful as in the other camps. The male refugee research assistant was absent much of the time and the female research assistant was more interested in her own personal issues than those of the

respondents. Two constructive interviews were conducted in Camp D (the transit centre in N.) where the Tanzanian research assistant interviewed two women recently arrived from Rwanda. These women had refused to return to Rwanda despite the brutal tactics of the Tanzanian government to force them to do so.

Two refugees translated the interviews into English. One translated the Burundian and Rwandan interviews, and the other translated the Congolese interviews. In order to determine the efficiency of the translators, back translation was used on a few randomly selected interviews. It was found that for the most part, the translations were accurate within the language constraints of the translators. The Congolese translator for example had a wider vocabulary and better grasp of English than the Burundian translator. The Burundian translator tried as far as possible to retain the language of the respondents, which he said was difficult to translate from Kirundi to English, because 'Burundians are not straight'; meaning that they took a circuitous route to explain a simple issue.

5.7.2 *Focus Group Discussions*

Focus Group Discussions were adopted in order to hold in depth discussions with a group of key informants (which was usually between 5-8 persons). It was felt that the interaction between members of the group would be more revealing in terms of data collection than conducting only individual interviews. A total of twenty-two FGDs were conducted, eleven in each camp. These do not include the additional data collected during the training sessions, which amounted to approximately eight additional FGDs per camp. The Focus Group format has a degree of flexibility that other methods don't necessarily capture (although one has to be aware of the possibility of facilitator bias), in that it allows the facilitator to explore wide ranging and potentially revealing issues by encouraging group participation. It also had an additional advantage of being a useful mechanism to identify respondents willing to undertake individual interviews.

The FGDs varied in length but typically took between one-two hours, including time for introductions and conclusions. A few discussions continued for three hours. The social mapping process took considerable time. Many respondents became quite involved with the process, which revealed significant information on the 'structural levels' of the camps and societal groups in Burundi and DRC.

The typical format of the FGD was divided into three steps; firstly the explanation of the purpose of the group discussion, making introductions and trying to relax the atmosphere. Here the issue of confidentiality and anonymity was discussed and agreements on recording the interviews reached. The majority of the respondents were willing to state their real name to the recorder, but in some cases, they gave a nickname or false name. They were assured that no names would be used in the writing up of the findings. The second and fullest phase of the discussion concerned the themes and issues outlined in the topic guide used by the facilitator (see Annex III). Finally, the wrap up allowed for any further questions from the group, as well as thanks and an indication of how the data would be used. Most respondents were anxious to know about feedback from the research. They were assured that I would return before June 2005 to provide them with verbal and written feedback. As mentioned below, this feedback took place in March 2005 when I took advantage of my involvement in an art project supported by UNICEF to return to the camps. The respondents were also anxious that the issues raised from the research should be passed on to higher authorities. Here it was more difficult to provide assurances, but I suggested that perhaps through published articles or presentations their narratives may reach a wider audience.

5.7.3 *Interviewing skills training and development of Topic Guides for Focus Groups*

Finalisation of the topic guides used in both the FGDs and individual interviews for children and adults was achieved primarily during the training

programme. Key questions were provided to the participants of the training who were then asked to develop their own topic guides. The topic guides were revised and piloted as part of the training process, before their use in the final interviews. Although the process of developing the topic guides was difficult for the participants of the training, it helped them to grasp the questions more fully. It also increased the sense of ownership of the process and familiarity with the research.

Most of the participants of the training found the methodology of conducting FGDs difficult. In some cases, it became an interview with six respondents rather than a group discussion. Fortunately in the final FGDs the research assistants had become more familiar with the techniques and their confidence in conducting FGDs increased over time. The process of developing the topic guides through the training programme had greatly assisted their understanding and led to the development of the 'social map' as a means of focusing the group on the information flow.

The development of the 'social map' (examples of these can be found in Chapter Eight) arose from the initial pilots of FGDs which were not very successful or dynamic. Participants found the idea of 'social groups' very difficult to understand and placing of groups in any kind of hierarchy almost impossible without significant intervention by the research assistant. However, the introduction of a visual representation through the 'social map' (which initially included movable objects) helped respondents to grasp the concepts more fully and to participate with enthusiasm.

On occasions, two FGDs were combined into one in order to have at least six participants. This occurred when for a variety of reasons some respondents were absent. This worked well in the Burundian camp, Camp A, where there were very lively discussions, but in the Congolese camp, the more dominant group took over the discussions. As one of the research assistants suggested: "one group moved the ideas in a certain direction." An example of this was the combination of leaders and commercial workers where primarily the religious leaders of the group dominated the FGD. This also applied to women who

were less vocal in most groups. This was particularly the case in the Congolese groups where it was difficult to get women to participate fully because of cultural restraints.

5.7.4 *In-depth interviews*

Arising from the FGDs, a number of individuals were selected from willing participants in the focus groups to participate in individual depth interviews. These totalled thirteen in the Congolese camp and included two 'Traditional Kings' (who were too few to include as a focus group), as well as some ad hoc interviews with individuals working on peace initiatives. 'Traditional Kings' in DRC were the equivalent of the Burundian respondents' 'influentials' i.e. in the eyes of the respondents, people who in their own country had considerable power and influence. However, when they fled to the refugee camp, although still respected, they held little if any administrative responsibility and were not considered powerful political leaders in the camp.

Eleven individual interviews were conducted in the Burundian camp. These respondents were primarily 'self-selected' and included interested individuals who had additional comments on key issues such as the role of education. These guided semi-structured, exploratory interviews gave the flexibility and open-endedness required to allow the perceptions and understanding of the participants to fully emerge. As Oppenheim suggests, the

> ...purpose of the *exploratory* interview is essentially heuristic: to develop ideas and research hypotheses rather than to gather facts and statistics. It is concerned with trying to understand how ordinary people think and feel about the topics of concern to the research (Oppenheim, 1992: 67).

With the potentially traumatic recounting of experiences of conflict, it was essential to give the respondent the time to answer potentially difficult questions within a supportive framework.

5.7.5 *Collection of data from children*

Although some of the data collected from children have been utilised in the subsequent chapters on findings and analysis, the responses from children were less successful than from other groups. This was due to the inexperience of the research assistants in talking to children. The main method of data collection was through analysis of children's drawings and writing. The most useful data collected came from the written material collected. However, this restricted the use of data to the narratives of literate respondents. Children from both in and out of school formed the groups, ranging from ages ten to eighteen years. The focus groups with children took a different format from the FGDs for adults as they utilised methods which allowed children to draw or write their experiences, as well as to voice them. In this way, the more introverted and marginalised children had an opportunity to gain confidence and to have their voices heard if not through speech, but through their drawing or writing (Johnson et al (eds), 1998).

During the printmaking workshops described below, some of the paintings produced by children highlighted their experiences of conflict more graphically than those produced during the drawing sessions of the previous year.

Illustration 5.1:
An attack on a Congolese home

The painting on the left, produced by a thirteen-year-old Congolese boy, provides an example of this. It illustrates his story of the attack on his home by rebel soldiers. Perhaps because the children were given ample time to express themselves in their own way, there was greater detail

and graphic representation of their stories, than those produced from the research data. They did not have to 'produce' results for an impatient research assistant.

On reflection, although some interesting data were collected from children, insufficient time was given to training research assistants with the specific methods necessary to conduct participatory research with children. The paintings mentioned above were a more effective way of collecting data about children's experiences of conflict, which came from the opportunistic data collection described below.

5.7.6 *Ad hoc or opportunistic data collection*

Although the research was designed with a structure in mind, because of the nature of the environment, the need for flexibility has always been acknowledged. This implies the use of what Robson defines as a 'flexible design approach', which allows data to emerge and does not exclude opportunistic data collection (Robson, 2002).

Therefore, additional data were collected on an informal basis, through ad hoc interviews with people working with NGOs in and around the camps, as aid workers for the UN, or employed by the Tanzanian government. In addition, secondary data were collected from newspaper articles, internet sites provided by refugees, and some reports and papers from NGOs and UN agencies. The UN and agencies reports were rarely relevant to the research as most focussed on narratives of monthly activities with limited critical analysis. Email correspondence with refugees and people who returned to their home country was another mechanism of obtaining additional data about returnee perceptions of the situation in Burundi and DRC.

Taking advantage of an opportunity to work on a project supported by UNICEF Tanzania, that took me back to the camps in March 2005, I was able to conduct some further 'opportunistic' data collection and to give feedback on

my findings to the participants of the research conducted the previous year. The project involved me working with an internationally renowned artist to conduct a series of printmaking workshops. These provided a forum for elders and children from two refugee camps in K. district (Camp M and Camp B) to explore their common experiences of conflict and peace. These were then translated into images which have since been printed by UNICEF in a book 'Voices for Peace'. These narrative illustrations reflect the experiences and childhood events of elders and children from Burundi and DRC. Many of them illustrate disturbing life stories, which are reflected in paintings similar to the one above. Some others are included in the remainder of this thesis.

5.8 My role as researcher

Although I had worked in the camps for many years and to some people was a familiar face, to the majority of the respondents, I was still a '*mzungu*' (white person) and as such my presence in many cases was intimidating. Consequently, although I would have preferred to be part of the process of interviewing and sit with the research assistants, I chose to sit at the back as an observer. This also permitted two interviews to take place concurrently so I could observe both. On occasions, I would join the FGDs but not individual interviews. My presence however, would always change the dynamics of the group and the conversation would often switch from Kiswahili or Kirundi to French as soon as I participated. Also respondents would sometimes 'play up' to my presence. This was the case particularly with the Congolese respondents, who wanted to elicit a reaction to certain controversial statements or questions. These ranged from my marital status to blaming the US or the UK for funding and participating in the conflict in DRC. In order to try to remain objective and not get embroiled in personal or political debates with the respondents (during interviews) I tried to remain as unobtrusive as possible for the majority of interviews.

My doubts as to the quality of the data collected and the use of research assistants continued throughout the data collection period. I wondered if I was

relinquishing too much control of the process to the research assistant. As I did not receive the translations in time to gauge the quality of the data, I was unable to judge the effectiveness of the research assistants on that basis. The few attempts I made at interviewing through an interpreter resulted in poorer interviews than those with a poor research assistant. A positive outcome of the relinquishing of control to the research assistants was their increasing confidence and sense that the research was becoming their own; that they were fully engaged in the process, and enlivened by it. If I had taken more control, something else would have been lost in the process. As noted in my research diary: 'There might have been something else lost – their own sense of what is right.'

My objectivity as a researcher was severely compromised by the harrowing nature of some of the stories that emerged. People were surprisingly open about their experiences, some of which involved rape and torture, or witnessing the massacre of their children. It was humbling and disturbing to read and on occasions listen to these stories. It would often take time to bring some level of objectivity to what was being recounted.

5.9 The process of analysis

The findings of the thesis which from the basis for the following three chapters of the thesis initially started with a process of colour coding key data relevant to the original research questions. This process was followed by an initial matrix mapping (see Annex VI for an example of an early matrix) which enabled the themes to be displayed across all cases and data sets, and was hyperlinked between the matrices and transcripts in order to ensure connectivity.

Arising from the initial matrices, Figure 5.1 below identified some of the main themes and ideas which would from the basis for the subsequent matrix mapping (as shown by the example in Annex VII).

Figure 5.1: Explanatory diagram arising from the initial matrix mapping process



A series of matrices for each of the FGDs and each of the individual interviews was produced arising from this identification of the main five themes in the diagram and is summarised in the table below:

Table 5.2: Overview of the themes identified through matrix mapping.

Information Transmission	What are the different mechanisms used – how did people learn?	Who are seen as closest to the information and why?	Who are the trusted transmitters or most truthful/believed and why
Educative Processes	Role of informal educative processes	Role of formal educative processes and informal within formal (hidden curriculum, peer etc)	Influence on conflict or peace building
'Structural levels'	What groups were identified	Which groups are seen as most powerful and why or how is power constructed	Are there any identified gaps between groups
Narratives on conflict and	Experiences and perceptions of	Consequences of conflict	What can contribute to resolution of

peace	conflict		conflict
Issues of identity	Identity issues relating to educative processes	Identity issues relating to information transmission	Identity issues relating to 'structural levels'

Arising out of the matrices a number of key issues emerged and included the following:

- Direct experience of conflict
- Perceptions of conflict and its causes
- Experiences of flight from conflict
- Life in exile: the consequences of conflict
- Ideas for peace building
- The role of educated people
- Identity – collective and individual
- Trust – through 'own group'
- 'Mouth to mouth' or oral transmission
- Gossip and rumour
- Arenas of learning
- The role of technology and the internet
- 'Small voices, big voices' and trusted transmitters of information
- The perception of power relationship and the small voices and big voices.
- The identification of gaps

During the findings and analysis of the data as presented in Chapters Six – Nine, there are both explicit and implicit assumptions made arising from the respondents' accounts. The implicit assumptions are made though an intuitive process, and therefore are more interpretive in nature than the direct quotations from respondents. However, despite the interpretation of the data, the spirit of the responses has been maintained and the integrity and honesty of the respondents' perceptions has been respected. In all respects, ethical

considerations have been maintained throughout the process of data collection and analysis, which are explored in section 5.11.

5.10 Constraints

A number of constraints affected the outcome and quality of the data collected. While these did not affect the overall outcome of the research, they constituted a series of challenges some of which caused delays in collecting, transcribing and translating data.

5.10.1 *Language and translation*

This was perhaps the principal concern for the success of the research, as I was almost totally reliant on the research assistants and translators. This increased the risk of misconceptions. There were instances when I believed the research assistant had understood something only to find out later that it was misinterpreted. I interviewed a few individuals using a mixture of French and English but the potential for misunderstanding was greater than if I had used an interpreter. Conversation was strained by language but also by my presence as a woman and as a *'mzungu'* (white person). My presence was often intimidating and/or distracting for many respondents. Despite the constraints of using research assistants, the benefits of a free flowing and relatively relaxed interview outweighed the disadvantages.

Similarly, with the transcribing and translation of interviews by translators, the time delay in sending the data (the first package took over a week to send and another month for the translations to come back) meant that it was difficult initially to determine the quality of the data collected. The sheer volume of the transcriptions implied considerable time and effort by both the Burundian and Congolese translators. During the analysis of the data however, it was evident that while much of the data related to narrative accounts of respondents' experiences of conflict, a significant quantity of data were linked to

information flow and educative processes. Therefore, my initial concerns about the quality of the data were largely unfounded.

5.10.2 *Research conditions*

Another key issue that affected my research was associated with the research conditions in which the data were collected. Much of the time I was living in accommodation without electricity or running water, which made it difficult not only from a technological standpoint (charging computers and batteries), but also meant that daily living was hard. This caused delays in typing up the translations, as any residual power was needed to transfer data from the digital recorders to the computer and from the computer to CD.

Fortunately, the digital recorders were a very successful means of recording and transferring large quantities of data. There was only one occasion when I was unable to transfer the data from recorder to computer. The use of notes on this occasion was a very inefficient method of recording interviews. The note-taker determined the speed of the discussion and made the group stop until he had written down what was said. Although at the outset of an interview, the digital recorder was sometimes an inhibitor, as the interviews progressed, respondents gained more confidence and ignored its presence.

Insecurity in the camps also caused significant delays, as there had been rebel activity in Burundian camp the week before I arrived. This made respondents nervous and sometimes reluctant to talk to strangers. As I had worked in the camps previously, and knew many of the staff, it was easier to convince people of my genuine intentions. People were apprehensive talking to someone on an issue that was seen as politically contentious. The authorities had banned group gatherings in the camps, so respondents were afraid of being arrested if they were seen in groups of more than three.

The reliance on logistical support from others often hindered the data collection process. If the transport from my accommodation to the camps was

not on time, I would arrive late, and interviews would be delayed. As the transport was offered as a favour by UNICEF and the Red Cross, I could not be other than appreciative of the daily trips to the camp that they provided. Some of the frequent deaths in the camps also affected the scheduling of interviews, which would be cancelled out of respect for the mourning family. Respondents also failed to attend on some occasions for other reasons, such as market day, or soap distribution, which frequently disrupted the research schedule.

Some non-attendance by respondents was due to the lack of 'incentive' that respondents received. Previous researchers had created a demand culture whereby respondents expected something more substantial 'for their service'. Fortunately, my previous work in the camp was recognised and there was a perception that I was not just coming to 'take' but had already assisted the refugees in the past. In addition, we tried to encourage a sense that the research was also their contribution to a process that may help people build peace within the region. The value that was placed on their information helped to convince most people that it was worthwhile participating without financial incentives.

5.11 Ethical Framework

In terms of ethical consideration, the British Educational Research Association (BERA) guidelines of 1992 have been adopted and adapted as the basis for my ethical framework, with particular consideration for the cultural differences entailed in the overseas fieldwork undertaken (BERA, 1999). As there were no specific ethical guidelines available for the refugee context, the adaptation of BERA guidelines was felt to be sufficient. The guidelines are organised under the following seven headings which have been summarised and includes adaptation to my particular research situation:

Responsibility to the research profession

The research has been conducted in an atmosphere of respect for both the research profession and for the participants concerned. It has avoided any

fabrication or falsification of data or findings and will report all findings to relevant stakeholders. My professional conduct while undertaking the research ensured that the research was not jeopardised in any way.

Responsibility to the participants

Participants were respected and focus groups chosen were entirely voluntary and were not manipulated in any way. Participants (including children) were asked to give their informed consent to participate in the research and were encouraged to feel free to participate or not, or to leave the study at any time. The research was conducted in a manner that aimed at all times to respect the culture and customs of those involved. It provided many opportunities for discussion and questions concerning the research and for participants to feel they were part of a process.

Responsibility to the public

The research has been written in such a manner that the findings are clear and can be read by members of the public. The right to anonymity and confidentiality of the participants has been respected at this time. Some respondents were anxious to have their names included in any future publications and their role in the research acknowledged.

Relationship with funding agencies

As I have no relationship with a funding agency to undertake this research, this section of the guidelines is not applicable. The logistical assistance received from UNICEF Tanzania had no bearing on the outcome of the research and while the value of the assistance is fully acknowledged, they have placed me under no obligation.

Publication

This section of the guidelines will be respected if the research or parts of the research are published.

Intellectual ownership

No other significant creative contributors to the research were involved. Every effort will be made to feedback the research to those who participated, in a language and manner that will be understood in the cultural context. This feedback was conducted in March 2005 to the Burundian and Congolese participants. Unfortunately time and organisational restraints prevented me

from giving personal feedback to the Rwandan participants. This was provided through hard copies of a feedback paper.

Relationship with host institution

As there is no host institution involved, this section of the guidelines is not applicable.

5.12 Ethical issues within the fieldwork context

The main ethical consideration specific to the research context arose from the circumstances of the Rwandan respondents. As mentioned above, the Rwandan respondents were reluctant to come forward for security reasons. There was a concern that by its very nature the research could compromise the safety of Rwandans who were hiding amongst the Burundian population. However after talking to many of the UN and NGO staff working in the camps, it was clear that although numbers of Rwandan refugees in hiding was not known, they were tolerated within the Burundian camps, as long as they were not overt in their activities.

There was complete anonymity of all respondents. Respondents could use any chosen name and this anonymity was rigorously observed particularly for the Rwandan respondents.

The traumatic nature of some of the discussions and the revelation by some respondents of the harrowing experiences they had undergone raised an early concern about the psychological damage the interviews might have. However, as most respondents expressed relief that they were able to tell their stories these initial concerns were felt to be largely unfounded.

5.13 Conclusion

The justification for adopting a qualitative approach to the research takes into account the special circumstances in which it was conducted. The context of

the research and the sensitivity of the subject make flexibility a necessity where change and uncertainty is part of life as a refugee. In order to understand the issues relating to conflict and the refugees' perceptions of it, the research examines meanings attached to individual and community perceptions of conflict and peace. These highlight the gaps within the educative processes, where the rhetoric of peace negotiators at the national and international level is not always met by the reality at the grassroots level.

The research therefore is an investigation of different perceptions and is not designed to seek out statistical facts. The personal narratives arising from the data collection have been taken from refugees in four camps. These camps represent sample groups from three case studies (Rwanda, Burundi and DRC) and while these are not comparative, they provide a triangulation of experience and offer different perspectives to illuminate the regional dimension of the conflicts in the Great Lakes.

The respondents came from a cross section of different groups from Burundi, Rwanda and DRC and were considered as the grassroots level at Level One of the 'structural levels' model seen in Chapter One. Apart from the Rwandan refugees – who were too few to form focus groups – the remaining groups were interviewed within Focus Group Discussions. These were chosen as the primary method for data collection, after which depth interviews were held with selected individuals. The training and use of local research assistants, the direct use of local languages and the informal settings – helped to ensure a degree of integrity and genuineness which a more 'classical' approach, might not have achieved. The use of research assistants also ensured that my presence as a '*mzungu*' (white person) would not significantly alter the dynamics of the FGDs and interviews. However, even though my principle role was that of observer, it was difficult to be totally objective given the research context and the harrowing stories of death, rape and torture that emerged from some narratives.

Despite the considerable concerns relating to the design and methods used in the field work, the outcome of the data collection and analysis was positive in

terms of the amount of information, breadth of consultation, openness of response and high level of interest of respondents. The research provided a small, but critical opportunity for the respondents to assert their dignity as part of a process in which they were defining the content of the research with minimal guidance from me or the research assistants.

This chapter also provided the basis for analysis of the data collected, out of which key themes were identified as the basis to analyse the data presented in Chapters Six to Nine. These focussed on:

a) Narratives of conflict and perceptions of peace
b) Educative processes and information transmission – primarily the role of educated people, oral tradition, rumour and gossip, use of new technology
c) 'Structural levels' and the respondents perceptions of power structures both within the camps and within their own countries
d) Identity and the link between educative processes and identity construction and shift

CHAPTER SIX: NARRATIVES OF CONFLICT AND PEACE BUILDING

6.1 Introduction

> You understand that they had invented ways of catching people at every place possible. At that time when the war started, there were people (Hutu) who had found refuge at the mission with the priest. Then Micombero himself came in a helicopter pretending that he was coming to tell them that there was peace. All those people were told to get out of the houses where they were. When they came outside, they found themselves surrounded by soldiers. The soldiers caught them, and piled them in a lorry. They dug a big pit with caterpillars at a place that I know...then they threw them in and covered them with earth while they were still alive.

This recollection from a Burundian elder is one of many similar examples of atrocities committed in various forms. The stories of those who had experienced terror and fear before, during and after their arrival in exile are powerful and harrowing, and this chapter focuses largely on these narratives, with limited explanatory intervention. What is revealed is not only the horrific nature of the experiences but also how perceptions have guided the process of conflict. These have nurtured hatred and hostility which has fed into the next generation. This inevitably affects the potential for successful peace negotiations at any level.

This chapter addresses the research questions raised at the outset of the thesis which ask:

- *What types of conflict have been experienced and what are people's perceptions of the conflict?*
- *How do communities resolve conflicts and how do they think conflict in their country might be resolved?*
- *How might educative processes used to learn about conflict be transformed into peace building mechanisms?*

6.2 Perceptions of the conflict and its causes

Many of the respondents were anxious to relate stories of the history of their country which they believed had a direct bearing on the conflict and its outcome. Many of the children also knew and recounted the 'history' of their country, mainly relating stories told by their parents rather than those learnt at school. The oral tradition in this context was significant, with many children's 'experiences' of conflict in fact being second hand from parents (cf: 7.3: pp. 197-201). These stories have been passed down through the generations and are explicit in their condemnation of the 'enemy' as this historical example from Burundian elders about life in Burundi indicates:

> Respondent 4: Let us come back to the past. When the Belgian defeated the German in our country, he allied himself to the Tutsi and they exchanged brides (married each other's women). The Tutsi went to school, the Hutu became farmers, who they would lash at will. They compared us to the machine that holds planks because we were workers. It is then that we were forced to look down. The Hutu was a house boy and the Tutsi would look after the cows.
>
> Respondent 5: The reason why the Hima [the tribe from which the Tutsis are said to have originated] were put aside, is that they learnt to own things. In the past, the Hima had no compound. They lived in bushes. If one had cows, they were kept in bushes. They had no house. Nothing. But after they had gone to school, after they had known how to build a house, how to own things and to get into the army, they got to the forefront.

Education in this context was perceived in a negative light. There was a perception that until the Tutsi 'had gone to school' Hutu and Tutsi had lived peacefully. Respondents believed education and knowledge created the differences.

The Congolese respondents also recounted stories from DRC that portrayed a particular view of the history and origins of the conflict in their country. Stories such as the one below from the FGD for families were common:

> Respondent: Some years back we welcomed Tutsis who were fleeing their country because of inter ethnic war in Rwanda and many of them settled in South Kivu...We lived peacefully with them in our country. To thank us for our hospitality, they ganged up with their Tutsi brothers now in power in Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi to take our land and rule...When they launched their first war in 1996, the Congolese people, though upset with the rule of Mobutu, distanced themselves from the insurgents when they noticed that it was led by unnamed Banyamulenge who were alleging that they were denied the Congolese nationality. Seeing that they would not go far, they hired Laurent Kabila a well known former Congolese rebel against the Kinshasa Government to head the movement. The Banyarwanda motives are very well known to the people of Kivu.

These stories provided by the respondents illustrate the Bembe view on the development of hostilities between the two sides, but a brief overview of the historical nature of the complex issues dividing the Bembe and 'Banyamulenge' is covered in more detail in Chapter 2.4 (p. 59-60) from a more academically reconstructed perspective (ICG, 2005; Nzongola-Ntalaja, 2004; Pottier, 2002).

One of the Congolese Traditional Kings recounted a story that clearly illustrates the Bembe perception of how hostilities between the 'Banyarwanda' and the Bembe developed in DRC. These are the stories that are recounted to children as 'history'.

> Respondent: According to the history we know, these people were coming to feed their animals on our mountains. When they entered in the Congo, they settled at Mulenge in the Territory of Uvira... and from here they went to Ngandja and in all Bembe territory always

> feeding their herds of cattle where they noticed that their animals were doing very well... Since the indigenous people had no ill feelings with the newcomers we allowed them in our midst. Later we noticed changes I talked about. But before that they were as meek as the sheep. One could not suspect them of any evil nor think they would drastically change this way. When they started to call themselves Banyamulenge instead of Banyarwanda, they became very aggressive and ready to kill people who would dare call them Banyarwanda. They used to walk with long knives and sticks.

It is not necessary to question the accuracy/inaccuracy of these stories. The critical issue is that these stories are consistently passed down to children as part of the oral history of their country. This potentially feeds the culture of violence and revenge that perpetuates through the generations. Children recount these stories as true and rarely have recourse to an alternative historical viewpoint.

As this child from the FGD for children in the Congolese camp recounted:

Interviewer:	What is the origin of war in your country?
Respondent 2:	We hear from our grandfathers that it is because the Banyamulenge like taking land by force and to impose that they be paid citizenship by force.
Interviewer:	Who gave you that information?
Respondent 2:	It is my father.

A similar explanation from a Burundian child about the conflict in his country is equally characteristic:

> Respondent 3: I do not know. What I know about it is (hesitation) I was not aware of the war we fled but I saw how the people were killed. For the rest. I was told by my parents.

Interviewer 1: What did they tell you?

Respondent 3: They told me how it all happened. How people were killed, why they were killed and the source of their conflict. The parents told me.

Interviewer 1: What did your parents tell you was the source of the conflict?

Respondent 3: The source of the conflict that I heard them say was that for the Hutu in our village, they were being massacred because they had voted for a Hutu instead of a Tutsi. The Tutsi who lived in our village wanted to force the Hutu to elect a Tutsi instead of a Hutu but the Hutu voted for a Hutu. I was not there to be sure but I was told that by my parents. That's the reason why in matters of Burundi, I only saw how people were killed but much of it comes from my parents.

When asked if parents should stop telling their children these stories, one woman respondent replied:

> Should I not tell my child when he asks "How was my father killed?" Should I not tell him the truth?

For most respondents there was no recognition that telling children the truth was different from recounting tales that engender revenge and retaliation. This sense of deep-rooted anger was tangible within both groups and represented an almost unshakable certainty that the 'enemy' was responsible for the conflict, whether the enemy be Burundian Tutsi, or Congolese Banyarwanda.

There were only two cases where there was admittance that 'maybe' their own side was also responsible for killing. This child's story was one of only two responses that admitted culpability of their own side:

Respondent 3: What I would say is that the reason why we left was that, in our region, they came and massacred people in the whole house one by one until they killed the last.

Interviewer: Who killed them?

Respondent 3: We saw a big group of men climbing the hill. They were armed with spears and sticks. They may have been Hutu who were coming to kill Tutsi. They massacred all the Tutsi in one house. Then the Tutsi came down to fight the Hutu. They fought and fought and fought. The Hutu were killed among whom were some of our neighbours. Those who survived the battle decided to go away.

A Congolese respondent from the CBO group made a more generalised statement when he said:

> On this issue let me say that we should not keep blaming Banyarwanda or the so-called Banyamulenge. People in the government of the then Zaire were accomplices in the preparation and the evolution of the war up to the ousting of Mobutu. The country was left open to any adventurer.

In contrast to these two perspectives the majority of respondents placed the blame on 'others'. The Congolese for example blamed the Banyarwanda, who were funded by Rwanda (in turn funded by the US and UK). The perception by the Congolese that US and UK are responsible for starting and perpetuating the conflict in DRC persists as noted in Chapter Eight. The gaps in structural levels in this sense apply not only to the gaps between the powerful and the not so powerful within DRC but also to the gap between nations, between rich and poor nations, between superpowers and countries that are being exploited by them. This exploitation was perceived by the respondents as taking many forms, but one common perception was that the US and UK were responsible for the much of the conflict and that the mercenaries that these countries sent in were interfering with the potential for peace in the country. This example from one of the FGDs for leaders highlights this:

> They are the ones [US and UK] who have the key to our peace. They have hired people to destroy us, we ask them to stop their henchmen [mercenaries] and return then to wherever they belong. They have this power.

Illustration 6.1
The 'White General' – a mercenary as perceived in DRC

Stories of 'white mercenaries' from the UK or US were common from many respondents. The presence of white mercenaries in DRC was confirmed during an interview with a senior diplomat working in Tanzania who had extensive experience of former Zaire, Burundi and Rwanda. In addition to my own research, the painting of the 'White General' on the left indicates the strength of feeling in this regard, and confirms the overall response by Congolese refugees regarding the involvement of 'outsiders' in the conflict. This was a print made by a youth in a printmaking workshop in one of the Congolese camps (cf: 5.7 pp. 151-159) and was painted by one of the Congolese boys in the workshop to demonstrate how 'whites' were interfering in the conflict in his country. Although these workshops were not directly related to my research, as one of the facilitators I was struck by the number of drawings and paintings that depicted scenes of violence and ethnic tension.

Although the Burundian respondents did not mention the role of US and UK as frequently as the Congolese, occasionally respondents discussed the role of 'superpowers' who they believed had the ability but not the political will to end the conflict in the Great Lakes. This is covered in more depth in Chapter Eight (cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224). This example from one of the group of professionals however was typical:

> Respondent 5: There are countries which, if they want peace to be restored in that region, it would be restored. But because of interests they need us not to understand one another. They also contribute to create the conflicts. The superpowers like USA, France, England, because of the interests they have in Congo,

> Burundi or Rwanda they see that if we continue with our conflicts, their interests would develop. …Those people who do not want us to have peace because of their interests should contribute their part to promote peace in the region.

As will be seen below in section 6.5, the belief that 'Whites' or superpowers could end the conflicts in the region and bring peace dominated perceptions of how peace could be restored.

6.3 Experiences and flight from conflict

The experiences of conflict that respondents recounted during the data collection could be categorised in two ways: one of physical experience, and the other the fear of the expected. Typically the Burundian narratives described the former and the Congolese the latter.

In the case of the Burundian narratives, many people witnessed the events of conflict which have been ongoing for decades. However what unified these experiences with those of the Congolese respondents was the aspect of flight. Many of the prints that emerged from the workshops mentioned above were of people fleeing from violence, particularly women and children who were often depicted carrying their belongings, as the painting below by a Congolese woman indicates.

Illustration 6.2
Woman and child fleeing DRC

Most of the Burundians interviewed (all of whom were Hutu) fled because of some personal experience or witnessing of the killing of family members or close neighbours. Congolese in contrast fled largely because of rumour. The story below from a professional Burundian woman relates her experience of escape from Burundi:

> When there was a head of the family, he was arrested. But if they happened to miss him, they arrested the wife and the children. I have been one of those families. My husband was not there having left before. Then I saw the soldiers come around my home as if they were just going around. Then they arrested my first born child and killed him. I took the remaining children and ran away from the area because if I had stayed there, they would have massacred me and my children because they had not found the one they wanted. That's what made me flee.

Most of the Burundian or Rwandan respondents were witnesses to violence or murder which caused them to flee rather than hearing it from other sources. A young Burundian teacher explained some of the reasons why she had to leave her home:

> Interviewer: Even though you were 12 years old you could see things. Can you tell us what happened? Can you tell us about the war?
>
> Respondent: We saw the soldiers come. They came. Because at the time I fled as I was a still small child the soldiers came at our home, they knocked I saw my parents run. I myself ran and because it was at night I ran away naked. There was a fence at our home a fence made of cedars. I scrambled/crouched under the cedars. We then heard bullets as people were being killed. I stayed under the cedars till morning. The next day I saw other people who were running away, fleeing carrying their things. I came with them. We came to a certain place which was a camp. We stayed there. The soldiers attacked the camp and we crossed the border to Tanzania.

As an educative process, directly experiencing conflict for the Burundian and Rwandan respondents was one of the most primary forms of learning about the conflict. In the world of this twelve-year-old child, the immediacy of her response relates directly to the experience she had in witnessing soldiers entering her house. There was no process to analyse the truth of the situation. Neither did she question why soldiers were coming to the house. It was sufficient that she saw her parents running in order to take immediate action.

Similarly a Rwandan nurse recounted how she saw the arrest of her fourteen year old son then discovered later that he had been killed:

> Meanwhile among the children I had left at home, they arrested my young boy child and they killed him. They took him and killed him. So when they told me to fetch water, I ran away. I escaped from them.

This woman's story is a common one for men, women and children from Burundi and Rwanda. Many told stories of either killings that they had witnessed in Burundi or threats that they were in danger. The story below from a Burundian commercial worker reflects widespread narratives that reflect some of the violent experiences that some people underwent before they fled to Tanzania:

> Interviewer: Who killed them? [they had been talking about the massacre of Hutu intellectuals in 1993]
>
> Respondent 3: They were killed by the army and they killed them in the house of the Bishop. They did not stop there. They charged then at our commune of Butaganzwa. They massacred people, burnt houses and domestic animals in them, slaughtered people in the street. I was hiding somewhere in my house and I was stunned. It was like a river which had flooded. Blood was flooding the street so that I ran without knowing where I was heading to. I was staggered and I fled to safety.

The trauma of the experiences the respondents have undergone before arriving in Tanzania, has stayed with them and many of the paintings from the

printmaking workshops produced by both Burundian and Congolese participants reflect these experiences. The paintings below depicting burning houses are only two of the many that were produced as examples of experiences the refugees had undergone before fleeing to Tanzania.



Illustration 6.3
House burning - Burundi

Illustration 6.4
House burning - DRC

Almost every person interviewed from the Burundian camps, recounted similar powerful and disturbing stories. Some were stories from the massacres of Hutus in 1972 and others were more recent from the 1990s.

The case below of a young Rwandan woman who was raped at the age of eleven is personal and harrowing, but is an experience that is common both during and after conflict. Rape frequently occurs as part of conflict and post conflict (cf: section 6.4 pp. 184-1186) and is now largely recognised by the international community as a war crime.

Respondent: At that woman's home [the place she had been taken to after her parents had been killed] I found out that her husband was also a killer. He teamed with those people who were reaching for and killing other persons in Rwanda…The woman thought that I was stupid and left me at home. She went to the field or to do her other jobs while I stayed with her child. Then they came to do me evil. They raped me without me knowing…They raped me when I was eleven years old.

Rape is perpetrated by many men engaged in conflicts, for some it is seen as a 'perk' of the job, for others as a means to abuse with impunity. The physical and sexual abuse of women is a common feature of war but until recently rape was not considered a war crime in its own right. It was after 1993 and 1994 that the statutes from the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and for Rwanda (ICTR) were introduced to form the foundation upon which crimes of rape and sexual violence could be punished (Scheffer, 1999).

During the three and a half months of conflict in Rwanda approximately eight thousand women were raped. For many in Rwanda rape not only exists as a continuing mental torture but many are also infected with HIV/AIDS by the rapist. They are not only stigmatised by their communities because of their 'violation', but doubly labelled because of their infection. Amnesty International report that

> Sexual violence and forced marriage continue to be perpetrated by members of the current Rwandese military (Rwandan Defence Forces or RDF), security forces and unpaid militias. These assaults are sometimes reported but are again seldom prosecuted (Amnesty International, 2004: 2).

In the printmaking workshops mentioned above, three out of the five women in one workshop told stories or drew pictures at some time during the workshop of their personal experience of rape in their home countries.

Illustration 6.5
Forced to walk at knife point before being raped

The etching on the left is one such example, which depicts a story from a participant who as a child was

forced by a man 'to take a walk' after fetching water from the well. The artist cried as she related this story, embarrassed that she was still so affected more than thirty years later. These horrific experiences of rape for the respondents were not only confined to their home country but many women were subjected to rape also within the refugee camps (cf: 6.4 pp. 184-186).

The fact that respondents wanted to tell these chilling stories and were anxious, even demanding in their right to be heard, indicates how strongly people have felt that their difficulties have largely been ignored by the international community. This is particularly the case for Rwandan Hutus who believe that their plight has been overshadowed by the Tutsi massacres in Rwanda in 1994. The story of this young Hutu woman highlights the other side of the genocide story, from the Rwandan Hutus who were also subjected to torture and death.

Interviewer: How did you escape? What happened that made all your relatives die, your father and mother die and you survive? How did they kill them? What did you do to survive?

Respondent: They killed them with old hoes, iron bars, machetes and gun.

Respondent: When I went home I was with my father and mother. They came and arrested my father and we separated with my mother, trying to hide from those people. They arrested him first, and then they took him and killed him. They rolled him in banana leaves, burnt him and he died. As for my mother and I, we tried to hide. She persuaded one of her friends to hide me. Then they arrested my mother and we were left. I and her friend. She [her mother] was taken by the people who were killers. They led her to their leader who was a counsellor. When they arrived and even though the wife of that counsellor was a friend of my mother's, she did not protect her. They took my mother and threw her in the river, after a short time.

The stories from the Congolese respondents revealed that the many had fled because of atrocities that they had heard about, rather than witnessed. In their

narratives about how the conflict started, many of the Congolese respondents expressed surprise, less that war was about to take place, but that their army was so easily defeated. A number of respondents described how they and their family were shocked by the outbreak of war because they were convinced that 'their' army would be able to defeat the Banyarwanda without difficulty. The man from one Civil Society FGD group stated:

> We had no doubt on our victory. Banyarwanda as we knew them were not a threat at all. We had faith in our Government and the army. That is the reason why we were not planning to leave. We knew pretty well that the war was coming from Rwanda in connivance with Banyarwanda.

They were surprised instead when the national army fled in the face of the rebel forces. As one man from the CBO group said: 'We understood that a big war was being prepared while we were asleep.' The rumours that were rife during that time were not taken seriously, despite their veracity. Information about the build up to the war was not sufficiently believed to make people flee. Those who fled usually had some direct experience of the war, or received information from a source that was totally trusted. This concurs with the suggestion in Chapter Three that for rumour to believed, it has to come from a trusted source as well as contain elements of truth. Many stories from both Congolese and Burundian respondents revealed that sometimes the most 'trusted' information would come from the 'enemy' side. For example one respondent described how a Banyarwandan friend had warned him about the war:

> He said that we had been very good to them but powerful nations urged them to take our country and occupy it. We have accepted the offer and what is going to happen is massive killings of the Congolese indigenous tribes. He told me that they had taken an oath that each one was to kill his own friend. Whoever would not do that was to be killed by his fellow Banyarwanda through poison or anything else including guns. He added that High Officers in the National Army were also bribed and were not going to fight. On hearing this I left without delay. Members of my family who refused to leave were killed. I lost 48 of them.

There were many instances of people who warned neighbours and friends from the opposing side, who assisted each other, often at the risk of their own lives. The brief story below from a Burundian commercial worker is just one example:

> One Tutsi friend told me "Are you here? We have already made a list of all Hutu in Kirundo. You are going to be exterminated" So we left our beer and we saw a helicopter fly over us. It massacred people in Ntega-Marangara [a province of Burundi]. That is how we came to flee.

6.4 Life in exile: the consequences of conflict

Despite the horrors of the conflict and the terror of fleeing their country, the majority of respondents related negative experiences about their life in exile in Tanzania. Feelings of humiliation, loss of freedom, indignity and in some cases abuse were common in the descriptions of life as a refugee in the camps. There were many examples that compared life in the camp to 'being in prison', or living 'like an animal in a park' or a 'bird in a cage.' There were variations in their descriptions of the type of prison they felt it to be, but all felt the confinement, their lack of freedom and lack of rights to be the most important issue. The example from one member of a leaders group in the Congolese camp highlights this feeling:

> We don't know our rights, if we ever have any. We are insulted by those who are supposed to take care of us. We are humiliated before our siblings' eyes.

A major consequence of the confinement and close proximity of residents in the camps was the issue of security; personal security was of considerable concern to girls and women. An informal interview with a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) official suggested that possibly up to fifty percent of women in the camps had been subjected to some from of sexual abuse, although the majority of cases remain unreported. In 1997 the International Rescue Committee (IRC) conducted a study into the high incidences of rape in the Burundian camps in Tanzania and reported that:

> ...approximately 26% of the 3,803 Burundi refugee women between the ages of 12-49 in the established camp of Kanembwa have experienced sexual violence since becoming a refugee. Refugees have been subject to such violence at every stage of their quest for safety: in the conflict situation in Burundi, along the Tanzanian border, between the border and the refugee camps, and within and around the camps. Perpetrators have included soldiers, policemen, Burundi and Tanzanian nationals, fellow refugees, relatives, husbands, and one reported case of a rape by a NGO security staff member (who has since been fired for another offence) (IRC, 1997).

Similarly a Burundian woman from the FGD for family expressed her general concern about the situation in the camp and the feelings of insecurity that were common among many women and girls:

> The fact of being gathered here in the camp, the moral behaviour of our children has been very much affected, especially our girls. Women and girls are not spared. Those who venture to go to fetch water or firewood are raped. Cases of rape are plenty. We don't feel secure at all. You cannot be sure of the health state of the rapist. He may be already a HIV/AIDS victim. AIDS has been spread among us at a scaring speed. Many marriages are falling apart because of this wind of rapes. Husbands suspect their wives of having willingly consented to do the act. There are many cases of divorce now. Women, we have no peace of mind at all.

It is a travesty that victims of conflict – fleeing from some of the most horrific experiences – are then subject to further violence in supposedly peaceful places of refuge.

The issue of security was only one of long lists of hardships and complaints against the organisations running the camps or providing services. This story from a young Rwandan woman highlights the perceptions of many respondents. Although glad to be out of the direct conflict, she finds life very hard in the camp:

> Respondent: I find that I had no pleasure in the country [Rwanda] because I was only able to sit in solitude and in despair wondering how I would grow up or the way I would live, without

> anybody from by family around me. However, I was glad when I arrived here [in the camp] even though life is not good either because it is in a camp...I also found that there was no security when I arrived. There were guns – there was banditry. I heard people cry out because they had cut one another with machetes...People came to attack us at our house with the aim to do us evil, they stole everything we had in the house, and they wanted also to kill us. It may be understandable when one is killed where there is no peace, but here our things have been stolen in a situation where there was supposed to be peace.

The situation in many of the camps during the data collection period was considered highly insecure. Prior to my arrival in March 2004, there had been rebel insurgents entering into the Burundian camps who had killed several people. Rwandan rebels were also said to have entered the camps in N. region to force Rwandans hiding amongst the Burundian refugees, to join them. I was told of one case where several girls had been taken by the rebels, 'as slaves'. One of the girls escaped and returned to tell her tale, but spent the rest of her time moving from house to house in fear of her life. It is inexcusable that in a supposedly protected environment after escaping from one form of abuse in their own country, refugees experience further abuse in their country of asylum.

6.5 Ideas for peace building

The majority of respondents saw little opportunity to engage personally in peace building mechanisms. Despite the fact that there were several peace initiatives taking place within the camps, there was little recognition that these had any bearing on the peace process in their countries. As noted in Chapter Eight many narratives suggest that peace could only be brokered by the most powerful of their country or by the 'superpowers' such as UK and US (cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224). This highlights the power relationships referred to in the models of structural levels identified in Chapter One (cf: 1.5 pp. 28-36). Perhaps this

perception comes from the fact that community initiatives for peace building are not regarded either internationally or nationally as a significant part of the process and only those peace initiatives brokered at the highest level are considered relevant. If the profile of the community voice for peace was raised and recognised internationally, it may provide more lasting and sustainable peace initiatives when combined with national/international treaties or agreements (cf: 10.5 pp. 269-322).

Respondents provided many examples of how they perceived the higher 'structural levels', as well as more powerful nations could bring peace. A few of these examples are provided below:

A Congolese family member stated that:

> Politicians are the ones to bring peace, but in these high positions, they forget themselves and are serving only their own interests. For peace to be found, they must forget their own interests.

Similarly a Burundian teacher suggests that peace is dependent on the abandonment of self-interest:

> Leaders should not defend their own interests but be concerned with the interest of others. Different groups should sit together to settle differences.

The example below from a Congolese man, a respondent in the FGD for CBOs is indicative of many narratives from both Burundian and Congolese respondents concerning the role of Western influences in their countries:

> Today the US are the sole superpower in the world. These people covet the wealth Congo is endowed with and they want to exploit our country by using a proxy whose name is Rwanda. Why can't they look for puppets in the DRC the way they did with Mobutu instead of bringing us the Rwandese? The sentiment of being under Rwanda, a small country which doesn't have the might of Congo cannot and will not be stomached by the Congolese people.

Few respondents regarded the lower hierarchical levels as having an opportunity to assist the peace process, but one Congolese English teacher suggested:

> For peace messages it is necessary for mobilisation before and after peace building through different groups, where each group is trained separately. Radio is a very good way of passing information and could be used to start a peace building programme.

In a slightly different way, a Burundian teacher suggested that it is not for others to solve the problem of the conflict in Burundi:

> The conflict needs to be solved by Burundians themselves, not by outsiders. Each person must admit what wrong they have done. Until each has 'begged pardon' of the other there is no hope for peace. The past has to be put aside.

This particular response is redolent of the assertion by the FNL in Burundi that until culpability is admitted on both sides, through a peace and reconciliation process, then they will not participate in the peace process in Burundi (cf: 2.3 pp.54-58).

These responses reflect the apparent powerlessness of the groups at this level, despite the existence of several peace groups in the camps, some of which were part of a network, others which worked independently. All however, were working together with community members to try and facilitate dialogue and peaceful resolution of domestic and local conflicts. Despite this, the majority of respondents failed to recognise these initiatives as significant in the overall process of peace building.

6.6 Conclusion

The narratives outlined in this chapter highlighted a number of key issues relating to the respondents' perceptions of the origins and outcomes of conflict. Firstly there was an overwhelming sense that respondents'

consistently blamed the 'enemy'. Their perceptions of the historical background to the conflict and how the conflict started were prejudiced by the deep-rooted revenge mentality that pervaded the narratives collected. This highlights one of the problematic issues for this research in terms of finding effective peace building mechanisms, i.e. how to break the cycle of revenge? The negative stories highlighted by the narratives in this chapter were passed down through the generations and serve only to fuel the conflict, whether in the short or long term.

Secondly, despite the horrific tales that people recounted of their flight from their home countries, many respondents felt that life in the camp was only marginally better than enduring the conflict. Feelings of indignity, imprisonment, and lack of security were commonplace. There were rare stories of positive experiences arising from life in the camp.

Lastly, the community saw themselves as impotent in terms of their effect on peace building. This confirms the gaps suggested at the beginning of the thesis, between different 'structural levels', within societies and between societies and relate to the models outlined in Chapter One (cf: 1.5 pp. 28-36). There was a sense that peace could only be brought by 'superpowers' such as the UK and the US or by high level politicians within the country. This is perhaps because of a) a failure to recognise the potential of the peace initiatives already in existence at a local level, and b) a denial of the effect that the negative narratives might have on the younger generation.

CHAPTER SEVEN: INSIDE OUTSIDE SCHOOL – THE ROLE OF EDUCATIVE PROCESSES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how different educative processes were perceived by respondents as being effective mechanisms for information transmission on conflict issues in Rwanda, Burundi and DRC. Emerging from the questions presented below, topic guides were developed which aimed to elicit responses to identify different mechanisms used to transmit information which form the basis for educative processes. The findings from the data collection therefore address the following research questions (see Chapter 1.4, pp. 26-28):

- *What types of formal and informal educative processes exist?*
- *Which of these are perceived as the most significant in the transmission of information in their countries?*
- *What factors within the most significant educative processes make them so?*
- *How do educative processes affect identity construction and shifts?*
- *Which educative processes identified were perceived to influence conflict?*

The main thrust of this chapter focuses on the role of educative processes in formal and informal ways, first through the paradoxical role that 'educated people' were perceived to have played in the conflict, and secondly through a variety of informal educative processes ranging from rumour, gossip and other forms of oral transmission, to radio and internet. In addition arenas for learning and personal experiences of conflict also emerged from the data analysis as issues that addressed the above research questions. The greater emphasis on informal mechanisms arose because formal educative processes were rarely identified by respondents as a source of learning about the conflict, even though informal learning within formal educational settings was

acknowledged. This was the case for both the Burundian and Congolese respondents. This was unforeseen given the traditional perception of formal education as a potent change agent. The limited role of formal education as perceived by respondents is surprising given the fact that in the Rwandan genocide many teachers were identified as perpetrators in the conflict and were said to promote an enemy culture (Mamdani, 2001; Obura, 2003).

7.2 Formal educative processes

Formal educative processes had significance chiefly in terms of producing 'educated people' (those with a university education). These were identified by some as having culpability in the conflict but paradoxically also having the potential to promote peace. Schools along with other 'arenas of learning' were identified among the Burundian refugees as places where students would gather to discuss their engagement in the conflict – or to train for it. However teachers were not identified as teaching hate messages or teaching directly about the conflict. This does not mean to say that this did not exist, but that it was not identified by the respondents as forming a significant part of their experience.

7.2.1 *The role of 'educated people'*

There was an important distinction made between 'education institutions' and 'educated people'. The role of education institutions as considered above was less important for most respondents than that of 'educated people' or 'intellectuals' who were perceived as 'part of the problem'. It was suggested that they possessed a degree of responsibility for influencing and even contributing to the conflict. One of the Congolese youth interviewed summarised some of the sentiments about intellectuals that were voiced by several of the respondents:

> The educated people can be easily corrupted and hence sell us…They cannot be trusted '*kabisa*' [completely].

He suggested that educated people were 'closer' to 'Whites' who were seen by the majority of Congolese as being at the heart of the conflict. Whites were perceived in this way by many Congolese respondents because of the funding given to Uganda and Rwanda which it was suggested was used to support Rwandan rebels and disrupt DRC. There was a belief that the increased interactions between 'Whites' and 'educated people' resulted in the corruption and ultimate deception of the 'intellectuals'. As one Congolese youth said 'The Whites interact with the learned people and deceive them.'

There was a contradictory element in the perception of many respondents to 'intellectuals' as many considered 'educated people' to be closer to the information source. The paradox of education as either the benign or malign force that was discussed in Chapter Three (cf: 3.3 pp. 87-91) is reflected also in the perceptions of respondents towards 'educated people'. While they were not necessarily trusted, it was known that they could gain better access to and understand the information better than people with less education. They were also perceived by some as having the potential to 'bring the light', but often did not live up to that potential. They were seen as easy to manipulate because of their close interaction with Whites. This challenges the common perception that 'educated people' make more informed choices and are therefore less likely to be susceptible to manipulation which was discussed in more depth in Chapter Three.

A group of Burundian parents saw 'intellectuals' as being close to the information and able to gather additional information not always available to others. One respondent stated:

> I too think that the group of intellectuals [are close to the information] because he can even give you information that has not been given in the country. They listen to many radios.

Intellectuals therefore were seen as powerful people who could influence the outcome of conflict. 'Educated people' were seen as powerful in two ways: firstly that they were 'closer to the Whites' and therefore close to the perceived seat of power, and secondly because they had a greater ability to gain access to and interpret the information they received regarding the conflict. This power however, made them less trusted than those with little or no education who were perceived as more likely to tell the truth. They were distrusted not only because of their education but also because of the power it invested on them.

Similarly, 'educated people' were seen by one Congolese respondent as having 'failed' their nation. The expectation was that 'educated people' would have helped the situation and 'shown the way to others', but this was not the case. Others too stated that 'intellectuals' should be 'the light'. A traditional healer for example stated: 'The educated have totally failed, as the light of the society they have not shone the way as they should.' In this way 'educated people' are seen as having the potential to bring about peace, but they have failed to do so. A commercial worker from DRC was asked:

> Interviewer: Do you think that educated people can be instrumental in bringing peace in your country?
>
> Respondent: Yes and no. Yes because they are called to lead and people are inclined to listen to the learned ones. No, because they are the main troublemakers. They start to fight against others and bring people into their disputes on ideologies.

Some respondents indicated that educated people could also become the targets of war as well as be part of the problem. This was particularly the case for Burundian teachers who had witnessed the massacre of Hutu intellectuals in 1972 in Burundi:

> Respondent 3: I have something to add because I left my country in 1972. What was frightening was that when the war started, there came soldiers to arrest everyone who had been educated.

> Every Hutu who had sat on a school desk, every businessman (Hutu) was arrested with the reason that he was said to be a criminal. When it came to the end of April, at the beginning of May, in order to arrest all the workers, at that time, we received our salaries from CADEBU at Bujumbura where we all were. They called the workers to go and get their salaries. All those who went the first day were caught and massacred on the spot. When we saw that, we told ourselves "should go and die like the first?" We said no and we went away.

Teachers and university students as 'educated people' perceived themselves in this context as victims. It is well documented that 'educated people' were not only perpetrators of mass killings during the genocide in Rwanda, but had also been victims during earlier pogroms (Mamdani, 2001).

The Burundian respondents in Malkki's research in Mishamo refugee camp in Tanzania, similarly identified how 'educated people' had been targets during the 1972 massacres:

> They wanted to kill my clan because my clan was educated. The clans which were educated, cultivated, they were killed. In my clan, there were school-teachers, medical assistants, agronomists...All have been exterminated (Malkki, 1995: 98).

What is evident from these responses is that there was a contradictory perception of 'educated people', both as 'part of the problem', but also having the potential for bringing about social improvement, by providing the 'light' for others to follow. This contradiction stemmed from the particular role that 'educated people' played in refugee camp life. The fact that educated youth for example were adopting greater responsibilities in refugee camp administration - often as 'spokespeople' for NGOs and international agencies - caused some resentment from elders who felt increasingly marginalised.

Because of the shifting roles, education provision in the refugee camps has altered the dynamics of relationships, not only between elders and youth, but

also between educated elites and 'ordinary people'. The availability of education Katunzi and Ndalichako suggest

> ...started as a temporary measure to address the interruptions in education and to facilitate children's possible reintegration into schools in their home countries when they went back home. Nonetheless, with a prolonged stay of refugees, provision of quality education in the camps has become increasingly important (Katunzi and Ndalichako, 2004: 1).

Due to this prolonged stay of refugees in the camps and the fact that education up to primary level is provided free and available to all, the potential for this to undermine the traditional educated elites has been dramatically increased. However, until the refugees return to their countries of origin, it will not be evident if the shift in power structures resulting from greater access to education in the camps will be maintained on return to their home countries; or whether traditional power structures will reassert themselves. This issue is discussed more fully in Chapter Eight.

7.2.2 *'Arenas of learning'*

As mentioned above education institutions were rarely identified as places where formal educative processes for learning about the conflict were utilised. This was particularly the case for Congolese respondents who felt that education institutions had no influence on the conflict - except in producing intellectuals. However, it emerged from the Burundian respondents that secondary schools and universities were places where 'planning' and discussions on 'how to fight' took place. One respondent identified what he called the 'le Carrefour des idées' or 'the marketplace of ideas' where he said that Tutsi students would discuss issues relating to the conflict and make plans on 'how to fight'. Other respondents also suggested that these students were protected by soldiers who would assist them to bring weapons into the school. There was no admission that Hutu children had access to weapons or that they were recruited into armed groups through any similar arenas. Hutu students were typically presented as victims – the fleers, rather than perpetrators of –

violence. The example from a teacher below when he described how he escaped from Burundi highlights this:

> ...Then we split into two gangs (the students) a group of Hutus and Tutsis. The group of Tutsi students joined the Tutsi population [those who were said to be killing Hutus].When I saw that I ran away to Rwanda.

Although schools were identified as places where weapons would be smuggled in, they were not directly identified as teaching about the conflict. Instead they were seen as places where militant students would gather and learn about fighting techniques. School was recognised as a potential training ground for violence but not as the source of the conflict. It was the 'arena of learning', the place for social gathering that was more important than the educational context of the institution.

Religious institutions were also given credence as arenas of learning because the religious leaders were generally considered as one of the trusted groups in society. Religious leaders play a significant role in both Burundian and Congolese society and would often be sources of information for the congregation. Various Christian denominations (as well as Shi'ite and Sunni Muslim groups) form the majority of the refugees from both Burundi and DRC. However, there was no sense amongst the respondents that religious leaders had any culpability in the conflict. This contrasts with the stories from some of the Rwandan refugees I worked with in 1994-6. Although there was denial on the part of the religious leaders themselves – particularly the Catholic leaders – about involvement in the genocide, some of the refugees recounted stories that illustrated the high level of involvement of the churches, which they suggested either perpetrated crimes or ignored pleas for sanctuary.

For the Burundian and Congolese populations however, there is more a sense that the religious leaders are 'the light'. This statement from a Burundian teacher is representative of many responses in both Burundian and Congolese camps:

> When the church leaders hear the truth, they tell their followers that they should avoid the information which may be circulating. They tell them how to behave and to try to love one another. That's mainly the message from churches. No one teaches about conflicts. They tell their followers to avoid the troubles.

For the Congolese the informal arenas of learning such as the street, market place and religious institutions were also regarded as more effective than education institutions as conduits for information transmission. School as an institution was not regarded as an important arena for educative processes by the Congolese, and in the words of one teacher, 'schools should be left out as they only endure the events that unfold.' This meant that they felt schools should be ignored as sources of information as they are the victims of events, not the perpetrators. Another member of a civil society group suggested that:

> Information in the camp is in the street. People are not informed at schools. What people know is from the street.

This perspective belies some of the stories that emerged after the Rwandan genocide about the role of education institutions in fomenting violence and hate messages (Bird, 2003b; Mamdani; 2001; Obura, 2003). In contrast the narratives of the respondents indicate that the informal mechanisms of gossip and talk that is a feature of 'the street' interaction, appeared to be more effective for passing on information about the conflict. This is discussed in more depth below.

7.3 'Mouth to mouth' and the tradition of oral transmission

An oral tradition was identified by both Burundian and Congolese respondents, who recounted traditional stories concerning the history of the conflict passed down through the generations. This included the historical basis for divisions in both countries as well as the foundations for the current conflicts. For example one Burundian respondent explained his perception of

how the 'injustice' between Hutu and Tutsi first arose and then suggested that these accounts are not written but are passed down from father to son:

> Respondent: So if you consider the problem of injustice between Tutsi and Hutu it is a long story. So someone would say that this began in Micombero's regime [a former ruler in the 20th Century] he would be mistaken. This began a long time ago.
>
> Interviewer: You say that these things began a long time ago how did you know them? Who told you?
>
> Respondent: You know that here in Africa the writing is recent. We received information by oral transmission. You were told information by one who has witnessed it. My father has a father. My father's father told my father the story. My father told the story to me and when I get my child I shall tell him the story.

Such an oral tradition is a powerful educative process that carries credibility with the recipient, because of the close relationship he/she has with the transmitter. Perhaps also because of the belief that parents are always right, there was little questioning of stories from parents. There was limited critical awareness of alternative viewpoints to history. When some respondents were asked if they thought that 'their own side' was also culpable, the answer was often yes, but no details or stories were provided. Although culpability was not directly admitted, the Burundian respondents identified one of most critical issues in the conflict as 'lies'. One of the 'influential' people in the camp stated:

> All that makes Burundi to be in such a mess is 'lies and fear.' In order for those things to end, the people must be given a say again. When the community will get back the word that has been taken from them, the fear will also end.

The implication is that the lies and therefore fear is passed from the top – that 'the people' have no voice in their own destiny. As a result there is still an abnegation of their own role in the conflict, the fault always lies with others, whether this refers either their own political leaders, or to the 'enemy' (cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224).

The downplaying of their own side in conflict is reflected throughout the transcripts. A blame culture exists on both sides. For example, a Tutsi website suggesting that there will be another genocide, recounts almost exactly the same 'hate' stories as those told by Hutu respondents from Burundi and Rwanda[4].

The oral transmission of stories was considered by all groups to be one of the most significant educative processes for passing information. Information was passed on through family and friends who were trusted sources of information. Parents for example were automatically trusted by children: 'My father cannot cheat me.' said one Congolese child. This child believes all that her father tells her in the same way as the adult quoted above believed the stories that had been passed down from generation to generation. One child learnt about the war entirely through stories that her parents told her. She stated very clearly that the Banyamulenge wanted to 'take over our country' and to 'exploit our wealth' and when asked where she learned this, she said: 'My parents tell me this every day.' The parental transmission of information was perceived as one of the most powerful educative processes and most people learned about the identity differences between themselves and their 'enemies' from these parental stories. As one mother explained:

> Our fathers told us "these houses belonged to people you could call now district commissioners. They died while you were still very young in 1965. It was then that their houses were burnt because they were Hutu." As our parents told us the stories, we would cry as we looked at these houses as they stood empty. Then came the year 1972. Then I was old enough to see what happened. They [Tutsis] came and took people to their death.

Learning from her parents this second hand knowledge was transformed into first hand knowledge as she grew up and witnessed events that were resonant of those recounted by her father. In this way, the oral tradition from her parents was confirmed by her own witnessing of events.

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[4] www.kulana.org

These informal educative processes were recognised by most respondents as being the primary and most significant mechanisms for receiving and giving information. If someone received news, it would be passed around informally. A group from the Congolese CBOs stated that: 'The way information circulates among refugees is informal. Therefore there is nobody responsible for news.'

The educative process by which this informal transmission was most commonly identified was by word of mouth. When information came from people who had witnessed events this information was identified as particularly valid. A family man from DRC stated: 'It is difficult to doubt somebody who claims to have witnessed an event or has heard from someone who saw it happening.' In the camp, information received from people who had travelled back to their country and reported on the situation was regarded as an important and reliable source. As one Congolese teacher stated:

> There are people who sneak out of the camp and who even go to Congo to see how life is there in order to return if possible. These people bring reports of the evolution and restoration of the peace process in DRC.

Word of mouth was seen as more trustworthy in the volatile and insecure situation of recent times in DRC and Burundi, although sometimes letters were also used as this Burundian teacher indicated:

Respondent:	Or we can use the means of letters, writing letters.
Interviewer:	When you write a letter to somebody he answers you immediately, he tells you…
Respondent:	Yes.
Interviewer:	How is it done with letters?
Respondent:	If you write to a person, you can ask him/her how the situation is where he/she lives. Or how the situation is in the country, and he/she answers you.

However for other respondents, letters were not always the best means of sending information, chiefly because of security reasons. One of the elders from the Congolese FGD highlighted how letters could add to danger:

> In general it used to be passed onto people by way of *mouth to mouth*. Sometimes friends or kin would send letters to their relatives, but this way was avoided because if such letters were intercepted, the recipient or the sender would land in serious trouble with the security agents.

Word of mouth, also through the telephone, where communication was with those who were witnessing events at home was considered more effective. As this Burundian restaurant worker suggested: 'The most accurate information now is from people who talk on telephones. Not everybody has left.' The use of mobile phones has revolutionised the way many people receive information from their home countries. It has brought the possibility of direct communication with eye witnesses who are generally considered to have the most accurate information. During a visit to the camps in 2005, I was struck by the rapid increase in the use of mobile telephones in the camps after a new network was introduced. Most information regarding the situation in both Burundi and DRC was being received by those with mobile phones, and then passed on to other members of the community by *'mouth to mouth'*.

7.4 Rumour

Rumour, which was often passed on through gossip was considered a different mechanism from *'mouth to mouth'* even though it was another form of oral transmission. Rumour 'was rife' before, during and after the conflict. Before the conflict started in DRC many rumours were not 'taken seriously' which is why they were treated as different from information passed between trusted friends and family members. There were many Congolese for example who believed strongly that their army would defeat the 'invaders', so the rumours concerning the possible take over of their region were ignored until the evidence was overwhelming that the national army had been defeated. Many

respondents were shocked at their national army could just 'run away' in the face of the 'enemy'. As this Congolese leader stated:

> When the war begun we started wondering how the Rwandese could dare attack us and let alone beat us on a battleground. It was unthinkable and unacceptable in the mind of the Congolese people. The fact is that the enemy was not stronger than us but the enemy bought influential people in the Government and in the National Army. In reality, our army didn't fight.

Rumours such as 'the Banyamulenge have killed a Pastor at Tulambo and given his meat to dogs.' were commonly cited as scaring people but still not sufficient for them to flee the country. It was not until they started witnessing events and seeing 'troops of Banyarwanda growing in numbers', hearing gunfire and seeing wounded, that people started to believe that their army had 'run away' and were leaving them to their fate. A Traditional King from DRC said:

> A lot of rumours were circulating. We got them [rumours] from themselves [Banyamulenge] and especially from the queer behaviour all during those years of their preparations. I think it was one of their tactics to scare people by telling them their plan. But first signs were the arrogance and insubordination displayed by that community in prelude of the war:
> a. They refused to be counted during the Scientific Census.
> b. They forbid all Administration officials to step in their villages
> c. They started to send their sons to Rwanda for military training in order to come and launch their war of conquest.
> When they begun to refuse to submit themselves to local authorities and revolt against indigenous Chiefs we felt that their threat was real.

The build up to the conflict was noted by the supposed changing behaviour of the Banyamulenge, and accounts of which were then noted and passed on through rumour and gossip. Rumour in this way was used as a mechanism to incite fear against the enemy and therefore was important from a transmission point of view.

For Burundians, rumour was equally important and as for the Congolese was often passed on through gossip at the market place, at water collection points,

food distribution sites etc. However, as mentioned above, much of the information was not taken at face value especially if it was known to be rumour. As one of the Burundian youth interviewed said:

> When we hear rumours, we wait for some time to see if they have some truth and we listen to radios to verify them. No one can give me information that I will accept on the spot.

However, rumour was still a powerful mechanism and much of the information that people initially received about the conflict was through rumour, whether they believed it or not. Although rumour was accepted as part of normal life and as the way information was transmitted, few Burundian respondents admitted to acting on rumours because they felt that people would tell lies. A young woman, when asked who spread information, said:

> Ordinary people. The ordinary people walk around. When I hear information I tell a person, that person tells another one ... and the news spreads. However, most of the time individuals lie.

This was a common theme amongst Burundians, who frequently said that the Burundian population tells lies; particularly those at the top. They suggested that this was one of the causes of conflict because people were not willing to admit the truth. This statement from a Commercial Worker was representative of many similar statements by the Burundian respondents:

> I find that the war comes from the fact that they lie to one other on everything they do. Since they have begun talks, they have never told the truth to one another.

Rumour in this context is associated with lying, as indicated in Chapter Three (cf: 3.4.2, pp.101-106). Rumour more than the 'street talk' of gossip was associated with the circulation of lies. The importance of trustworthiness of information was a consistent factor throughout the data collection process, and it was important for the respondents that information they received by whichever educative process, was from a trusted source. The role of trust is examined more fully in Chapters Nine and Ten, but the element of trust

features in the way respondents sought trusted information from different media as described below.

7.5 The role of technology: radio, internet and mobile phones

Radio featured strongly for both Congolese and Burundian respondents as one of the most important educative processes for obtaining trusted information. The majority of Congolese and Burundian respondents from both focus groups and in-depth interviews cited radio as being one of the most significant sources of information. In contrast, the few Rwandan refugees interviewed, suggested that radio was not important in learning news of their country. One of these respondents said that she would rather die than go back to Rwanda, so hearing news of her country did not interest her and in fact she positively avoided it. She said:

> I do everything not to hear about it…I listen to radio Tanzania. From Tanzania. I do not want to hear about Rwanda. Because simply to hear that a person has died or fled from politics, it shows me things that may result in something which is worse.

Radio, more so than any other form of media, such as newspapers or television, was important for the Burundian and Congolese refugees chiefly because of the availability of radio in remote rural areas. Very few people except the urban rich would have access to television. In DRC, Burundi and in the camps in Tanzania, radio was a lifeline for information. This is not to say that all radio stations were trusted. Typically 'national' i.e. government led radio stations were not trusted, so any information from these stations had to be verified by using other sources. Trusted radio stations were cited by respondents from both countries and these were typically international stations such as the BBC, Voice of America (VOA) and Radio France International (RFI). As one Congolese family man indicated:

> The first source of information is radio, especially foreign stations. To us this is the trustworthy source especially when

> many stations broadcast the same news items stemming from different reporters.

The Burundian respondents also mentioned a radio station called Radio Isanganiro which was trusted because it presented balanced reports and was managed by both Hutu and Tutsi correspondents. As one of the Burundian Elders said

> There is information in French, Swahili, Kirundi from different radios. If you follow them, all that is said on FM is said on Isanganiro. The first radio to tell information as it has received it is Isanganiro.

Respondents also stated that they compared stories between radio stations and other sources to determine the most truthful information. Information was rarely taken at face value and was verified by a number of different mechanisms. Both Burundian and Congolese respondents were deeply mistrustful of much of the information they received and often referred to their own populations as 'liars' or 'not straight'.

Radio announcements before the conflicts arose, were also recognised as being important factors in encouraging people to flee. Most respondents would place journalists close to the information even if they were not regarded as powerful. One elder from Burundi stated: 'The information given by the journalist is the grassroots information.' Radio therefore was important for respondents before, during and after the conflict.

As an educative process, radio made a significant contribution to how respondents reacted, before the war started, during the conflict – sometimes determining the decision when to flee – and after the conflict in finding out information on the possibilities for peace and for repatriation. If they believed the source of information on the radio was a trusted one then it acted as a very powerful mechanism for change. It also had a social and psychological function in linking people in exile with those at home, and had the potential to influence the perpetuation or cessation of the conflicts.

News is central to the life of most of the refugees who offered similar statements to the one below provided by a Congolese man from a CBO:

> We listen to BBC, VOA, Deutche Welle and even local radios. We are like all other refugees eager to know what is happening here and in the DRC...thanks to this link they can know about unfolding events in DRC and here in the camp;

Internet was a relatively new phenomenon for most refugees, but despite this, even though an internet centre was located in the Burundian Camp M, the Congolese who had funds would travel the two hours from their own camp to use the internet. Two internet centres were established in 2001 by Global Catalyst Foundation, an American charitable organisation to serve both refugees and the local Tanzanian population in K. district. One of the centres in Camp M was used by the majority of users to contact friends and family in Burundi (this had an important social function and had a direct bearing on their readiness to repatriate). The centre was primarily a training centre for computers, with only ten refugees being trained at any one time. It was open for the general population for only a few hours per day for internet use, although secondary school students had greater access.

The overall demand for internet was very high, with people queuing for up to two hours to gain access. However the cost was prohibitive for most refugees who were not working, so few respondents would use the internet other than for email, although some used it to access broader and wider information about the situation in Burundi and the dynamics of the peace process. The internet manager of the centre stated that these were mainly 'politicians' who would use the internet for access to news:

> Beside all these, there are politicians who come to read information on Arib.Abarundi.org, umukeknyezi.org, Umuco... they learn about different news about the country.

The information gleaned from the internet would be passed on to the rest of the community, and on occasions those who were not literate would ask to have information read to them by the staff at the centre. The internet manager

saw the internet as a 'source of democracy' because no-one could lie. Questions can be asked and answers always found. It was seen as a great source of education as well as information.

However, there was little sense of a critical awareness about the type of information that could be found on the internet. The 'computer cannot lie' attitude of many of the respondents did not take into account the possible biases of people who were posting the information on the internet. The technology was too new to use it in the same critical way they used radio.
As mentioned in Chapter Three, mobile phone use in the camps exploded exponentially in the year between undertaking my research in 2004 and conducting feedback in 2005. There was remarkable interaction taking place because of mobile phones, not only between refugees within Tanzania, but also between the refugees and their compatriots at home. It affected the decision of many of them to repatriate.

As this article from The Guardian highlights with an example from Kenya, mobile phones allow the marginalised to communicate:

> In a culture where people travel long distances to find work, the mobile has become the most useful and ubiquitous piece of technology since the bicycle. Just as bicycles are used in rural Africa to transport bananas or paying passengers, the mobile is changing lives in ways unimagined in the developed world. It links distant families and allows the poor to communicate. (The Guardian, 2005)

The description of mobile phone use in Kenya is similar to that found in many of the refugee camps in Western Tanzania. The educative processes that take place because of radio, internet and mobile phone should not be underestimated. As mentioned in Chapter Ten, radio soap operas are fast becoming one of the main mechanisms in Africa for promoting behaviour change in relation to HIV/AIDS. Computer based learning is already mainstreamed in Northern countries. As the rapid introduction of computer technology into formal education institutions increases in Southern countries,

it is important to recognise that computers and internet will become a significant feature of the education landscape.

7.6 Conclusion

This chapter explored to what extent formal and informal educative processes affected a) people's perceptions of the conflict and b) how they received information before, during and after the conflict. Formal educative processes proved to be less significant, except in the production of 'educated people'. It would appear that 'school learning' had little to do with the harsh reality of conflict. The paradox of formal education that was highlighted in Chapter Three extends to the role of 'educated people' in the context of the conflict scenario. 'Educated people' were perceived to be more powerful in terms of their access to information and proximity to 'Whites' as the seat of power, but were perceived as a result to be less trusted and therefore less effective as a tool for educative processes.

The role of informal educative processes, through oral or aural information acquisition proved to be more significant for many of the respondents than formal educative processes. For example traditional stories or news of the conflict, particularly from those within one's 'own group' were perceived as important mechanisms for receiving information, although the information that was believed and acted upon, depended on the level of trust accorded to a particular source. Trust was an important element in this context, determining whether an educative process was successful or not in transmitting information that would make a difference to perceptions or to actions.

The narratives outlined in this chapter revealed – in concurrence with literature indicating how education can sometimes compromise peace – that 'educated people' are perceived as less trustworthy and ipso facto less successful conduits for information transmission.

CHAPTER EIGHT: THE 'COOKING' OF POLITICS AND THE IDENTIFICATION OF 'STRUCTURAL LEVELS'

8.1 Introduction

This chapter investigates how the different 'structural levels' identified might have influenced conflict. 'Structural levels', as identified in the hypothetical model outlined in Chapter One exist in every community and most respondents identified the relationship between the different structural levels and how conflict is influenced or peace is brokered. Although the levels and groups identified in the hypothetical model may not necessarily exist in the same way within the refugee situation, there are marginalised groups within every community that have little or no access to information or power. The Congolese, Rwandan and Burundian societies are no exception. The findings indicate that respondents saw a clear relationship between power, proximity to information and the exacerbation or mitigation of conflict. They felt that as a community they had no role in either conflict or peace building – they were mere victims of circumstance. The gap between themselves and the decision makers was perceived as too wide for them to influence the course of events.

The process by which respondents came to identify these gaps was through a 'social mapping' exercise. This allowed the focus group participants to discuss and identify the various groups within both the refugee camps and their home countries and map out the proximity of each group to the source of information about conflict. The gaps between the decision makers (the 'big voices') and the 'small voices' was often bridged by mediators who were seen as trusted members of the community.

The findings arising from the 'social maps' aimed to address the following research questions as outlined in Chapter Five:

- *Do the 'structural levels' identified in Model B (see Chapter One) reflect the reality on the ground?*
- *Which groups and power structures are perceived by respondents to exist?*
- *How are they perceived in terms of information transmission? (i.e. in terms of the relative importance of different levels and groups)*
- *Is there a gap between the levels and if so what form does it take?*

Through the discussion of the findings below, there is an attempt to answer some of these key research questions.

8.2 The identification of 'structural levels'

'Structural levels' were identified by the respondents through a social mapping process. An example of one of the social mapping process in terms of proximity to information is seen below in Figure 8.1 and the majority of social maps were similar in format. During this process, the terms 'small voices' and 'big voices' were coined by the refugees during their attempt to identify groups at different levels of the community and the power relationships between groups. 'Small voices' were generally seen as 'being outside the circle' i.e. far away from the information source and 'big voices' were those closest to the information, and were often seen as the most powerful.

The 'social maps' that were developed during the data collection process indicated clearly that the respondents identified various 'structural levels' as depicted in the hypothetical model in Chapter One. Respondents were free to draw the social maps as they wished and many highlighted their perception of the different layers of society. Most respondents felt that the hierarchies associated with proximity to information applied not only to conflict but also to other aspects of politics and governance. The example below is a clear indication of the refugee perceptions of societal stratification.

Figure 8.1: Social Map of FGD Professionals N. (Training) 24.03.04



This social map highlighted the various levels (if not all the groups) that respondents felt represented the basic stratification of their society in Burundi.

The subsequent social maps – similar to the above – which were developed during the training session in N. were used as models for the remaining FGDs in other camps. The respondents were able to place the different groups within their own social maps corresponding to their own perceptions and style. The subsequent discussions that emerged through the social mapping process focussed on where these different groups were placed in terms of access to information and power.

Maps similar to the one below in Figure 8.2 highlight how government, military or party leaders were not usually trusted but were regarded as the most powerful and therefore closest to the information about the conflict.

Schools here were seen as a mechanism for passing information, but on an informal basis similar to the way information would be passed in the street.

Figure 8.2: Social Map of DRC taken from FGD Head teachers 25.05.04



After the social mapping process, the model (Model D), originally devised to represent structural levels in the respondents own countries was revised, and a clearer picture of 'structural levels' emerged. Leaders, politicians, intellectuals, for example were all easily identified at the top levels, and families (women and children), farmers, people with disabilities and many others were identified at Levels One and Two. These were perceived as being 'outside the circle' i.e. possessing no power or access to information.

Model D: Revised model of 'structural levels' of society based on respondents' perceptions of proximity to information



8.3 Small voices, big voices: trusted transmitters in relation to their proximity to information

The majority of groups interviewed placed politicians close to the information but were clear that most were not to be trusted. One member of a focus group from the CBOs alleged that politicians 'all consider Congo's politics and leadership like their profit making project.' There were many references to leaders 'cooking politics' and serving their own interests. A 'Traditional King' from DRC said

> Politicians are known to be selfish, whatever they preach conceals their real motives: to enrich themselves to the detriment of the society.

This traditional leader saw his own group of Traditional Kings as being the most trusted because he felt that they work 'first for the benefit of the people under [their] authority.' Only one other group from Civil Society also identified Traditional Kings as being 'people's representatives and custodians' which identified them as trusted transmitters of information. As noted in Chapter 5.7.4 (p. 150), although the Traditional Kings were respected, they were not perceived in the camp as particularly influential or powerful.

The most trusted transmitters tended to be the mediators between the powerful and the community. Although not powerful, youth had a particular role to play as mediators as they were considered by different groups, both in the Burundian and Congolese camps, to have a particular mediation role. A respondent from the Burundian Civil Society FGD indicated that 'youth are very instrumental because politicians need them to attain their objectives. This is the cradle of activists.' The youth were seen as dynamic and able to negotiate between the politicians and the community and as a result to pass on important information. An example of this was provided by the Congolese FGD Civil Society group, who cited how the youth who had been involved in a peace initiative in the camp might act as effective mediators. In particular they noted that the leader of the association,

> ...was a good mediator – he can go to both leaders and the community. He effectively forces the situation in the camp by holding meetings, announcing them without asking permission first from MHA [Ministry of Home Affairs – the Tanzanian government administrative body in the camps].

In contrast, the Burundian sense of 'mediation' took a more passive role, where youth would work alongside camp level administrators and then pass information gained onto the rest of the community. Burundian respondents noted that particularly 'educated youth' who were typically employed by NGOs and UN agencies and therefore often had access to 'insider information', had greater access to information. These educated youth were considered more self-aware and therefore trusted as mediators (although paradoxically as noted in Chapter 7.2.1: 212 were not trusted in other

respects), and given 'the word' i.e. trusted. As this Burundian head teacher suggested:

> Respondent 5: the youth of this group make their auto-criticism. It is a group that criticizes itself. And when you meet someone who does his own criticism he becomes a real man in the future and he is given the word.

The contrast between knowing the information and being trusted enough or powerful enough to use it was indicated by the relationship of prostitutes to information. For several of the FGDs in the Congolese camp, prostitutes were considered to be close to the information source, by virtue of sleeping with powerful people. Although in many ways a 'small voice', prostitutes could obtain information before many others; but in terms of the power structures of society, their level was still low. Similarly the wives of politicians were seen as being close to the information (but not powerful), while women in general were typically seen as 'outside the circle' and therefore a 'small voice'. The relationship between information and influence in this context therefore, is blurred, as the typical power structures that placed the 'powerful' close to the information, did not apply to prostitutes and wives of powerful men.

Similarly there were contradictory responses regarding the role of women as trusted transmitters. Some respondents felt that women were not trusted by men because they were seen as being unable to 'keep a secret', while others felt that women were more trustworthy because they had less self-interest, and less to gain. One Congolese woman summed up the general attitude of Congolese men towards women:

> Women are not trusted. A child may be more trusted than a woman. Men think that women cannot comprehend things and convey the message as it is sent.

An Elder later confirmed this negative stereotype of women:

> Women and children were knowingly left out. According to Congolese traditions, women and children cannot keep a secret.

> So men try to hide from them any sensitive information in order to avoid any leakage that can send panic within the community. But in the end husbands do inform their spouses in due course. By the same way children can superficially get to know some news.

This is perhaps a traditional stereotype of how women were perceived by men, and contradicted the very strong and positive roles that I personally witnessed women taking in both Congolese and Burundian camps.

Regardless of whether it came from women or men, trusted information needed to be verified from different sources before it was fully believed. As was mentioned above regarding the perception that the population were 'liars' one Burundian traditional healer stated:

> Truthful information needs investigation. People are liars. They can give false information so you don't trust it unless you check it first.

There were few exceptions to this, the most notable being those who had travelled back home, were eye witnesses to the situation and therefore automatically trusted. A Burundian Head Teacher particularly trusted information that came from 'fighters':

> In general, the person whose information most people believe is the fighter. When a fighter comes from Burundi and tells you information, you usually don't doubt about it.

Other respondents in the group felt that the trust in this case was associated less with the person as a 'fighter' and more because he had arrived directly from Burundi. Witnessing conflict therefore was sufficient to guarantee trust, and there was little attempt to verify stories that came from people who had arrived from Burundi.

For the Congolese many of the different religious leaders were seen as trusted transmitters because of 'their spiritual status' and the respect they held in the community. It was not thought by the community that a preacher could lie. In

contrast some respondents from Burundi argued that preachers were just as guilty of lying about information as politicians, and one respondent from the Civil Society FGD suggested that preachers often

> ...speak politics while pretending that they are preaching the Gospel. When he is preaching you hear him insert some things like "Watch out there is this or this..."

The Burundian respondents indicated that 'wise men' were considered more reliable as trusted leaders, although the 'wise men' they trusted came from those men 'who had swallowed the stone' i.e. 'who have experience'. Traditionally these would have been elders in the village. A head teacher from Burundi stated:

> People that one can trust as mediators are these wise men because what made them so [i.e. were elected as 'wise men'], was because they could be trusted. As I hear, everyone agrees on them being selected as wise men.

These particular trusted 'wise men' are distinguished from those who are considered as bogus because they are educated. In the words of a Civil Society respondent:

> ...the 'wise men' today consider education. They consider *ethnics*. If someone has studied two or three years post primary, he is considered as a wise man. The elders as such are no longer respected, no longer considered. And this has contributed to make Burundi as it is. Only those who are educated are considered to be wise.

This reverts again to the suspicion and resentment that elders had for the educated. They were not considered by elders either to be wise or trusted. Trust was a particular feature of relationships within the community, and was dependent on whose information was believed or acted upon. For information to be significant it either had to come directly from a trusted source, or through a trusted mediator. Therefore in terms of peace building strategies – as will be seen in Chapter Ten – it is important to identify and utilise these trusted sources in order to maximise the potential for peace building.

8.4 The perception of power relationships

As mentioned above, most of the respondents identified themselves with marginalised groups, groups who had no power and who were the 'small voices'. For example, this elderly traditional healer from Burundi when asked about what information was trusted or 'truthful' stated that for him:

> The truth has lost value because the old people have been put aside. In the past, the king needed advisors. They were chosen among the old people. Today, the intellectuals do not want to listen to old people. The old people tell the truth because they have no interests. They tell the truth for the truth.

Truth was rarely equated with power or proximity to information, with the exception perhaps of the religious leaders who for most respondents, particularly the Congolese, were considered to give truthful information. Lies were generally associated with power.

As noted in the model above, the 'small voices' tended to be the most marginalised. However in a camp situation respondents highlighted the fact that the marginalised sometimes became more powerful because of the conflict and the previous 'powerful people' became the marginalised. The identity shift was recognisable although not directly stated. The shift was also observed in terms of power relations, where 'educated people' were typically selected to assist the INGOs and UN agencies run the camps. Therefore some traditional roles were usurped by young educated youth who could speak several languages. The mere fact of speaking English in some cases resulted in certain youth being appointed by an INGO, regardless of their competency to do the job. Youth, and in particular educated youth who spoke English, played an increasingly important role in refugee society. Their paradoxical role echoed that of other 'educated people' (cf: 7.2.1 pp. 191-195) in that they were of necessity mediators between the powerful and the community, but this did not make them liked or necessarily trusted. They were perhaps mere couriers of information that could not be obtained by other means.

The educated were often despised but were seen as powerful in the camp because of their relationship with NGOs and UNHCR. This sometimes led to resentment, particularly by older people with less education. For example these health workers from Burundi when asked which groups were excluded suggested that:

> Respondent 2: The unheard are the illiterate. The illiterate can not join other groups because they have nothing to say.
>
> Respondent 3: The problem of illiterates is very important because you can't do any job without having at least a certificate of 6 years.

In the case of the Congolese, the Traditional Kings had a strong power base in their home country and commanded great respect. As one respondent from the civil society group suggested: 'They had an ability to reach the masses.' This power (according to the Traditional Kings themselves) was lost to them on arrival at the camp and the Traditional Kings positioned themselves 'outside the circle' when drawing their own location on the social map. This referred not only to their power within the community, but also what they perceived as 'magical' powers that enabled them to 'see things at great distances' and to 'transport' themselves across the country. According to one Traditional King this 'magical' power was only possible in his own country. He believed that when he was outside of the 'magic zone' his power was lost. In their own eyes (not necessarily the eyes of the rest of the community who still held great respect for the Traditional Kings), Traditional Kings had in effect become one of the 'small voices'. This identity shift from powerful member of the community as an administrative ruler, to an 'ordinary' member of the community was only temporary as there was a clear statement that Traditional Kings, unlike other administrative leaders, would regain their 'powers' on return back to DRC. Their construction of identity in terms of their power relationship to others was determined by location. This notion of identity shifting according to time and space is explored in more depth in Chapters Four and Ten.

The change in power of the traditional kings – and this equally applied to 'influentials' in the Burundian society – also meant a change in identity, from being a powerful member of the society, to what they perceived as 'nothing'. One Congolese Traditional King explained:

> Here I am nothing but a mere refugee like all the others. We are all under the authority of the Tanzanians who are attached to administration of the camps and at a certain extent the elected leaders.

The formal leadership structures that existed in DRC and Burundi beforehand were no longer recognised. People 'close' to the NGOs and to UNHCR (who were the de facto government) were now seen to be in power. As one Traditional King explained:

> The camp has its own administration in which we are automatically excluded; so the refugees were asked to elect their representatives on a condition that they must be neutral, people who were not leaders in DRC. Now we have a camp committee.

While the Traditional Kings had slipped from their power base to become 'small voices' other groups were perceived as always being 'small voices' and not able to change their role. The marginalised groups of society were obvious 'small voices' such as people with mental health problems, small children, the very sick and the very old. The main group that stood out for all groups including the Rwandan group was the Batwa, the pigmy ethnic group. This group is said to be indigenous to the region, and comprises only one percent of the population in each of the countries. All FGDs identified the Batwa as 'small voices' who were perceived as one of the most marginalised groups in their communities.

By far the largest group of 'small voices' were women. Although women were said to have more voice than in the past, they were still regarded by many respondents alongside children as 'small voices'. This also applied to the full social spectrum of different groups of women. Prostitutes and even wives of influential men were still 'small voices' despite being close to the information

by virtue of their proximity to powerful men. Being close to the information in this case did not make them powerful enough to become a 'big voice'.

Gaps were identified between politicians and those 'outside the circle' like women, children, elderly and people with disabilities as these people were 'caught unawares' and were unable to do anything. This situation, some felt, was the same for women and children globally. As this respondent from the Congolese FGD for CBOs stated:

> All over the world, women, children and the old are the people who suffer the most during violent conflicts. One of the reasons is that they don't know what has been happening in the community where they live. So they are caught unawares.

The 'not knowing' in this case – the 'being caught unawares' appears to be a critical factor according to this respondent. Similarly many other women complained that as 'small voices' they were 'out of circle' and therefore did not 'know'. Would greater access to information improve their 'knowing'? Does bringing the marginalised 'into the circle' in terms of information access elevate them to the status of a 'big voice'? One suspects that in the case of women and children, it would merely allow them a better place to hear the 'big voices' and be termed 'participation'. Given the cultural constraints of these countries, it will be some time before the marginalised will become 'big voices', whether inside or outside the circle.

The 'loudest' of the 'big voices' were naturally the politicians who were seen as the most powerful group by all respondents. While powerful, the politicians were not trusted because they did not serve the interests of their people. The statement by a Burundian traditional healer was typical of many made by different groups interviewed:

> Respondent 3: Since 1993, the politicians have taken the word and refused it to the people. They went after money and wealth. The word should be given back to the people…Political leaders are fighting for posts while they deceive us that they are fighting for us.

Many similar examples were found in the responses of Burundian, Congolese and Rwandan respondents. Leaders were seen as taking their country to war, without the mandate of the people who felt they were mere pawns. As this Rwandan nurse suggested:

> I am small. I am down. I am under their feet, of the leaders' feet. If it is their politics, I do not know.

In DRC politicians were seen as the most important group at the higher level, in terms of both conflict and peace making, because they are the ones who 'are in the kitchen of politics.' It was different however in the camps where politicians were not able to operate as they had in DRC. As one Congolese elder stated:

> ...we don't have politicians here [in the camp]. They know they are the ones who brought this hell on us all and they cannot be welcomed in the camp.

Politicians were perceived as benefiting greatly out of the conflict both financially and politically, so were anxious to maintain their positions by doing little to broker an effective and lasting peace. This self interest was seen as a barrier to peace, but despite this respondents felt that politicians had – and still have – an important role in the peace process. A Congolese family man said:

> The role of politicians in the peace process is very important. They are the ones on the helm of the country. That is why they are called leaders because they have a following. But in many cases once they are elevated, they forget the stairs that helped them ascend to the leadership and start to serve themselves. Politicians should put the interests of the nation before anything as the people don't like wars. A solution can be found.

There was a recognition that people in power do not care for the community, even though they may have been elected to that role. A Congolese English teacher suggested that 'people in power don't like to listen to those in a down position.' The selfishness of the politicians was often referred to as the main reason why they were not trusted to pass on truthful information. Similarly

they were not trusted to engage in political strategies that would benefit the people rather than themselves. A Congolese traditional healer mentioned:

> Our politicians are too selfish. They never consider to know what they must do for the country and not the other way around. If they can start to think of the people and to put the interests of the nation first, I am persuaded that Congo can be a prosperous country in Africa. They should know that their boss is the nation, the people. In addition they must know where they came from; they were mere citizens before ascending to the positions they have now and one day they will go back to that citizenship.

The few Rwandan respondents equally blamed politicians for lying and cheating the population for their own interest. As this Rwandan teacher explained:

> They lie to you in order for them to get their interests satisfied and to progress...So you find the country sinking in problems because of politicians who lie to the population and do not tell the truth. And if they want, all the wars can end, because they only have to abandon the habit of struggling for power and to tell the truth, to work for community.

Not only do they see politicians as a barrier to peace, but they also regard rich nations, particularly the US and UK as 'meddling' in their countries. The involvement of the US and UK was mentioned by the majority of Congolese respondents, as they were regarded as interfering in DRC politics in order to exploit its rich mineral wealth. This issue was referred to in greater depth in Chapter 2.4 (p.62), but clear links have been established between the conflict in DRC and international interests, including the US and UK (Duffield, 2001; HRW, 2005; Mills, 2002; Pottier, 2002). These economic interests are considered by some as '...a stronger driving force than political power for the continuation of conflict in DRC' (WCAC, 2003: 8). It appears that from the narratives outlined in this chapter, many of the respondents would agree.

The involvement of foreign actors and the fact that they are perceived to supply arms to Rwanda and Uganda, also constitutes a barrier to peace. They are seen as the ones who are 'pulling the strings' and have the power to stop

the war if they chose to do so. This perception is held by the majority of Congolese respondents, even the children. One Congolese child said:

> They are able to stop the war if they want, because these countries are powerful. People fear orders from those who are stronger. When adults intervene when we are quarrelling or fighting, we stop and obey because we don't want to be beaten. The same applies with big and small countries I guess.

Similarly Burundian respondents saw the powerful nations as participating in the conflict from behind the scenes. As a Burundian leader stated:

> Most of them [politicians] think of and work for their own enrichment and for the benefit of their masters who hire them. Here I mean the economic powers of the world.

The respondents' perceptions of the involvement of 'big nations' are explored in more depth below.

8.5 The identification of gaps

The gaps referred to here are numerous and constitute gaps not only between the 'small voices' and 'big voices' but also between 'big nations' and 'small nations'; between educated and those with little education, between 'structural levels' and within 'structural levels'.

In terms of 'structural levels' and power relations the main gap that emerged from respondents - particularly the Congolese - was between big nations and small nations. Both Burundian and Congolese respondents felt that they were part of 'small nations' who were being dominated, exploited and manipulated by rich and powerful nations. They could see the translation of power from leaders who were corrupt and wanting to be close to 'whites' and the manipulation of the small nations by the big nations to get resources.

The majority of respondents felt that as a community they were not able to achieve peace on their own. The gap between themselves and not only their

own leaders but leaders of powerful nations was too big. This statement from a Congolese youth sums up the perceptions of many of the respondents regarding the role of the US and the UK in the DRC conflict:

> Congo is a rich country, maybe they want to exploit our country to our detriment. They now hire Banyarwanda to wreak havoc. The Banyarwanda on their own cannot dislodge us, but since Americans and the British are backing them, we are now in this trouble.

Many groups and individuals, particularly respondents from DRC, suggested that US and UK exacerbated the conflict. They were perceived as destabilising the country in order to gain wealth and exploit mineral resources. Respondents suggested that the US and UK used the Banyarwanda to assist them by 'buying them, promising to help them attain their goals.' One of the respondents for the FGD of CBOs angrily insisted that:

> Today the US is the sole superpower in the world. These people covet the wealth Congo is endowed with and they want to exploit our country by using a proxy whose name is Rwanda.

Burundian respondents see the manipulation of their country less for wealth but as part of the colonial past and the power of 'whites' to exacerbate or ameliorate conflict. This Burundian head teacher highlights the perception of many respondents:

> Some of us continue believing that we cannot do anything that that the White does not approve. The white man helps us quarrel and he should also help us find peace.

Similarly the Congolese also perceive this gap between 'Whites' and their own nation as at the root of the problem both historically and more recently. A Congolese man from the FGD for CBOs stated:

> I fail to see how wars can be ended as long as guns are being made in their factories and sold to people or countries. The Whites are the main cause of our misery.

The majority of Congolese respondents presented similar accounts about the role of other nations in 'corrupting' their national leaders. This statement from a respondent from the women's groups is typical:

> Let the Whites leave Congo alone and our politicians should learn to love our country. A nationalist cannot take bribes from capitalist multinationals to destroy our own Motherland.

Only one respondent from the Congolese group of CBOs accepted that the Congolese needed to take some responsibility for the involvement of the 'Whites' when he stated:

> On this issue let me say that we should not keep on blaming Banyarwanda or the so-called Banyamulenge; people in the Government of the then Zaire were accomplices in the preparation and the evolution of the war up to the ousting of Mobutu. The country was left open to any adventurer.

This refers to the historical complicity between Mobutu and the Banyarwanda during the 1970s and 1980s, which extended to the war in the 1990s. This statement by another respondent from the Congolese CBO group highlights this perception:

> When the war begun we started wondering how the Rwandese could dare attack us and let alone beat us on a battleground. It was unthinkable and unacceptable in the mind of the Congolese people. The fact is that the enemy was not stronger than us but the enemy bought influential people in the Government and in the National Army. In reality, our army didn't fight.

As mentioned in Chapter Six it was rare for respondents to accept any level of responsibility for the conflicts, which they regarded as caused by 'others'. The majority of respondents were engaged in story telling which consistently blamed the 'enemy' either for direct intervention or 'corrupting' their people, as stated by this Zone leader:

> Once they accept to be corrupted by capitalist nations which covet our wealth, they become their slaves and fear to betray their powerful masters who literally bought them and owned them as their tools.

Another gap that was highlighted by respondents was between 'educated people' and the 'ordinary people'. As was seen in Chapter Seven 'educated people' were not trusted and there was a distinct gap between those who were perceived as educated (therefore possessing more power and information) and others without education. During the social mapping process, people with little education were typically placed 'outside the circle'. One young man from the FGD for youth said that 'educated people are corrupt and sell us to the Whites.' By this he meant the US and UK who he claimed were responsible for 'hiring the killers.'

A young Rwandan woman who had undergone horrific experiences during the genocide also suggested that the educated people were the most culpable:

> I find that the most involved are intelligent people who are educated and who are very intelligent. It is these who are most involved.

She went on to explain that typically these educated people were the ones 'at the top' and it was through a chain of orders from the top that instructions for the massacres reached the 'ordinary people'. Her statement indicates how a provincial leader in Rwanda might come to order the massacre of 'ordinary people':

> The Administration says "I was given order by the counsellor." The counsellor talks about the district officers, the district officer says that he received order from a province, the province from a Minister. So that you understand that it was a chain among the leaders.

The social maps highlight the various gaps between different groups; between those 'inside' and those at the edge of the circle. Most groups and individuals were very clear that they were rarely placed within the inner circles. There was recognition by most respondents that as a community they were powerless to effect change. An example is provided by this Zone Leader (one of the different categories of leader in the camp) when he was asked 'What can a community contribute to bringing peace?' and he replied:

> They have not been given that opportunity. I don't think that they will even get that chance. Those who manipulate things and power will not let this occasion to happen.

As mentioned previously there were 'mediators' amongst the 'ordinary people' who were responsible for acting as intermediaries between the powerful and the 'community'. These people were not necessarily powerful themselves, but had respect and status, or possessed certain skills to act as effective mediators. Typically religious leaders were cited as being mediators, as were journalists or certain radio stations. Some groups also cited 'wise men' as being a trusted group, but these sometimes had less access to important information.

As mentioned above, one group which was unusually selected as mediators taking information from one group to another in the camps was the youth, particularly youth who had some kind of education. As this exchange from the FGD of commercial workers highlights:

> Respondent 4: I believe that the youth will be able to transmit information because they are strong enough. They pass information to parents and to ordinary people.
>
> Interviewer: Any one else to contribute?
>
> Respondent 1: The youth are the most active and they are many. There are also youth who listen to radios. Youths who are grown up. They take the information to the parents.

This paradoxical role of youth who were tolerated because of their proximity to camp authorities and were perceived as 'active' was touched upon in 8.2.1. It is particularly paradoxical because other mediators were perceived as achieving their status as mediator through trust. The youth gained theirs merely because of expediency. They were strong, active and had access to information from different sources. This still did not make them liked or trusted. This role of mediators is a critical one if the community base of peace building is to be strengthened and is explored in more depth in Chapter Ten.

8.6 Conclusion

This chapter illustrated the ways in which people identified the power brokers of events and the 'structural levels' posited in the research questions in Chapter One. The gaps between the top and bottom levels in terms of information transmission and perceptions of conflict were also evident from the findings presented in this chapter. The concepts of 'big voices' and 'little voices' highlighted this aspect, and explored perceptions of who had greatest access to information ('big voice') and those who were marginalised ('small voice'). As a refugee even if they possessed a power base within the camp, few respondents identified themselves as being anything other than marginalised. The mere fact of being a refugee rendered them powerless.

This loss of political/social power and dignity was further revealed during the process of social mapping which was undertaken as part of the FGDs. This process encouraged respondents to represent in a visual way, the different groups of their societies, both in the camp and in their home countries. The differences in the two maps revealed the refugees' perceptions of conflict and the consequence of becoming a refugee. Most felt that the camp life stripped them of their dignity and their roles in life. For some, particularly elders and traditional leaders, the loss of respect had a profound affect on their sense of self worth. The artificially created camp administrative structures which replaced structures traditionally based on respect for age and wisdom, frequently created tension between the educated (most of whom were employed by various agencies) and the non-educated, who may well have been powerful figures in their own country.

This gap between the educated and non-educated people (cf: 7.2, pp.191-197) was perceived by many respondents as 'part of the problem'. There was resentment and dislike of educated youth in their role as mediators between the powerful and the community. But this did not stop the community using them as mediators as a matter of expediency. The identification of gaps therefore can be seen not only in terms of gaps between 'structural levels' in their own country but also at personal level in their present lives as refugees.

This indicates the lateral relationship between groups within the same 'structural levels'. Although there are clear hierarchies within the 'structural levels' of the refugee camp as well as in their home countries, respondents felt bound together in terms of powerlessness by virtue of their identity as a refugee. This issue of identity both as a refugee and as a victim embroiled in conflict is explored in the next chapter.

CHAPTER NINE: THE INTER-RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EDUCATIVE PROCESSES, IDENTITY AND TRUST

9.1 Introduction

Identity emerged as a major issue affecting conflict in the Great Lakes. This was despite the fact that the issue was not posited as a question in the topic guides, for reasons explained in Chapter Five and below. The findings from the research regarding issues of identity are presented here in the context of the theoretical perspectives identified in Chapter Four. They are examined within the relationship between identity and educative processes, as it is evident that the educative processes used to define, form and reform identity are key in revealing the educative processes that might be effective in peace building. The element of trust has been added as it often defines whether educative processes are successful or not. Trust influences the formation and maintenance of identities.

Identity was deliberately omitted when framing the topic guides for data collection. This was to avoid pre-judging or pre-empting the responses regarding identity. As identity is often considered a key issue in the conflicts in the Great Lakes, I wanted to ensure that if it emerged, it resulted from the respondents' perceptions not because of prompting. However as indicated below, the issue of identity was of prime importance in terms of the perceptions respondents possessed about the conflict and how they thought it could be resolved. It became clear through the process of data collection and analysis that educative processes were profoundly influenced by identity and vice versa. As will be discussed in depth below, the issues of educative processes, identity and trust are key elements in identifying effective mechanisms for peace building.

Figure 9.1 below aims to link some of the different mechanisms by which identities are constructed and shift. It indicates the intersection between

educative processes, identity construction/shifts and trust that provides the potential for peace or conflict to occur within different 'structural levels'. For an identity to be constructed or to shift there have to be elements of trust involved within the process. The synergy that relates to the elements of educative processes, identity and trust is presented within the framework of structural levels, as indicated by the pyramid.

Figure 9.1: Visual representation of the synergy between educative processes, identity and trust



9.2 Synergising educative processes, identity and trust

Through the process of data collection and analysis, issues of educative processes, the construction of identity, shifting identities and the issue of trust were synthesised into the model above. Some of the issues relating to identity

construction and shift are mentioned in Chapter Four which covers different theoretical perspectives on identity. However, this chapter focuses on how identity issues affected the respondents in the research and the implications of that for conflict.

9.2.1 *Educative processes in the construction and shifting of identities*



The data and literature both suggest that educative processes, both informal and formal have significant roles to play in the development, preservation and shifting of identities. Cultural and group identities are formed and maintained through talk, from traditional and cultural traditions that have been passed down through generations. As discussed in Chapters Three and Four, various forms of informal educative processes and mechanisms for the transmission of information have been identified as influencing the formation and reformation of identities.

This section of the chapter therefore links the theoretical elements of identity construction and educative processes within the frame of evidence collected through the data sets examined in this research. It examines how identities can be constructed and shift through different educative mechanisms.

The role of education in its broadest sense, in terms of the development of individual and collective identities is neatly summarised by Beach when he suggests that:

> Education, whether it be in the school, the family, the community or the workplace, prepares people to adapt to existing society, thereby maintaining a degree of continuity in our collective knowledge, values and beliefs across generations. It must also prepare individuals to participate in the transformation of society. It is this second concern to which consequential transition is directed, though it necessarily presupposes the existence and legitimacy of the first... Consequential transition is the conscious reflective struggle to propagate knowledge linked with identity in ways that are consequential to the individual becoming someone or something new, and in ways that contribute to socio-genesis: the creation and metamorphosis of social activity and ultimately, society (Beach, 2003: 57 in Granville, 2004: 5).

It is the production of collective knowledge allowing 'the individual [to become] someone or something new' that is at the heart of the construction of identity through educative processes. The importance of the oral tradition in this regard cannot be overemphasised. Children are not born with an identity, they learn it. The data suggest that they learn through the process of interaction with parents, neighbours and peers; through 'talk' and gossip. Their identities are formed and confirmed by this talk and as they grow older, through interaction with other adults. The response from this Burundian Teacher indicates how some people learn from respected elders:

> Respondent: You understand that the role of education, education from parents is very necessary. Because before a child comes to the (formal) teacher, he has had parent education.
>
> Interviewer: So...
>
> Respondent: You must hear such matters from parents. However, I can't say it is only my parents who know that. Any person knows, who is older than I am, knows how things began in Burundi. As for me I didn't often sit in the group of youth, but I liked to sit together with grown up men who were respectful, who were

> sharing ideas. There are proverbs that they sometimes used and you could learn from them even if you did not ask for an explanation at the time, but found out the meaning later.

As mentioned in Chapter Six this kind of social gossiping and story telling, acts as a mechanism for social bonding and inclusion through talk. The nature of oral tradition, through myth or gossip leads to a socialisation process that is facilitated, or hindered by outside influences such as media or propaganda. There is not an automatic belief that the media listened to is correct unless it has been verified from other sources, and these are typically sources that include 'talk' and interaction with peers and family members.

The role of formal education as perceived by the respondents was less influential in the formation of identities. Its chief influence was perceived to be in terms of the informal structures within the formal system, i.e. the hidden curriculum, student gossip, etc. Very few stories were recounted that indicated direct teaching that affected identity formation. This is not to say that it did not happen, but it was not identified by respondents. The majority of respondents when questioned directly on the role of schools in the conflict responded in a similar way as this Burundian Restaurant Worker:

> Respondent: Here in the camp, there is no school which can teach matters of information about the war.

Similarly this Burundian teacher suggests:

> Such information about the war in Burundi cannot be taught in schools because at school, they are learning other things like mathematics, languages…

The most common reaction from respondents corresponded to this response from the FGD for Commercial Workers:

> Respondent 2: As the gentlemen said, we are still young, but as we grew up, we were told that our grandfathers had been massacred under

Micombero's rule. That we learnt even though we were still very young.

Interviewer: Who told you so?

Respondent 2: Our fathers told us because at that time we were still very young, too young to know it and some of us were not born yet.

Therefore, even at an early age, the stories of 'massacre' were being told and passed on to very young children. The children did not learn information about the history of the conflict directly through school. There was also very limited mention of the 'hidden curriculum' or the informal peer gossip within the school environment as contributing significantly to information acquisition, even though it was evident from some responses that it did occur. The perception was that formal schooling was not significant in terms of inculcating messages. This is contrary to the popular belief that formal educational institutions not only reflect the institutionalised values of societies but also are able to significantly inculcate those values and 'control the "content" of thought' (Bashiriyeh, 2005). Schooling is often presented as an agent for change, for trying to influence the morality of children as future adults through programmes such as 'citizenship' education, peace education or life skills education. However, there is little evidence to suggest that such programmes presented within a formal school environment have a significant or lasting impact.

What appeared to have more effect particularly in the case of the Rwandan genocide was the propaganda fed via the radio to influence people's mindset by feeding on their fears and anxieties. The notorious pirate radio station 'Radio Milles Collines' was instrumental in inciting ethnic hatred by pushing an ideology that portrayed Tutsis as 'snakes' or *'inyenzi'* (cockroaches) that should be exterminated. An excerpt from a radio programme broadcast by the United Nations highlights the critical role this radio station played in the genocide:

Narrator:
The role played by one particular radio station – Radio Television Milles Collines - in fuelling hatred against Tutsis

> was something that bothered the UN Force Commander in Kigali at the time, Canadian General Romeo Dallaire.
> **ROMEO-R: General Dallaire**
> In a nation that is radio bound, that in some villages the radio or the voice of the radio is nearly the voice of God, the impact of that station is incalculable. It educated people on how to kill and how to disembowel and how to pull out foetuses and how to cut them in half and how to rape, how to mutilate (UN, 2004).

Much has been documented elsewhere on the propaganda machine of the Rwandan genocide through radio, so it is sufficient here to recognise that it was one element of the escalation of hatred in Rwanda.

The construction of identity as discussed above relates to the interaction with, and acceptance of, social norms and values of society through a variety of educative processes, the most significant of which were perceived to be informal. However as explored below there were other forms of identity construction identified in the research, both individual and collective which imply force or indoctrination. The section below highlights how identities are constructed, and shift according to context, but also how some identities are shifted through group pressure or indoctrination.

9.2.2 *Construction of collective identities: learning through group networks*

As seen in Chapter Four, the formation of collective identities occurs through a number of processes, some of the most significant of which are through informal educative processes. For many respondents this was often by learning through group networks which was an important educative process ranking highly among respondents, particularly Burundians and by which many respondents learned about and acted upon their collective identities. Being part of a 'group' whether that meant a student group, an ethnic group or family group was critical to what and how respondents learnt about the conflict and whether they trusted the information they received. Learning from their 'own group' was an important component in determining the level of trust or belief they ascribed to the information provided. One of the Burundian teachers

suggested that if someone is thought to be from the same ethnic group they are more likely to reveal information or plans:

> Interviewer: How is it known? [they were talking about the spread of the Hima empire]
>
> Respondent: Anything that happens among people must be known. How is it known? It may happen that a given person when you live close to him, that he thinks that you are of his/her ethnic group. He can then tell you about what he/she is planning.

This type of educative process through group networks was an important component of the conflict not only in terms of trusting information that was passed, but also in terms of the speed and spread of information through different educative processes. Where word of mouth was considered a more reliable process to *give* information, *spreading* that information through group networks was seen as the most effective educative process. Information spread within ones own identity group was perceived as trustworthy.

While 'own group networks' (Hutu or Bembe groups for example) were trusted, some individuals from the opposite group (Tutsi or Banyarwanda) who were considered friends were also sometimes believed to provide reliable information. The association of Tutsi or Banyarwanda individuals/friends with trusted and reliable information was observed by many respondents. Friendship networks transcended the identity clashes that were perceived by both the Congolese and Burundians as central to the conflict. For example a Congolese trader told a story of how her husband was approached by a 'Munyamulenge' friend:

> ...to warn him of an imminent war. He said he was told to kill his best friend who was none else than my husband. So he decided to inform my husband of that secret so that we could get out of the area before it was too late.

Similar stories emerged from the Burundian respondents who recounted many instances where their Tutsi friends had warned them about imminent danger. For example this respondent from the commercial workers FGD stated:

> One Tutsi friend told me "Are you here? We have already made a list of all Hutu in Kirundo. You are going to be exterminated".

Friendship on an individual level transcended group hatred and enmity. It was not evident however, whether this transcendence could be extended to a collective or group level.

One wonders if it is the collective element that turns individuals into *génocidaires*; the 'mob' aspect that is common for example to British football hooliganism. Or is it more systematic group indoctrination – a 'buying into' a collective identity that is then controlled and manipulated by the leaders of a particular group – where collective violence promotes a greater 'sense of belonging' among the group? In his attempt to explain how genocide occurs, Dan Stone for example points to

> ...a heightening of community feeling, to the point at which this ecstatic sense of belonging permits, indeed demands, a normally forbidden act of transgression in order to 'safeguard' the community by killing the designated 'threatening' group (Stone, 2004: 45).

He further suggests that

> This aspect of collective, orgiastic participation in no way ignores the question of individual violence. But it does recognize that, unlike the exceptional psychopaths who commit violent crimes in society, in time of psychic stress in war and genocide, 'ordinary people' are able to take part in collective acts of extreme violence of which they would otherwise never have suspected themselves capable (Stone, 2004: 57).

Does individual friendship however transcend this 'orgiastic participation'? What Stone fails to consider is the level of individual bravery and acts of heroism that go against the collective; that fight group identity in small ways in order to save the 'other' for no other reason than the fact they can. Stone asks

> ...how it is that individuals who lead otherwise normal lives can turn on their neighbours, throwing aside all norms of civilized behaviour, and engage in massive acts of transgression (Stone, 2004: 58-59).

Although Stone asks how individuals commit acts of transgression, he fails to ask how individuals can transcend similar group acts of transgression to rescue their neighbours or even total strangers, putting their own lives in danger to save 'others'. This surely has significant implications for peace building.

An example of this kind of transcendence came from one of the few Rwandan respondents, a nurse who recounted how a Tutsi helped to save her and her children:

> It was one Tutsi who saved my children. He paid money to those soldiers (military) [these were known as Inkotanyi which was the derogatory term for the RPF]. He went to my house and took all my children. He took them first and brought them to the border, at the customs. When they arrived at the customs, he paid some more money and he came back to see me at the hospital. When he came to see me at the hospital, he told me "I must go with you. I give you this money so that we take it while the people [the customs officials who were bribed] are still there." It is that money that brought me to the customs and I continued until I arrived here [N.].

Such accounts of bravery and assistance by individuals towards people from their opposing group have been recounted frequently on both sides. An example of this was highlighted in the internationally acclaimed film Hotel Rwanda which told the true story of a Hutu hotel manager who saved the lives of over a thousand Tutsis and Hutus who had taken refuge in the hotel. He only just managed to escape with his own life. Capturing and building upon these individual acts of courage, that have transcended hatred of the 'other', is the first step towards encouraging collective or group transcendence of prejudice and hatred.

9.2.3 *Shifting identities*

As seen above, the construction of identities is based on power relationships between oneself and individuals, groups or societal institutions. These power relations Giddens would say are based on the structures and social actions of society.



Social action and interaction as 'tacitly enacted practices' become 'institutions or routines' and 'reproduce familiar forms of social life' (Giddens, 1984: 94). Baker in quoting Derrida suggests that: 'there are no cultural practices that are not defined by frameworks that are 'caught up in conflicting networks of power, violence, and domination' (Baker cited in Lather, 2004: 4).

Such power relations that define cultural and societal practices, and thereby identity are not necessarily only based on routine, tacit acceptance of institutionalised social interaction. They can also be based on force or indoctrination. Identities might be shifted because of the coercion that individuals, groups or organisations, exert over others. The nature of coerced identity shifting is demonstrated below by the example of children or young women forced into becoming sexual slaves for militia frequently suffering many years of abuse as indicated by the example below:

> In 1998, I was leaving for boarding school in Gisenyi. Just before reaching the town...we were ambushed by the abacengezi [insurgents]...The taxi rolled over, and as the passengers fled the vehicle, the abacengezi chopped them with machetes. I managed to hide under corpses but heard the rebels saying they would get fuel to burn the bodies. I cried out, and they stabbed me...and carried me into the forest...There were

> other women and girls there too, from different parts of the country who were kidnapped under similar circumstances. ... Members of the militia came each night to rape me, until one night a militia member announced that I was his, that he was my "husband". I only thought of escaping to my family... (Amnesty, 2004: 1).

Not only was this young girl forced into a life of constant abuse, she was also forced to change her identity from that of schoolgirl – to prostitute – to 'wife'. All she could think about was escape. The competing 'voices' within her identity construction and also for those in similar circumstances, must have caused intolerable confusion. The reconstruction of yet another identity on return to a community that stigmatises and shuns those who have been sexually abused would prove to be equally traumatic.

Thompson highlights this shift in identities by what he terms 'appropriation'. This implies the acquisition of different identities within the context of how individuals make sense of the world and themselves. He suggests that the

> ...contextualized and creative process of interpretation in which individuals draw on the resources available to them in order to make sense of the messages they receive...calls our attention to the fact that the activity of 'appropriation' is part of an extended process of self-formation through which individuals develop a sense of themselves and others, of their history, their place in the world and the social groups to which they belong (Thompson, 1994: 29).

In this way there is a negotiable and contextual element to identity whereby identities can and do change, either over time or because of a certain event in the life of a person. This was highlighted by the change in identity for some people when they became 'a refugee' with its subsequent loss of status. Becoming a refugee – where loss of power and dignity affected large numbers of people – forced many to reconsider their own identities. The changes in the power structures that were observed in the Congolese camps, particularly for traditional power holders such as Traditional Kings, resulted in a consequent change in identity from powerful leader to 'a mere refugee'. As seen in Chapter 8.4, the shift in identity that the Traditional Kings underwent by

becoming a refugee was contingent upon location. As soon as they returned to their own country, their 'power would return'. This contextual element of identity allows it to be manipulated by external forces, whether through conflict or through force, which can strip or invest identity depending on the time and space.

Some theorists point to similar constructions and deconstructions that define and alter identity. Garrison for example states that:

> Since growth is the characteristic of life, education is at one with 'I am what I am' [but] is not possible anymore in the discourse of subjectivity where 'I' is constructed from a myriad influences and relationships, from parents to teachers, to media and propaganda (Garrison, 2004: 45).

The data also revealed some examples where individuals changed an ascribed identity e.g. ethnicity. In Burundi supposedly 'fixed' ethnic identities can be changed through the acquisition of wealth and ritualised ceremonies, which indicates that ethnic identities are malleable. The shift from Hutu to Tutsi in the past is demonstrated by the Burundian elder below:

Respondent: Yes, That's how it was. This means that the word Hutu has its origin in the fact that in order to get a piece of land or cattle, he would work for Tutsi for twelve days. He was then called a 'Hutu' of that person who had given him he cow or the land.

Interviewer: Were there Hutu who changed to be Tutsi?

Respondent: They changed their *ethnie* [ethnicity] when they had cattle, a big land and wealth. They would give cows and they were accepted as Tutsi.

Interviewer: Was there any ceremony organised for that?

Respondent: Because he would be rich and wealthy, there was a ceremony that was held and he would leave his land to come close to the Tutsi. Then he would change *ethnie*. This was done mainly by those who had a good shape of body like that of Tutsi. He would choose one group of

> princes or of Tutsi that he wanted to join for example: Batare, Benengwer, Bezi....

The fact that '*ethnie*' could be changed, is acquired not inherent, implies that perhaps there might be hope for the resolution of identity based conflicts (however it should be noted that this finding was only found among the Burundian respondents and may not be the case for Rwandan ethnic groups). The issue is that for an identity to change there has to be a basis for that change, a desire or will to renounce a particular ethnicity or identity in favour of an alternative.

For many respondents, the process of acquiring an 'ethnic' identity as opposed to a religious or political one was largely determined by what in the data analysis was called, 'learning through group networks'. The data implied that the most trusted and therefore the most effective learning mechanisms were contained within one's own identity group. The communal element to identity construction within a group can sometimes either protect or expose a group to violence. People feel safe within their own group, but the preservation of that group to the exclusion of others can also expose them to jealousy, ridicule and even violence because of the difference that brings them together as a group in the first place. The preservation of the 'ingroup' as Salazar terms it, is all important but it can jeopardise individual safety as a consequence (Salazar, 1998).

The extreme of this is reflected in totalitarian states where power and control of a communal group is based on subscription to a single identity and suppression of all others. This can include, at a 'softer' level, a desire for 'nationhood' in the sense of land ownership. Religion can also be exclusive where polarisation of religious views excludes tolerance and diversity in order to succeed in exerting religious control. While religion in theory should be exempt from the promotion of violence, in practice it is often embroiled in dogma used to justify violence in a 'holy' or 'just war'.

In order to identify how to break the potential for violence associated with exclusive and authoritarian control of identity groups, it is necessary to consider the possibilities available to individuals to transcend their identity group. Is the only possibility for transcending this group identity through individual friendship? Or could the transcendence of difference through individual friendship be utilised beyond an individual level? Is transcendence of group identity the route to a positive identity shift? As noted in Chapter One (p.32), 'positive identity' shift here refers to the adoption or shift towards an identity that transcends a vengeful mentality, i.e. an identity that encourages negative and stereotypical presentations of 'the other'. The most important question here is who decides what is promoted within any particular culture/group as positive or negative. Al Qaeda is a clear example of a group that decides and promotes an ideology where murder and terrorism are considered as justified attacks. They suggest that 'God has sanctioned such punishment, that they have the 'right' to attack and destroy not just villages and cities, but 'the economy of those who have robbed our wealth and to kill civilians of the country which has killed ours'...a convenient justification for revenge' (Davies, 2004: 81).

More positively many respondents narrated stories demonstrating the potential for transcendence of this negative identity adoption, particularly at an individual level, whereby individuals were able to empathise with the 'other side' and ignore difference. Another example is provided by Mamdani, when he talks of a 'retired soldier-turned-policeman' embroiled in the Rwanda genocide. This man

> ...hid eleven people in different locations: from ceilings up above to pits down below. When I asked him whether he knew of anyone else who had helped people by hiding them, he said "no". When I asked why he thought there had not been others like him in the area, he simply said: "People don't have the same mind." (Mamdani, 2002: 220).

The transcendence of identity and the ability to empathise with the 'other'; to increase the potential for individuals such as the 'soldier-turned-policeman', leads one to examine the potential of internet technology to support the

transcendence of negative or positive identity construction. Through the internet and consistent access to alternative viewpoints, could there be an impact on identity construction, reconstruction? Can the mindset of hatred be overcome by being in contact with so many other links to the outside world? Does technology allow that potential merely through the offering of choice, or are we still governed in our choices by cultural, political and social influences? Perhaps formal education can play more of a role in this context, in providing a quality education that allows for critical thinking and problem solving, that encourages tolerance and a diversity that offers alternative views of history. Internet in this instance can be used as a critical tool to verify or discount certain viewpoints of history.

9.2.4 *Identity, trust and social capital*

Trust is an element that binds the social fabric of group identities. Without trust within the group members, the group falls apart. The types of educative processes that are trusted and adopted lead to a set of conditions that influence conflict and/or peace. The positive implies good governance, an open and free press, a fair and democratic election process leading to a cohesive and peaceful build up of social fabric of society. The negative implies an authoritarian state, state controlled media, and suppression of opposition leading to (if the country is at peace) a forced cohesion, or (if the country is in conflict) a breakdown in cohesion.



As Colletta and Cullen indicate:

> Unlike interstate conflict, which often mobilizes national unity and strengthens societal cohesiveness, violent conflict within a state weakens its social fabric (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 3-4).

In these circumstances, what Pottier terms the agency of 'reality' implies acceptance or rejection of the 'dominant narrative.' He suggests that there is often a fundamental contradiction between those who perceive and make judgements on the reality e.g. outside actors who fund arms deals) and those who live it and know its true implications but have no control over changing it (victims of war). Pottier cites the example of the role of the UN, Britain and US in Eastern Zaire as an illustration of this. The narrative of Eastern Zaire Pottier suggests, ascribes a '*single cau*se' to the conflict, which Rwanda's President Kagame, used in 2004 as the excuse for invading DRC i.e. that Hutu extremists residing as refugees in the East of the country were a security threat to Rwanda (Pottier, 2003). This narrative, which has largely been accepted by the UN, Britain and the US who continue to support Rwanda, implies a *'single solution'* to expel the 'extremists' by any means, including arming the Banyamulenge, 'the self-created Tutsi group'.

The 'narrative' that was acknowledged by the respondents reflects Pottier's argument in relation to the contradiction between the local and international versions of events. Recognition of the 'local' was an important feature of the trust that was invested in certain information or knowledge, something that was of particular concern to most respondents. There was little trust invested in their leaders, who they felt had 'betrayed' them, and through their lies (which could be said to fuel the 'dominant narrative') had 'sold them to the 'whites'.

The following statement by this Burundian youth could come from any citizen of any country in conflict who wants to trust his/her leaders to tell the truth:

> Respondent 3: I find that the war comes from the fact that they [politicians] lie to one another over everything they do. Since they have began talks they have never told the truth to one another. More over no one wants to leave

> anything to the other while each wants to have everything for himself.

This was a common theme amongst the respondents that most politicians are regarded as being self-interested liars and cheats.

While trust of politicians and leaders was largely lacking, the majority of respondents believed in and trusted religious leaders as this Congolese head teacher stated:

> Religious leaders by virtue of their mission and their social status are very much trusted. They are obliged to tell the truth to the followers.

Similarly a sixteen year old Burundian boy said:

> I would believe information that I would get from the church leaders because they are God's servants and they tell the truth.

Only religious leaders were consistently trusted in this manner. It is possible that the unity of faith within a particular identity group makes all religious leaders automatically one of the respondents' trusted 'ingroups'. Salazar for example suggests:

> In defining the ingroup, there exists an implicit definition of outgroup. Yet these definitions are not static. In emphasizing one level of the nation-related identities, a group that shares the same identity at another concentric level could be defined as an external group (Salazar, 1998: 122).

Religious leaders are at the same concentric level as their congregation because of faith, regardless of other identity groups they belong to. The identification with a certain faith, makes them part of the ingroup. Yet as Salazar indicates there is a switch in identity at different concentric levels. For example, the Burundian respondents could be seen on two concentric levels as a Hutu (using ethnic identity to form the ingroup) or as Burundian (using national identity to form the ingroup). Similarly Davies points to the fragility of 'multiple *loyalties'* some of which she suggests can be

> ...easily nested – supporting a local football team and then the national one; but the usual test is the 'cricket test' – if you are of Pakistani origin living permanently in the UK, which team do you support? (Davies, 2004: 79).

This type of question was asked of some of the respondents - how they would define themselves, as a Hutu or a Burundian? Primarily most respondents said they would always define themselves first as Burundian. They see that the Hutu ethnicity has been 'given'; it is not necessarily the fundament of their identity. However, when further investigated, it was revealed that their initial response came from their identity as a Burundian living *outside* Burundi. When living *inside* Burundi, they define themselves first as a Hutu.

Such questions surrounding the subscription to an identity in terms of such markers as nationality, ethnicity or religion, are critical in understanding how violence is perpetrated. For example Mohammed Sadique Khan, one of the suicide bombers responsible for the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 2005, defined himself entirely according to his religion – Islam:

> I and thousands like me are forsaking everything for what we believe. Our drive and motivation doesn't come from tangible commodities that this world has to offer. Our religion is Islam…Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters (BBC, 2005).

Khan's 'people' are fellow Muslims, not fellow Britons. His identity was constructed entirely as part of the religion to which he belongs and as part of the ingroup with which he identifies.

The respondents were conscious of ingroups and who was to be trusted. As this Burundian head teacher indicates:

> But if he is one who considers ethnic, political ideology or religion, he may not tell you the truth if you do not belong to the same group as his. However when you belong to the same group, he can tell you for example that even if you are told by

> someone else that the Hutu do not die, they die. The information in that case is truthful and you trust it.

Similarly a Congolese professional stated that:

> We Congolese learnt from the conflict in Congo that to live with a person with whom you do not share the same tradition (culture) is a very bad thing.

This could be identified as what Bar-Tal terms the 'we-ness' of a group, the social bond that defines the cohesion of a group or network (Bar-Tal, 1998). This is similar in nature to what social capital theorists define as the trustworthiness of group networks that promotes social cohesion and support collective action. Colletta and Cullen suggest that the breakdown of this form of social capital between ethnic groups contributed to the genocide:

> Within Hutu extremism, state-driven vertical social capital fueled the success of communal-level Hutu groups through excellent information networks, reinvented past traditions, and a sense of solidarity, obligation, and civic duty (Prunier 1997). Social capital within the groups increased, as links between them waned, further splitting society. The bridging social capital that had existed, even though in a weak form, between diverse communal groups was now rapidly transformed into purely bonding social capital founded on fear and survival as Hutu and Tutsi groups coalesced on each side of the divide (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 41-42).

The issue of trust in building and cementing social capital ties is a central theme among much of the literature on social capital. For example Sullivan draws the element of trust in her paper on social exclusion, social identity and social capital. She suggests that:

> The notion of social capital draws upon ideas of trust and reciprocity among social groups to explain how, among other things, social cooperation and citizenship contribute to coherent, prosperous (relatively speaking) and healthy social groups who play a full part in society - socially included groups. There is some evidence that individuals and groups high in social capital can tackle incipient social deprivation, social isolation and exclusion with greater effect that those where there is little or no social capital (Sullivan, 2002: 3).

Similarly, the features of social capital that Putnam defines as 'networks, norms, and trust that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit' could also said to be features that bind social identity groups together (Putnam, 1993: 35-36). However, much of the literature referring to social capital focuses on the positive aspects of collective norms and values, rather than the negative; where for example the high social capital of groups like Al Qaeda may have devastating consequences.

We have seen the examples from the findings that trust is maximised within one's own identity group, yet have also seen examples of the potential for extraordinary cross-identity acts of heroism. This however is usually on an individual basis. So can the factors of individual trust be translated within the social capital framework, to increase the level of trust between opposing groups? This again raises the question of how to break down the 'enemy' culture and the negative aspects of group cohesion in order to establish more effective peace building mechanisms. The section below attempts to highlight this issue before Chapter Ten presents some suggestions as to how it might be addressed more fully

9.3 The potential for conflict and/or peace

> We say that it is the mouse inside which shows the way and welcomes the mouse that lives outside. The Banyamulenge are those who went to bring their brothers Banyarwanda to kill our people. The aim was not only the quest for power, they have a bigger agenda. One is to implant Tutsis in the Congo and you cannot implement such a plan without wiping out the indigenous people the way you cannot start a plantation in a forest without clearing undesirable trees. The same way, they came with a genocide agenda to perpetrate against our populations. In Fizi, the Bembe are the target.

This statement from a Congolese teacher is typical of those from many respondents that highlight the promulgation of an 'enemy culture' as mentioned above. The majority of respondents expressed these stereotypical

views and failed to recognise the culpability of their own side. This statement by a Congolese respondent from the CBO group is another typical example:

> Rumors on the war that sent us to Tanzania were plenty. One day I was going from Baraka to Bukavu with a fellow Catechist. On our way I saw him reading a booklet **"FUTUR RWANDAIS"** ***(Rwandese Future)*** . At the page 5 the sub-title was: Creation de l'Empire Hima (Creation of the Hima Empire) this on how they were going to conquer and establish their Hima Empire. When he noticed that I was so curious to look at his book and pictures he was annoyed and asked me why I was so interested in his book instead of reading mine.(I had a book in my hands). What are you looking at? Don't you Bembe have a future? This is the future of Banyarwanda. I was astounded to see how he reacted that way as we were all in the same faith and co-workers. The he closed his book and put it in his bag.

These stories could be said to be representative of stories that have been passed down through the generations, from grandparents, to parents, to children. The narratives by children for example illustrated 'enemy' stories that they stated had been heard from their parents (cf: 3.4.1: 93, 7.3: 197). The story below illustrated by the etching produced by a sixty-nine-year-old Burundian woman, is indicative of the type of narratives that feed the 'enemy culture'.



Illustration 9.1
Etching of 'Hutu' being led to death

In 1972 some of our family members were massacred by Tutsis. One of the Tutsis could lead more than thirty Hutus to the commune to kill them there. The Hutu had first to collect special grass to make ropes to tie themselves. The last Hutu who was tied was given the task of beating out the brains of his colleagues with a 5 kg hammer. Afterward it was his turn to be killed.

What such stories and drawings illustrate is that these historical narratives, passed down through an oral tradition are one of the most powerful

mechanisms for transmitting the values and beliefs that the younger generation adopt. Through the informal educative processes of narrative, the enemy culture is maintained and the identity of conflict guaranteed. Similarly therefore one would expect that these educative processes have the potential for peace building. The question is how to transform negative identity construction into positive? Breaking the cycle of revenge is a critical element in the transformation into positive identity construction and is explored in more depth in the following chapter.

9.4 Conclusion

This chapter has highlighted how educative processes in various forms influence the construction and reconstruction of identities that play a role in conflict and/or peace. It has demonstrated the importance of informal educative processes – particularly through oral tradition – in confirming cultural identities that are passed on to subsequent generations.

The chapter has presented the framework within which educative processes can be defined as forming the basis by which identity is constructed or shifted. Identity has been identified in this research as being fundamental to the process of conflict and or peace building, despite the hope that this was not the case. Therefore any mechanisms which aim to mitigate conflict and build peace need to focus on the educative processes that affect identity. As will be outlined in Chapter Ten, while these mechanisms are not definitive, they may complement and strengthen existing peace making approaches of which informal educative processes are not typically a feature.

CHAPTER TEN: ENTRIES FOR PEACE: A CONCLUSION

10.1 Introduction

This chapter reveals how the narratives of victims of conflict may provide a means of identifying opportunities to break the cycle of revenge. This was identified in the previous chapter as a critical element in fomenting hatred and continued violence against the 'other'. The original research aims and questions focussed around the role of educative processes (formal and informal), information acquisition and identity which in turn might influence conflict and/or peace. Three assumptions were made that related to this (cf: 1.3 p. 26):

- There are various educative processes (formal and informal) that affect information acquisition at different 'structural levels', and which influence identity construction and shifts. These in turn affect the outcome of conflict.
- Informal educative processes have a particularly critical role to play in identity construction and shifts which affect the outcome of conflict.
- The synergy between educative processes, information transmission and identity within different 'structural levels' is crucial to determine the most effective conduits to promote peace.

So are the assumptions of the research correct and how have the findings contributed to the existing body of knowledge within this arena?

The original questions that guided the research in the early stages have been synthesised with the data analysis into a number of key issues which are outlined below. These then form the basis to determine a) if the assumptions are valid, b) how the findings have contributed to the existing body of

knowledge in this arena, and c) to identify concrete strategies for peace building.

10.2 Central issues

Although the assumptions listed above guided the process of data collection, the methodology included inductive methods. This implied that although some fundamental questions guided the research, the original assumptions were revised on a continual basis because of new issues emerging from the data collection and analysis. A key issue included in this section – which was not identified in the original research assumptions – is the element of trust. However, throughout the chapters in this thesis, there has been an underlying sense that trust is the enhancer, the glue that binds the elements of information transmission, educative processes and identity together. This issue of trust has been considered and embedded within the context of the other elements of information transmission, educative processes and identity, as examined in detail in Chapter Nine (cf: 9.2.4 pp. 246-251). However, it is considered more specifically within Issue Two (10.2.2) below.

Therefore arising from the data collection and analysis, three key issues are outlined below which I believe are central to the context of conflict in the three countries under study, and therefore to finding alternative mechanisms for peace building.

10.2.1 *Issue One: Informal educative processes have high significance in information acquisition affecting identity construction.*

It was evident from the data collection and analysis of findings that a number of educative processes were influential in information acquisition and the construction of identity, and that these were primarily informal. These focussed principally on oral tradition, rumour, belief systems, propaganda and

new technologies (cf: 3.4.1-4 pp 93-113; 6.3-4 pp.177-186). These informal educative processes clearly influenced people's perceptions of the conflict and therefore the potential for peace building.

As examined in Chapter Seven, educative processes were perceived by the respondents to be particularly significant when they were embedded within informal mechanisms. These informal educative processes emerged from an extensive oral tradition within the cultures of the respondents, where word of mouth is more valued than written text, and learning is part of life's process. This is an education that begins at birth and is part of an individual's continual development throughout life. It possesses elements of the processes that have been described by others as contributing to the construction of identity.

In an African context, this type of learning has traditionally been part of everyday education in an informal sense. Individuals, as part of a community, learn on a continuous basis through the environments they are placed in and the hardships they face. In this context institutionally based learning is less relevant than life learning and the acquisition of wisdom. In more recent years, radio has gained greater prominence both in formal and informal educative processes, indicated by the majority of respondents in the research. Both the research and literature illustrate the positive and negative influences of radio in inculcating values and in the transference of information.

These different forms of largely informal educative processes can affect and contribute to the construction/shift of individual and collective identities. As Granville suggests

> The activity of learning is not just an additive process, the accumulation of new knowledge: rather it is concerned with the creation of identity, and the individual becomes "someone or something new" through this process (Granville, 2004: 5).

The research has indicated that this transformation process into 'someone or something new' comes about largely through informal educative processes, in particular through the oral tradition (cf: 6.3 pp.177-184). The oral tradition is

part of the socialisation process which concretises individual, group and cultural identity and has the potential to preserve images of ethnic, cultural, political, or religious difference, whether positive or negative. One of the most powerful media within the oral tradition, which is often overlooked, is that of gossip. Gossip was identified in Chapter Three as a significant social consctruct, where talk defines the meaning of the world, and group gossip determines the social construction of a collective identity, again either positively or negatively (cf: 3.4.2 pp. 101-106).

Informal educative processes such as gossip and story telling perform a fundamental social function in terms of social bonding to overcome fear, promote confidence in oneself and within the group. Sometimes this might be used to subvert authority or in other cases might be used or manipulated by authorities to enfold groups, bring them into a wider group or state identity. Much of this social bonding process and basis for group inclusion is dependant on trust (cf: 4.4 pp.131-136).

As noted in 10.2.3 below, trust is also an important element in the social binding of gossip. It is rare to gossip amongst those who are not part of your own social group, whom you do not trust. Trust is the glue that binds together the identity of a group (cf: 4.2.1 p.123-127). This element of trust was highlighted by the respondents. They believed information or knowledge only when it came from trusted sources (cf: 7.3 pp.197-201). The most trusted learning arenas were identified as those within their own identity group. Any possibility for transcending this group identity was perceived as being through individual friendship, rather than through cross-group interaction.

Preservation of group identity while united by trust also has the potential to promote exclusivity. This can then either protect or expose a group to violence. People feel safe within their own group, but the perpetuation of that group, to the exclusion of others can also expose them to jealousy, ridicule and even violence. As Davies indicates there is a

> ...paradox that a secure identity is needed in order for people to be less aggressive towards others; and yet that 'essentialising' of identity can equally be a cause of conflict (Davies, 2004: 212).

There is however a negotiable and contextual element to identity that is frequently overlooked. Identities can and do shift, either over time, situation or context. For example large numbers of refugees were forced to reassess their own identities after fleeing from their lives before the conflict. This was highlighted in previous chapters which recounted the changes in traditional power structures observed in the camps. For some, these resulted in a consequent change in identity from powerful community member to 'mere refugee'. This negotiable element of identity allows it therefore to be manipulated by external forces, which can strip or invest identity according to need (cf: 9.2.3-4 pp.241-246).

The potential for shifting of identity was explored in Chapters Four and Nine, and this is perhaps where an opportunity for positive change exists. The contextual nature of identity is possibly the key to the replacement of 'who one is' with 'what one's experiences are'. (Davies, 2004: 212). Others also point to the capacity to shift and 'reframe' identities.

Rutherford for example argues that the capacity for identities to shift therefore implies that

> Identity then is never a static location, it contains traces of its past and what is to become. It is contingent, a provisional full stop in the pay of differences and the narrative of our own lives (Rutherford, 1990a: 24).

These viewpoints illustrate that the definition of identity the respondents have adopted is contingent, and determined by 'other' factors over which they often have no control. As was illustrated in Chapter Four, the shift in identity is not always voluntary; it can come about through coercion (cf: 4.2 p. 116). Furthermore, the signifying practices of one's experiences may be so

destructive that it becomes easier to shift identity towards the negative than towards the positive.

The reclaiming of positive identities will be explored in more depth in the final section of the thesis which looks at the contribution of informal educative processes to the construction of positive identities. These would be through informal educative processes that promote positive information acquisition from trusted sources.

10.2.2 *Issue Two: There is a synergy between information transmission, educative processes and identity – which is enhanced by the element of trust*

As mentioned above in Chapters Three, Four and Nine, trust binds social interaction and is a vital element in the construction and shifts in identity. Chapter Seven highlighted how the respondents sought out information from trusted sources. For educative processes such as radio, gossip and other forms of oral/aural transmission to be believed they have to come from trusted sources. For identity groups to maintain their cohesion there has to be mutual trust and reciprocity amongst group members. For conflict to be sustained there has to be trust or belief in the justness of the cause for which you are fighting. For at least some closure of the gap between the top and bottom 'structural levels', there has to be trust in the leadership that the needs of communities are being met and the involvement of civil society is recognised.

As Colletta and Cullen suggest in their analysis of violent conflict and the transformation of social capital, intra-state conflict

> ...divides the population by undermining interpersonal and communal trust, destroying the norms and values that underlie cooperation and collective action for the common good, and increasing the likelihood of communal strife (Colletta and Cullen, 2000: 3-4).

Trust therefore is an element that acts as 'glue' in either a negative sense – cementing hatred against the 'enemy' or more positively, as a force for collective support and 'action for the common good'.

Trust is possibly one of the significant means of breaking down 'enemy' culture and is certainly an essential element to peace building at all levels. However it is not only trust that is critical here, but also a sense of security, and as Davies suggests, a need for 'that sense of secure self which does not project deficiency onto others' (Davies, 2004: 214). I also suggest that it is the 'sense of secure self' that allows for cross-identity group acts of heroism to take place (cf: 9.2 pp. 232-251). The findings have indicated that although trust is maximised within one's own identity group, there is potential for extraordinary cross-identity acts of courage that save the lives of 'others'. Such acts however, typically operate on an individual basis. For the breaking down of a revenge culture, the question is: can the factors that allow for individual acts of courage or heroism be translated at group level to develop the sense of awareness and empathy with 'others'?

This is related to who is trusted and why? One of the key questions of the research concerned the groups perceived as the most trusted transmitters of information and why they were regarded as such. As mentioned above, the findings indicated that typically information from own group networks, whether it be in the form of gossip, or through other oral/aural formats, required less verification than other sources. For information to survive and be passed on there had to be elements of truth which was trusted and verified by different avenues, often by radio. However, only certain radio stations were trusted, usually international stations or local stations that were regarded as independent and unbiased.

Information passed on by family and friends was trusted and in particular for children, parents were perceived as purveyors of the truth and incapable of lying. The mechanisms for passing on this information would typically be word of mouth. When this came from close friends or family it was considered one of the most trustworthy sources. This trust of family and friends also

related to the preservation and definition of identity as ethnic identity was often defined by the tales of others rather than from an inborn sense of identity.

Individuals in general tended to be trusted more than groups, although certain groups were more trusted than others. For example religious leaders as a group were trusted, but educated people were not. Educated people within the refugee community possessed a paradoxical role, as they were in general mistrusted for a number of reasons, primarily because they were seen as elites, closer to whites and liable to 'sell out' their fellows (cf: 7.2.1 pp191-195). Despite this they were also perceived as providers of information, as they had better access to it, and understood the information that was presented to them. However, it was recognised that this knowledge of the outside was largely reproduced from elite knowledge and perception, whether through distillation of elite perspectives from radio, or from those with access to the internet.

A key group of trusted people within the community were termed 'mediators' by the respondents. These were people within the community who could bring information from the 'powerful' (i.e. from those closest to the information and who had the most influence), and were trusted to pass on the truth to rest of the population. In Burundi and DRC these groups included religious leaders and also 'wise men' who 'had swallowed the stone', i.e. elders or Traditional Kings who had 'powers' which enabled them to understand information with greater clarity and wisdom. In the camps however, while religious leaders were still considered mediators, the youth had greater access to information and were perceived as mediators rather than elders who were seen as powerless. Youth however were also seen as more educated and although 'educated people' were less trusted, they were perceived as 'necessary' in order to gain access to information. This paradox of education and 'educated people' was discussed in Chapters Three and Seven (cf: 3.3 pp87-91; 7.2.1 pp.191-195).

Focussing on some of the most trusted groups in these communities has enabled me to identify elements that encourage trust at group level. It is

envisaged that these can be exploited to promote similar acts of courage that cross-identity lines observed at individual level. These might serve as 'entries for peace' to provide alternative mechanisms for peace building. It is only through trusted mechanisms, that the potential for positive identity shift can be realised. For such a shift to take place, not only do trusted conduits have to be identified but appropriate educative processes need to be identified as the means by which change can occur. Davies argues that 'critical pedagogy' in schools may be the answer. A 'pedagogy of difference' that 'enables young people to analyse class, 'race' gender, 'ability' or 'special needs' in order to understand the sources of inequality and conflict' (Davies, 2004: 214). However I suggest that it is not only through the formal system that change can occur. For peace-enhancing identity shifts to take place, a number of informal educative processes also have to be identified (as outlined below in 10.4 pp. 269-280).

10.2.3 *Issue Three: The gaps between different 'structural levels' have the potential to influence the outcome of conflict and therefore peace*

It was evident from the data collection that for the respondents at least, while there was an acceptance of the existence of the 'structural levels', there was little recognition that things could change and that their contribution might make a difference to the outcome of conflict and/or peace (cf: 8.5 pp. 224-228). In this way the gap between levels was perhaps even wider than first assumed. The role of the communities, particularly in their weakened state as 'refugees', was perceived as minimal and the overwhelming sense of powerlessness was tangible, as this statement from a Congolese leader highlights:

> To rely on others is the worst thing in the life of a grown up. We are reduced to the state of mere beggars. The latter are even better because they can move to a spot where many people pass and offer something to him/her. Here we cannot budge a single mile, lest we are in trouble.

Such reduction in status and esteem undermines the traditional societal structures of the community. For example, one of the strongest customs of traditional African society, respect for age, becomes a victim of the new structures and environment of a refugee camp. From their position as 'respected elders' older people in the camps became marginalised. This loss of status has major implications for the social cohesion of communities and for the transmission of cultural values.

The respondents perceived the gaps between their own needs as a population and the interests of their leaders as being one of the major 'barriers to peace' (cf: 8.4 pp. 218-224). The perceived self interest of political leaders by the 'led population' is probably a feature of every nation. However, the fear which accompanies the gaps in the 'structural levels' between leaders and communities in the countries under study renders the situation different from gaps within most developed nations. The relationship of conflict with 'incompetent, parochial, fragile and authoritarian governments' (Azar, cited in Miall et al, 1999: 86) is evident in the countries under study where there is little recourse to justice and the populations perceive no opportunity for change, except in some cases through violence. A statement by a Congolese from the CBO group was indicative of such attitudes when he said, 'peace can only be achieved by fighting. Sometimes fire can extinguish fire.'

The consequences of the perceived gap in the context of the research are particularly significant because there are no free and fair elections to enable the populations of these countries to expect change through a democratic process. The situation in Burundi is an example of this fact, as highlighted by an email sent during the June 2005 municipal elections from a refugee who had returned to live in Bujumbura:

> The campaign was led very carefully and peacefully, which was a surprise to many. The cities and the country as a whole had a variety of colours, speeches and slogans from the more than thirty parties (38). The situation changed only two days before the elections. During the night, each family was visited by armed men to tell them that they had to vote for a certain party. Since then, the population was so much terrorised that

> there was no more vote at all. They were just going to save their lives. The well prepared elections became only a show. On the Election Day, hand grenades were thrown to the voting mass in different zones in Bujumbura. In the Provinces, three persons were killed by armed men from the army. Two provinces could not vote because of attacks from the government army to the population.

The forthcoming parliamentary and presidential elections appear to have little hope of rendering a true democratic process in Burundi (time of writing June 2005). The fact that not only Burundi, but also Rwanda and DRC have not had consistently democratically elected governments is perhaps one of the political keys to understanding the situation in the Great Lakes.

Although Rwanda's President Paul Kagame was re-elected in August 2003, the elections were said to have been fraught with corruption and there are still questions over the nature of the strict control of the country which Reyntjens likens to a dictatorship (Reyntjens, 2004). Similarly in DRC democratic elections planned for June 2005 have yet to be held and are likely to be delayed until at least October or November 2005 (time of writing June 2005). President Joseph Kabila maintains a fragile peace within the main cities of the west of the country as other nations such as Uganda and Rwanda continue fighting for control of mineral resources in the east. A credible and democratic election might be the only key to restoring peace to this beleaguered country.

The involvement of other nations in the conflicts in the Great Lakes Region was another feature of the gaps indicated by the respondents. Particularly for the Congolese, there was a wide gap between themselves as a 'weak and poor' nation and the 'powerful' nations of the world such as US and UK. As this Congolese leader stated:

> Since we are weak and poor, we cannot refuse Americans to benefit from our wealth having in mind that the powerful is always right and all his acts always just or justified no matter how evil they might be.

This is resonant of the suggestion by Miall et al that

> Modern states, particularly weak ones, are porous to the international forces operating within the wider global community... (Miall et al, 1999:74).

The different international mechanisms for resolving the conflicts in these countries are also recognised by some authors as contributing to the conflicts and widening the gaps between rich and poor nations. As Miall et al state:

> Galtung for example criticizes 'conflict dictators', who impose settlements in their own interests... The approaches they [Galtung and others] advocate are at odds with the stock-in-trade of international diplomats, for whom sticks and carrots are an essential means of inducing or forcing parties towards a settlement, for which an international third party provides the framework (Miall et al, 1999:139).

Some might suggest that closure of these gaps, whether between rich and poor nations, or between grassroots communities and their leaders, may be unrealistic in the short term. However, there should be possibilities for nations in conflict to develop sustainable systems that recognise community level peace building by respecting and utilising community contributions. The increased involvement of civil society may assist to bring this about. Organisations such as the African Great Lakes Initiative (AGLI) illustrate the attempt by grassroots societies to effect peaceful change. AGLI's 'Alternatives to Violence Project' works with local communities on 'trauma healing and non-violence training' to shift the dynamic of the community away from a cycle of vengeance (AGLI, 2005).

Similarly, a 'Civil Society Dialogue' held in March 2004 by the International Peace Academy (IPA) brought together civil society groups from the Great Lakes Region. This recognised the involvement of grassroots civil society as a critical element in the integrated response needed for peace building in the region. As stated in their report:

> The complex, interlocking, and regional nature of the Great Lakes conflicts, the spillover across national boundaries of small arms, the large refugee movements, inadequate physical space for the populations, and environmental destruction from the exploitation and plundering of the region's natural

> resources clearly require an integrated regional response (IPA, 2004:1).

Part of the response it was suggested should come from the increasingly important role of civil society, where for example in

> Rwanda and Burundi, women's organizations are at the forefront of the reconciliation and integration efforts... in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), CSOs were part of the negotiations that led to the establishment of the Transitional Government in 2002 (IPA, 2004: 1).

Such peace building 'from the bottom-up' has been a critical element in many recent peace initiatives which Lederach suggests '...were driven largely by the pressure for change that was bubbling up from the grassroots' (Lederach, 1997: 52). Only by the recognition and involvement of grassroots in the overall peace building process that takes place at all levels, can the gaps that form the 'barriers to peace' be closed.

The potential for finding alternative peace building processes, that encompass all levels in different ways, have been outlined in section 10.5 (pp. 269-280), but the implications of the issues described above, are summarised below.

10.3 The relationship of these issues to the original assumptions and research questions

When analysing the above issues in relation to the original research assumptions, it is necessary to review Model A presented in Chapter One (cf: 1.5.1 p. 30) to illuminate the synergy between educative processes, information acquisition and identity in relation to conflict. In light of the research findings, it is possible to summarise some of the processes by which this research suggest positive identities can be constructed – or shifted – which may contribute towards peace building.

***Model A:* How educative processes might affect information acquisition leading to identity construction**



Model E below has been revised slightly to include the element of trust that emerged from the findings. This shows how educative processes, whether formal or informal, feed into information acquisition through trusted sources, into identity construction or shift. This again is situated within a framework of structural levels, such as family, community, leadership and media as were identified in Model D (cf: 8.2 p.213). How these have been translated into concrete recommendations for peacebuilding can be seen in section 10.5 below.

Through the replacement of the negative with the positive, the same conduits that are used to promote conflict could be used to promote peace. This may then assist in reforming or shifting identities in favour of peaceful rather than violent approaches to difference. The findings indicate that the conduits that appear to be most successful are those that utilise informal educative processes, such as oral tradition, radio and internet. These conduits however, need to come from trusted sources, such as trusted radio networks, family and community groups, and where appropriate religious leaders. These 'entries for

peace' might promote the transcendence of group prejudices, fear and hatred of the 'other'.

Model E: Revised model to illustrate the role of trusted sources in information acquisition and identity construction or shift



10.4 The contribution to existing knowledge in this arena

In Chapter One (cf: Chapter 1.6.4 pp.38-39) it was suggested that there has been limited research that investigates informal educative processes that affect information transmission and identity construction that thereby influence conflict. While the individual arenas of education, information and identity are enriched by substantial literature, there is a scarcity of literature when considering the interrelationship of these three elements. This research has investigated these different elements, and has perhaps contributed to furthering existing knowledge and provided new insights in four key areas:

a) Increased understanding of the role of informal educative processes and oral transmission as a contribution to existing research in formal education.
b) The presentation of the relationship between information acquisition, educative processes and identity within a framework of structural levels, has not been identified in the literature reviewed by this researcher.
c) The representation of a broad variety of actors and their relationships within a structural levels framework has not previously been presented in a similar way, despite extensive literature searches.
d) Identification of alternative peace building mechanisms (appropriate to a refugee context) that focus on informal educative processes, in particular a 'family approach' to peace building.

10.5 A 'pick and mix' approach to peace-building: reclaiming positive identities

The findings from this research suggest that informal educative processes appear to be significant in effecting identity shifts and transmitting important information relating to conflict and/or peace. Therefore peace building strategies need to be located also within the informal parameters of educative processes. It is here that identity construction is deeply rooted, through family and community interaction, and that the potential for identity shifts towards the positive might be achieved. However there are no quick fix solutions to achieving this.

One approach by which some believe positive identity shifts can take place is through participatory methodologies. These aim to encourage a process by which people are expected to adopt a sense of ownership in the process of change which occurs at their own pace, style and level. Like formal education,

participatory approaches to developmental change have been regarded as a panacea; the new way forward. However more people are starting to question these approaches, suggesting they are as top-down as traditional approaches of the past. For example, Davidson cites the work of Mosse, who he says,

> ...warns of how, rather than encouraging the use of bottom-up approaches, the dependence on participatory techniques can actually lead to the strengthening of top-down systems for a number of reasons, including the tendency for locally dominant groups (who may themselves have strong links to the regional or national elite) to take control of the production of knowledge, and the fact that the project organisers can never be seen as passive facilitators of the production of knowledge (Davidson, 2005: 311).

This indicates the danger of adopting any single approach as a panacea, and I would argue that for effective peace building mechanisms to be established there should be a multiplicity of approaches to promote a positive identity shift towards peace rather than conflict. In their summary of peace education approaches for example, Smith and Vaux rightly argue that

> ...none of them offers a 'magic solution' for the prevention of conflict. Rather they represent a complex matrix of education initiatives that address key themes and values that could have a preventative effect in the long term (Smith and Vaux, 2003: 35).

Therefore it is necessary to present a variety of approaches, to adopt a 'pick and mix' of peace building strategies that agencies and communities working within refugee contexts can utilise that are appropriate to their particular environment.

Other authors have written eruditely on the potential of positive change through the formal education system. Therefore, this thesis suggests that the 'pick and mix' approach to peace building should consist primarily of informal educative processes as a means for promoting a positive identity shift, but interact with the formal system in a holistic way, through what Miller and Affolter term the

> ...slow shift from ideologies of antagonism and the glorification of violence to constructive ideologies that offer an inclusive, peace-oriented vision of the future (Miller and Affolter (eds), 2002: 34).

The suggestions in this chapter are tentative and should be adapted according to the circumstance in which peace building is taking place. They have been presented as provisional ideas for peace building through positive identity shifts that are appropriate in a refugee context or similar (as explained in Chapter One (p. 32) and above (p. 245). The aim is not to provide a training programme, or set of guidelines, but suggestions for approaches and techniques that might be useful as 'entries for peace' i.e. starting points that may assist communities and practitioners to review peace building strategies from a holistic perspective. They are not suggestions for specific conflict resolution, conflict management or peace keeping practices, which are all related stages towards a process that

> ...encompasses the full array of stages and approaches needed to transform conflict towards sustainable, peaceful relations and outcome (Lederach, 1994: 14).

These interventions should be built up through existing community structures and complement, not replace, existing peace building strategies. While others may find the mechanisms below suitable for different contexts, I do not claim them to be so. They are based on the context in which the research was conducted and do not claim to have wider generalisability than a refugee camp setting.

10.5.1 *Through a formal educational approach*

As indicated in Chapter Three, formal education has had a powerful role to play in the development of conflict in many countries throughout history (cf: 3.2 pp. 83-87). Therefore it is vital that formal education institutions play a role in the flip-side to conflict and take part in peace building. Peace building in this context is seen therefore as part of an ongoing process utilising formal educational institutions but still employing informal educative processes as

part of a community partnership. In a report written for the Centre for British Teachers (CfBT) I concurred with Bush and Salterelli when arguing that:

> Peace building cannot be seen in a vacuum, as a single educational input, but as a 'process rather than a product', relying on local rather than external inputs which seek to create opportunities rather than impose solutions. [Bush and Salterelli] suggest that peace building education has to go further than 'add good education and stir' and offer more systematic community based mechanisms which encourage peace building as a process rather than a product of education (Bush and Salterelli, 2000 in Bird, 2003b: 22).

The educational approach is one that aims to provide a co-ordinated mechanism to the creation of positive histories and peace building efforts, by linking what is taught at school with the teachings of parents or guardians at home. It would involve utilising informal educative processes in schools and creating greater community-school dialogues and partnerships that take learners out into the social context and bring communities into the school context. This type of community/school dialogue would perhaps fit with Davies' advocacy for 'democracy and dialogue' in her proposal for 'complex adaptive schools'. Such dialogue she suggests is part of the process of '*positive* conflict', allowing the processes of argument and difference to be played out through

> ...a critical pedagogy and political education which surfaces inequalities such as class, ethnicity, gender and (dis)ability as well as global inequality... (Davies, 2004: 223).

By using radio and internet within educational and community institutions these dialogues can be strengthened further. As outlined in section 10.2.1 above and in the findings (cf: 7.5 pp. 204-208) trust is a critical element here and only trusted radio and internet sites could be used as peace building conduits. As seen below in section 10.5.6 radio is already a feature for many learners in Africa and eventually internet will become a similar feature in many learning institutions. Tanzania for example already has a programme planned to introduce online technology into all teacher training colleges nationwide. This may well help to revolutionise the way teaching and learning

is approached, and some of the informal techniques below could be promoted through online technology.

10.5.2 *Through the oral tradition*

As was discussed in Chapters Three and Seven, the oral tradition was perhaps the strongest feature that emerged from the data collection (cf: 3.4.1 pp. 93-101 and 7.3 pp.197-201). There was clear evidence that the stories that parents and grandparents passed on to their children and grandchildren had a profound affect on their perceptions of themselves and of others and their involvement in conflict. While the whole family approach mentioned below might be one way of approaching this, there may also be additional mechanisms which could encourage the use of story telling in schools and other institutions, as well as strengthening the tradition of storytelling which is becoming a dying art in African culture. As has been noted in previous chapters:

> Entertainment, education, initiation, government, welfare and religion were thus carried out through personal contact and in the language of the group. As in all face to face communication, the language of the exchanges was always *parole*, the dialect particular to the small group (Mafu, 2004: 54).

In recapturing this tradition of '*parole*', it is necessary to encourage new storytellers who are willing to tell positive stories of the 'other' and also persuade the traditional elder storytellers to recite stories that might contribute to positive identity construction. McAdams' approach to storytelling asserts that the construction of culture and history is a critical feature of storytelling, which is not a mere chronicle of events (McAdams 1993). Meaning and moral values are attached to stories which can impart strong social and psychological messages as well as open up opportunities for different groups to share aspects of their 'joint history and the suffering of the other' (Chaitin, 2003).

Chaitin highlights examples of how

> Storytelling and narratives have been used since the 1990s to reduce conflicts and work toward reconciliation between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland, blacks and whites in South Africa, Palestinians and Israelis, and between descendants of Holocaust survivors and Nazi perpetrators (Chaitin, 2003).

She provides examples from two groups which have utilised storytelling in this way:

> PRIME (the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East) and the TRT – To Reflect and Trust. PRIME is a jointly run Palestinian-Israeli research non-governmental organization (NGO) that undertakes cooperative social research that studies issues that have great importance for both peoples. Research projects are designed to explore crucial psycho-social and educational aspects of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and to use the findings for peacebuilding work...The TRT is an international organization that began in 1992 as an encounter group between descendants of Nazi perpetrators and of Jewish Holocaust survivors. These individuals met together in a self-supporting atmosphere to tell one another their life stories in an attempt to better work through (that is, learn to live with) their pasts, in particular their parents' experiences during WWII (Chaitin, 2003).

The use of storytelling therefore in the context of this research, could also be a powerful medium for change, to build up processes and action from within and through the conflicting groups' own cultures. At different arenas of learning and gathering places, story telling, theatre, radio shows and other events could be held in an ongoing, interactive basis, by community members rather than outsiders. It is the sense of ownership and action – the agency of control of positive identity shifting – that is critical here. This does not deny the positive role outsiders can bring to the process, but recognises the different starting points between professional communicators and communities. In traditional societies such as those concerned in this research, communities typically analyse and transmit knowledge through talk and visualisation. This is often in contradiction to the style of text based training conducted by educated,

professional people who typically conduct peace building courses, or introduce peace education into schools and communities.

10.5.3 *Through a whole family approach*

The family unit – whatever its composition – is one of the most fundamental learning environments and the interaction within that unit has profound and life-lasting consequences. Therefore in recognition of the critical importance of the family environment, it is suggested that the use of a whole family approach, if combined with other key arenas of learning such as school and work, has potential as a transformational mechanism for promoting positive identity shifts. The narratives from the respondents indicated the critical role of parents in providing trusted sources of information to children (cf: 7.3 pp.197-201).

Therefore this approach focuses on the family unit as the essential element in developing a peace building strategy and like Smith and Vaux, questions the traditional

> ...rationale as to why peace education programmes are directed towards certain groups (children, adolescents, adults, politicians, combatants, bereaved)... (2003: 35).

Many existing approaches to peace building focus on certain groups or sub-sections of society who it is suggested should be 'educated' separately in peace building strategies. There is no particular rationale for this, except – so the argument goes – that some groups such as women for example, are more restricted in their responses while in the company of men, and similarly children in the company of elders. While this may be true in some circumstances, it is not definitively so, as the printmaking workshop outlined in Chapter Five indicated (cf: 5.7.5 pp.157-158). Here the positive interaction observed between elders and children highlighted the potential for bringing together diverse groups. This inter-generational interaction between young and old has become increasingly part of African family life as a consequence of

the HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa, where older people are frequently left as guardians of the young.

As more and more of the working population are dying from AIDS, grandparents are increasingly burdened with the task of caring for children. This implies that work with grandparents as part of the family unit is essential when defining the learning needs of children. Using the ideas of the story telling approach mentioned above, elders could be encouraged to take an active role in peace building. The stories that many of the elders recounted during the process of data collection were negative and stereotypical. These harmful narratives of history are passed on through the generations and it is such narratives that need to be counteracted by positive stories that 'engage the self and other, and provide a narrative that is both cognitively and emotionally compelling' (Chaitin, 2003).

It is not an easy process to encourage this positive outlook in elders who have traditionally failed to consider the perspective of the 'other'. Perhaps through engagement in positive narrative and contribution to radio drama mentioned below, it may be possible to bring about constructive transformation of the dominant narrative against the 'other'.

This approach is not exclusive and can include aspects of traditional peace building programming, such as life-skills or human rights education. The difference is that family units are the focus of attention rather than the typically defined groups of women, youth, elders etc. Interventions would be complemented by using techniques such as those outlined in section 10.2.4-6 which might include story telling, bringing together elders of a number of families and promoting interactive family radio drama or visual arts.

Therefore the 'whole family approach' is put forward as central to an alternative process for peace building. It is appropriate particularly in a refugee context where there is the possibility to work more easily in a confined area where extended families live in close proximity. Having said this, the refugee camps are the size of large towns of fifty to sixty thousand persons. Through

this approach it could be possible to work with family units of different generations, through a number of means, such as community theatre, radio, family dialogues, family workshops etc.

While this approach may be more intensive and time-consuming than traditional mechanisms for peace building, when combined with the other methods mentioned below, it could provide a strategy which has not previously been utilised in development circles. Family approaches have been used in many other arenas, from 'family therapy' to 'family literacy' to encourage better communication within and between families in resolving critical issues affecting one or all family members. However despite extensive researching it has not yet been used as part of peace building programmes.

10.5.4 *Through a leadership approach*

This section is designed merely to highlight why leaders should be included at all levels in order to lessen the perceived gap between leaders and communities. The 'structural levels' identified in Chapter One and confirmed by the findings in Chapter 8.2 (cf: pp 210-213) indicate that leaders at all levels from family level to community and national levels are perceived as critical in the decision making that leads to conflict or promotes peace. The approach outlined below is not based on traditional leadership training, but recognises the role of leaders at different levels and how such a role might be utilised to positive effect.

In terms of leadership it is not only political leaders who might require training, but as in Lederach's model cited at the beginning of the thesis, there are a number of leaders at different levels of peace building strategy development (cf: Chapter 1.5 pp.28-36) who should be included. Lederach suggests that the top level consists of political, military and sometimes religious leaders and involves high-level negotiations, while the middle level leaders consist of respected heads of business, education or agriculture and utilises problem solving workshops. The grassroots leadership works within the community and might include refugee camp officials, NGO and health

workers who would work with local peace commissions (Lederach, 1997). Mediators in this approach would be a critical component in its success; ensuring that the gap between leaders at the top and the community could be bridged.

Miall et al, suggest a broader range of multi-track conflict resolution which builds further on the approach taken by Lederach. They also perceive a need for a 'complementary range of third party interventions' which should have an 'increased emphasis on the importance of indigenous resources and local actors' (Miall et al, 1999: 19). The emphasis on grassroots 'local actors' is the critical element in the approach recommended in this thesis. Many leadership programmes have focussed on leaders at the top levels of society. However, fewer national or international interventions have included leaders at grassroots level to accept and assume responsibility for peace building. As was seen in the Rwandan genocide it was the leaders at this level who implemented the orders of their national leaders.

Therefore recognition of the roles and responsibilities of leaders at all levels is essential as Miall et al suggest:

> Conflict resolution must therefore concern itself not only with the issues that divide the main parties, but also with the social, psychological and political changes that are necessary to address root causes...[to achieve this] a multi-track approach is necessary, relying on interventions by different actors at different levels...(Miall et al, 1999: 158).

What Miall et al and Lederach fail to account for is the need to bring leaders of different levels together. It is not sufficient for interventions at different levels to be conducted in tandem, but it is necessary to have a holistic approach, which a) bring leaders of different levels together in one forum and b) bring these different leaders together with members of their community – to be accountable and to negotiate peace building strategies that are realistic and achievable for all. As religious leaders are particularly trusted conduits for information transmission, their inclusion and role in peacebuilding needs to be reviewed and developed further. Similarly, positive 'role models' as 'leaders'

could also be included amongst these groups i.e. individuals such as those mentioned in 9.2.2 (cf: pp.237-240) who have transcended the boundaries of identity prejudice.

The engagements between different actors within various forms of leadership training would still involve the use of the informal educative processes already mentioned.

10.5.5 *Through media – the role of radio*

Distance Learning is not a new phenomenon in formal education circles and many projects have encouraged access to basic education through radio in many countries including those in Africa. For example in Tanzania, 'Mambo Elimu' which means 'education is everything' in Kiswahili, operates a distance learning programme on behalf of the US based Educational Development Centre (EDC) which provides basic education services for children of grades one to four using the national Tanzanian radio network.

However radio is not only a mechanism for providing formal educational services to children and adults, it is also an important feature of everyday life in Africa. Few communities do not have access to radio. Despite the fact that many policy makers remain unconvinced about the strength of popular culture and the potential for its success, the successful use of radio soap opera has been recognised particularly in the field of HIV/AIDS communication strategies (Myers, 2002; Rogers et al, 1999; Singhal et al, 2003; Vaughn et al, 2000). Radio programmes such as the long running 'Twende Na Wakati', (Let's Go with the Times) in Tanzania or Rwanda's drama serial 'Urunana' (Hand in Hand), are designed to focus on urban and rural populations by using entertainment as a means of raising awareness on HIV/AIDS and other health related issues (Myers, 2002). These types of approaches have been used less frequently in the field of peace building, although an initiative by Search for Common Ground has brought together radio stations from sub-Saharan Africa, including Radio Kwizera in Tanzania with Radio Ijambo in Burundi to

launch 'Radio for Peacebuilding Africa'[5]. This broadcasts programmes jointly in Burundi and Tanzania, which are designed to reduce tensions and facilitate reconciliation amongst Burundians (and other African countries) whether at home or in exile.

Drama in particular is a powerful medium which Myers suggests:

> ...can portray the psychological and social blocks that stand in the way of behavioural change. It can also explore emotions and motivations which conventional communication methods (such as public service announcements) cannot reach. Through realistic characters, drama can portray the different options and solutions that people can use to overcome the social, emotional, spiritual and societal barriers associated with HIV/AIDS. The best dramas are written on the basis of ongoing participatory audience research which is a continuous process of listening, recording and feeding back the reactions of ordinary listeners through focus groups (Myers, 2002).

The use of interactive drama, through radio and television, as well as through community street theatre, and perhaps at a later stage through internet, when combined with the other approaches mentioned above, could provide a potential entry point for peace that has previously been overlooked.

10.6 Conclusion

The lasting impression gained from this research is the intensity of the respondents' desire to be heard, to have their stories told, and gain access to some kind of audience. This reflects their feelings in being reduced to 'objects' in the conflict scenario: forced to flee, forced to re-organise themselves in refugee camps, and forced to obey restrictions imposed by the host countries. These people have decisions taken from them. The research provided one small, but critical, opportunity for the respondents to assert their dignity, to define themselves through their abilities to overcome adversity. For a short time, they became 'subjects', asserting their own importance.

[5] http://www.radiopeaceafrica.org/

The research underscores the need for refugees to be given the opportunity to assert their humanity through the provision of social and cultural services. These people are expected to rebuild their societies when peace returns. Their commitment to do this is either enhanced or damaged by the extent to which they are the subjects of their own destiny, not the apathetic objects of aid.

It is hoped that soon the refugees may be able to return to a future that provides them with dignity and a sense of self-worth in themselves, in their communities and in their own countries. Perhaps by reclaiming positive identities through approaches similar to those mentioned above, they might be able to rebuild their sense as individuals and as communities in ways that assert their commonality, but that recognise and accept diversity.

Annex I: Maps of Refugee Impacted Areas in Tanzania

Tanzania
Affected Populations by District
Assisted Refugees
(October 2004)



The boundaries and names shown on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations

Prepared by OCHA Regional Support Office - CEA, Nairobi

Annex II: Training Notes for interviewing skills workshop

DAY ONE

Time	*Topic*
9.00-9.15	*Introduction: just go around and introduce, say who you are and what you do.*
9.15-9.20	*Giving out folders and review of the programme*
9.20- 9.40	*Why am I here? Overview of my research* *Questions? Clarifications?*
9.40-10.00	*Conflict web. Brainstorm on what we mean by conflict* *What are your views on resolving the conflict in Burundi?*
10.00-10.20 (10 mins each)	*In pairs ask each other to recount a story/experience regarding conflict, this can be here in the camp, in your home, or in your own country*
10.20-10.30	*Is there anyone who would like to tell their story to the whole group?*
10.30-10.45	***TEA***
10.45-11.15	*Review of research brief and understanding it. Clarifications of meanings etc.*
11.15-12.00	*In pairs discuss the brief and the topics and in your own words try and summarise what you think the research might achieve? Do you think it is worthwhile?*
12.00-12.30	*Plenary*
12.30-13.30	***LUNCH***
13.30-13.45	*SRA over view on flip chart. What are in depth interviews?*
13.45-14.00	*Look and read the notes on key characteristics of interviews (Pages 1-4 SRA notes)*
14.00-14.15	*Questions and clarifications*
14.15-14.30	*Focus Group Discussions what are they? Flip chart*
14.30-14.45	*In three groups discuss any other important features of FGDs*
14.45-15.00	*Plenary*
15.00-15.15	***TEA***
15.15-15.20	*SRA Questioning techniques. Look at the paper on questioning*
15.20-15.25	*Exercise on opening closed questions. Brainstorm for examples of each*
15.25-15.35	*SRA practice session. In pairs, 1 person listening but not responding verbally (5 mins) and then swap, this time respond verbally*
15.35-15.45	*Plenary on the exercise. How did it feel? What was the difference between the non-verbal and verbal responses*
15.45-16.30	*Planning for the next two days. Identification of respondents for Day three. 5 teachers (for AM 9.00), 1 gp. Children Std 2, 1 gp. Std 6; 3 health/CS workers (PM 14.00)*

DAY TWO

Time	***Topic***
8.30-8.35	*Ask for two refugee volunteers to participate in the demo. interviews. Others are to take notes for comment afterward*
8.35-8.45	*First demo. Asking only closed questions. 10 mins*
8.45-9.00	*Second demo. Open questions 15 mins*
9.00-9.30	*Plenary session. What was good/bad about each demo?*
9.30-10.15	*Practice session. Design your own demo interview, with an introduction, a few questions, and a conclusion. What do you have to remember in the introduction and conclusion?*
10.15-10.30	*Plenary: what worked?*
10.30-10.45	***TEA***
10.45-11.00	*Topic guides: Flip chart. Overview of what is a topic guide and how to design one.*
11.00-11.15	*Look at the dentist Topic Guide and compare with the FGD questions (hand out FGD questions) Plenary*
11.15-11.45	*Working with children. What are the issues? How to conduct FGDs with children*
11.45-12.30	*In three groups redesign the FGDs into a topic guide using the research brief also as a guide. One group focus on individual interviews, one on FGDs for children and the other on FGDs for adults*
12.30-13.30	***LUNCH***
13.30-14.00	*In pairs practice interviewing each other using the topic guides*
14.00-14.30	*Plenary. How did the Topic guides stand up to the interviews? Were they useful? Did you manage to ask some other questions not just those on the guide?*
14.30-15.00	*Revise the Topic Guides according to our experience as a brainstorming session*
15.00-15.15	***TEA***
15.15-16.00	*FGD practice session. Using the new TGs for FGD, in two groups practice conducting an FGD, one as though you were children, and the other as adults*
16.00-16.20	*Plenary*
16.20-16.30	*Preparation for the next day. Spaces for interviews. What to remember about making interviewee feel comfortable, introductions, confidentiality etc.*
	Use of the recorder

DAY THREE

Time	*Topic*
8.30-9.00	*Inform caterers to prepare tea for extra 5 people*
	Preparation for interviews-everyone should have their notebooks and pens. In pairs decide which one will be interviewing and which one will take notes. You can also swap over during the course of the interviews. At the end of the interview (this may take one hour, but you decide the timing according to the interest of the respondent) review your notes with your partner and make a summary of the interview. At the end the interviewee is to get a soda/tea and mendazi at the tea break
	Give the 2 pairs the recorders and recorder stands and a quick repeat of the training. I shall sit in on one interview
9.00-10.30	*In pairs conduct the interviews at Sheraton with the identified teachers*
10.30-10.45	***TEA***
10.45-11.30	*Feedback from the interviews, comments, any changes in the way you conducted the questions? Types of questions? Any interesting outcomes?*
11.30-12.30	*Revision of topic guide for adults- small groups and plenary session.*
12.30-13.30	***LUNCH***
13.30-14.00	*Preparation for interviews. Hand out topic guides for FGDs one for adults and one for children. If only one of was the main interviewer in the morning swap over so that each of you has a chance to conduct an interview*
14.00-15.00	*Conduct interviews, two groups of children, 3 CS/health workers. I will sit in on one of the groups of children. Two interviews recorded.*
15.00-15.15	***TEA***
15.15-15.30	*In your pairs make a summary of the interview*
15.30-16.00	*Plenary session. Interesting outcomes*
16.00-16.30	*COMMENTS anyone who would like to comment on the research etc. for informal chat otherwise close*

Annex III: Example of a topic guide

TOPIC GUIDE FOR FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSION ADULT

1. **Introduction and greetings**

- Introduction of interviewer
- Introduction of respondents
- Brief purpose of the study and expected procedure of the interview
- Confidentiality and recording

Once the tape recorder is switched on, respondents should each identify themselves to the tape. They do not have to give their real name. The interviewer must write note the social group from which each respondent has come, their sex and the approximate age.

2. **Background**

- Life in the refugee camp
- Compared to life in their country

3. **General information about leaving their country and arriving in Tanzania**

- Can they describe how they came to the camp from their country
- Were there specific incidents that caused them to flee

4. **Groups of people in society and their relation to information**

- Description of different groups of people within the society. If necessary give respondents examples of groups such as religious leaders, traders, professional/working people etc.
  Probe: which of these groups is most powerful
  which have no voice
  are the groups the same in the camp as in their country? Describe the differences
- **IN THE GROUP** ask respondents to draw a social map where information is at the centre of the circle representing the camp, and ask them to place the different groups in or outside the circle depending on their 'small or big voice') i.e. their ability to access information about the war and to pass that information on to others. Help them by giving a small example. Once they have drawn the map ask them to identify who are the mediators/middle people who help the marginalised to get access to the information, or who are used by the powerful people to give information. Are these mediators trustworthy or can they change or misinterpret the information? Who out of the mediators are most trusted? Would the social map be the same for society in their country? Draw the differences.

NB If necessary use objects such as stones, beans etc to represent people from different groups e.g. a bean represents a journalist, a stone a leader, how close is the bean to the centre of the circle?

- Difference between information sources in the camps and back home in their country. Are they the same? Describe the differences and why they might be different
- From these groups on the social map who do they believe most to give them the most accurate information about the conflict
  Probe: why
- Ask about the role of different forms of education/teaching (e.g. school/university, parental teaching, religious teaching, media etc.) in giving information about the conflict
  Probe: which form of teaching is most effective in passing on truthful information?
  Which is most trusted?
- Ask them to describe what they know of the role of politicians in the conflict and the peace process.
  Probe: Do they have a chance to speak to politicians at any time?

5. <u>Possible solutions to the conflict</u>

- Any suggestions from them as to how the conflict might be solved in their country
- What action is needed within the community to promote peace

6. <u>Questions from the respondents</u>

- Any further comments or questions
- Reminder of confidentiality, purpose of the study what will happen to the info.

Annex IV: Example of questionnaire distributed to all groups (English version)

QUESTIONNAIRE

Thank you for answering this questionnaire. Your answers are confidential.

Age: Sex: Education: Primary ☐ Secondary ☐ ☐
University

1. Where did you live before you fled to Tanzania?
   Country.....
   Province.....

2. Please describe what happened to make you flee from your own country
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

3. **Before** the war started how did you hear that there might be a war (tick YES **or** NO in the box next to the question. You can tick more than one)

	YES	NO
A) A relative Please say what relation to you (e.g. brother, mother).....	☐	☐
B) A friend	☐	☐
C) A leader Please state what kind of leader (Ten Cell, Prefecture etc.)	☐	☐
D) On the radio Please say which radio programme/s).....	☐	☐
E) From an education institution Please tick which one .... Primary School ☐ Secondary School ☐	☐	☐

College ☐
University

4. If you witnessed the conflict directly, please describe what happened.
.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

5. Which groups were most involved in the conflict and why?
.....
.....
.....
.....

6. While you were still in your country and the war was going on, who gave you the most reliable information about what was happening?
.....
.....
.....
.....

7. After you arrived in the refugee camp from who/where did you get the most reliable information about the conflict still happening in your country?
.....
.....
.....

8. If there was more than one person/group please name them all.
.....
.....
.....

		YES	NO
9.	Did you check the information that you received?	☐	☐

10. How?.....

Would you be willing to talk more about your experience in the war?

	YES	NO
☐	☐	☐

Annex V: Example of individual topic guide with adults

1. **Introduction and greetings**
   - Introduction of interviewer
   - Introduction of respondents
   - Brief purpose of the study and expected procedure of the interview
   - Confidentiality and recording

Once the tape recorder is switched on, the respondent should each identify him/herself to the tape. They do not have to give their real name. The interviewer must write note the social group from which the respondent has come, their sex and the approximate age.

2. **Background**
   - Life in the refugee camp
   - Compared to life in your country

3. **General information about leaving your country and arriving in Tanzania**
   - Can they describe how they came to Tanzania from their country
   - Were there specific incidents that caused them to flee

4. **Experiences of conflict in their country**
   - What do they know about the conflict in their country
   - Where did that knowledge come from
   - What have they suffered as a result of the war

5. **Learning about conflict**
   - Before they fled what things had they heard about the preparation/planning for the conflict
     Probe: How
     who from
   - What methods do they find out about the ongoing conflict now they are in the camp
     Probe: Who
     How
     influence of radio/other media?
   - Are there any other methods of communication that they think are more effective to pass on information e.g. radio, rumour, word of mouth, gatherings/meetings, posters etc. **NB** Only give a few examples if necessary as a prompt
     Probe: Why
   - When they get information from different sources, whose information do they trust most? Who do they trust?
     Probe: Why

what makes these people trustworthy?

- Ask them to talk about some of the rumours they have heard about the conflict

Probe: How do these rumours get circulated
which ones do they believe and why

7. Groups of people in society and their relation to information

- Description of different groups of people within the society. If necessary give the respondent examples of groups such as religious leaders, traders, professional/working people etc.

Probe: which of these groups is most powerful
which have no voice,
are the groups the same in the camp as in their country?
Describe the differences

- Find out how the small voices get information to and from people who are most powerful. Are there middle people who pass on the information to grassroots people? Who are they?

Probe: Are these people different in their country to those in the camp

- From the groups they mentioned above who do they believe most to give them the most accurate information about the conflict

Probe: why

- Ask about the role of different forms of education/teaching (e.g. school/university, parental teaching, religious teaching, media etc.) in giving information about the conflict

Probe: which form of teaching is most effective in passing on truthful information?
Which is most trusted?

- Ask them to describe the role of politicians in the conflict and the peace process.
- Do they trust politicians?

8. Possible solutions to the conflict

- Any suggestions from them as to how the conflict might be solved in their country
- What action is needed within the community to promote peace

9. Questions from the respondent

- Any further comments or questions
- Reminder of confidentiality, purpose of the study what will happen to the info.

Annex VI: Example of Analysis Matrix

CAMP A TRAINING

MATRIX MTI 1

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

NO.	Group	What are the different mechanisms used MTI 1.1 cf: MTI 3.1	Who are the most trusted transmitters MTI 1.2	What is seen as truthful/believed and why MTI 1.3
MTI 1 Coding	Teacher male-summary Interview male	**From neighbours, other students and head teacher via word of mouth. Radio, leaders telling people individually**	**New refugees coming from Burundi were seen as reliable sources of info. In the camp**	**N/A**
MTI 2 Coding	Teacher male 2 male 2	**Oral transmission, from father to son 'when I get a child I will tell him the story'. From peers. Radio and newspapers cf: MTI 5.1**	**Tutsi neighbours/friends who 'tell you what is being planned' who says 'friend there hasn't been any conflict between us until now, I pray, go away. We have prepared a massacre here.' This kind of information is most trusted. It then goes round by word of mouth, 'from friend to friend'. Written information is less trusted because it 'can be leaked'. Only certain radio stations and newspapers are trusted – those seen as unbiased e.g. Isanganiro, BBC.**	**Doesn't automatically believe or trust everything. 'The Burundi tell lies' in case they are implicated. He analyses information first from past knowledge or experience. 'The truth of information depends on how you get it'.**
MTI 3 Coding	Teacher female female	**Heard from the radio on the day of assassination. No information of conflict before that. From other people who listened to radio when she had no access. Internet, letters**	**Letters to those living back at home they 'tell you how the situation in our country is'. Certain radio stations are trusted e.g. Isanganiro, Radio Free Africa,**	**'Those who tell the truth are those who have been pushed out' i.e. Hutus. Sees her own ethnic group as telling the truth**
MTI 4 Coding	Child interview Child Interview	**When in Rwanda through businessmen who had travelled to Burundi. While in Burundi seeing things with her own eyes, other information through school, radio.**	**N/A**	**Again she sees her own ethnic group as most truthful**

Annex VII: Example of Matrix analysis from Camp B

FOCUS GROUP DISCUSSIONS

CAMP B

MATRIX 1 NMF

INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

No.	GROUP	What are the different mechanisms used-how did people learn NMF 1.1 cf: NMF 2.1	Who are seen as closest to the information and why? NMF 1.2	Who are the trusted transmitters or most truthful/believed and why NMF 1.3
NMF 1 Coding	CBOs FGD CBOs	**They seemed to learn about the war initially by accident. They couldn't believe it at first. A lot of rumours circulating about different acts of violence, and of things happening, but no accounts of actual witnessing of killing or violence first hand. People passed on information through family and friends. If they got news of something then it would be passed on informally. 'The way the information circulates among refugees is informal. Therefore there is nobody responsible for news.'**	**Women were seen as close to information sources because men possessed the information, therefore women would find out first either as a wife, girlfriend or prostitute 'politicians use prostitutes to get inside information of their opponents; they even use to harm their political enemies.' The question is in this case is possessing the information enough? Politicians closest in the sense that they create the information, they might pass this on to other influential people. Religious leaders also seen as being close to information 'Religious leaders are also get first hand information by virtue of their being close to all works of life. They easily mingle with all their followers irrespective of their social classes.'**	**Leaders are not trusted as they are seen to have their own interests at heart. 'They all consider Congo's politics and leadership like their profit making project.' One respondent though said that information that came from politicians could be trusted because 'they are in the kitchen.'**
NMF2	Leaders/commercial Group COMBINED LEADERS +	**They heard rumours from the radio that war was imminent. They suggest that the US was involved form the start. Two respondents were told by Banyamulenge friends who had been told to kill non-Banyarwandans. 'My husband was approached one day by**	**Politicians are the first because they create the news, then journalists who follow them and then listeners who get information after that.**	**N/A General paranoia about US and Rwanda, and that there is a conspiracy to poison them even while they are in the camp. They don't seem to trust anybody**

	COMMERCIAL GROUP	**his friend Onesphore, a Munyamulenge, to warn him on an imminent war. He said that he was told to kill his best friend who was none else than my husband. So he decided to inform my husband that secret so that we get out of the area before it is too late.' Another respondent got news from a tract that was being spread around.**		
NM F3	? not sure ?? Interviewer: Sela	**In the camp, information is controlled by UNHCR and then camp leaders pass it on from there. Church leaders also make relevant things known to their congregations.**	**Educated people because they hear the information first and pass it on to others. Also leaders and traditional kings**	**N/A**
NM F4	Teachers TEACHERS	**Rumour – 'As said earlier, during the last days of MOBUTU's era, the government was no more. Rumours were plenty on activities of Banyarwanda that could endanger the security of the land but nothing was done,'**	**Politicians, Intellectuals who then pass the information on to the people. Religious leaders, Traditional Kings, politicians 'Intellectual people who are sought by politicians in order to gain their support and spread their ideas among the learned ones who in turn will descend to the community in general.'**	**N/A**
NM F5	Civil society CIVIL SOCIETY	**"Radio Canal Afrique" of South Africa. I believe that the channel was owned or managed by the rebels. Relatives who lived in the Plain of Ruzizi used to tell us that troops from Rwanda were entering daily in the Congo with a lot of ammunitions.' Hearing of various killings and that government was 'doing nothing' to protect them. Then hearing of the 'slain priests of Uvira' they realised war had truly started. Witnessing: a few accounts of actual witnessing of killings in this group (cf: NTMF 4.1) Politicians, tell**	**Politicians are the most aware when something is about to happen. They are the ones 'cooking politics' so they know. Church leaders also very important, and some were directly involved. NGOs because they have connections with the masses. Traders: because of their wealth end up occupying good positions in their respective community. Therefore politicians approach them to get their support and financial assistance;**	**'The youth are very instrumental because politicians need them to attain their objectives. This is the cradle of activists.' Traditional Kings who are seen as 'people's representatives and custodians.'**

		traditional kings who tell 'husbands' women are left out until they are told by their husbands, and children are last to know,		
NM F6	Family FAMILY	**Journalists. Market place, through gossip and rumour. In the camp, the camp leaders inform people what is happening at all levels. Church leaders 'are sought' for their information. Email also a new way of getting information. Also people who travel between the camp and DRC. In the camp getting information is particularly important. 'It is quite different. As refugees we need information as we need food, it is a part of our life taking into account that people who were informed in time about the war and who acted accordingly have saved their lives. Therefore information is life. In the Congo we were busy struggling to earn our living, how to get money, buy this or that for the family and so forth. But now the experience has taught us to information is a necessity.' 'How does the information circulate in the Congo? Sources: Leaders at all levels, Radios, Church/Religious leaders, Traditional Kings/Chiefs.'**	**'The information we get here is more often than not inaccurate; it is amplified or distorted so we have to be careful or skeptic.'** **'Between the source of the information and consumers there are mediators: UNHCR and NGOs' workers and those who are close to them constitute the main source: Camp leaders, travelers, radios, and people known as "journalists" in the camp.'** **Those 'out' of the circle seen as the old, people with disabilities, uneducated women, children and 'the don't care'.**	**Elected leaders: camp leaders, class leaders etc; Organizations working in the camp Traditional Kings/Chiefs Church and other Religious leaders School leaders**

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